VIRGINIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

DEFENDING VIRGINIA TELEPHONE THREAT CASES & VIRGINIA CURSE & ABUSE CHARGES 

In Virginia, any person who uses threatening or profane language over the public airways including telephones, radios, CBs can be charged with a criminal act. Also, any person who uses curse words to another that is reasonably likely to provoke an act of violence can be charged with a crime. These are serious offenses that carry life changing consequences. The Virginia law offices of SRIS, P.C. have a number of excellent Virginia telephone threat defense attorneys and curse and abuse defense lawyers in its offices in Fairfax, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond, and Virginia Beach, Virginia. For more information or to make an appointment with SRIS, P.C., please call, send an e-mail or complete the on-line form.

To obtain a general overview of telephone threat & curse & abuse defense, please click here.

To learn more about the laws pertaining to telephone threat & curse & abuse defense in Maryland or Massachusetts, please click on the state.

The following are some of the different curse & abuse and telephone threat charges in the Commonwealth of Virginia:

VA Code § 18.2-416. Punishment for using abusive language to another

If any person shall, in the presence or hearing of another, curse or abuse such other person, or use any violent abusive language to such person concerning himself or any of his relations, or otherwise use such language, under circumstances reasonably calculated to provoke a breach of the peace, he shall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.

§ 18.2-427. Use of profane, threatening or indecent language over public airways

If any person shall use obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious, or indecent language, or make any suggestion or proposal of an obscene nature, or threaten any illegal or immoral act with the intent to coerce, intimidate, or harass any person, over any telephone or citizens band radio, in this Commonwealth, he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.

§ 18.2-429. Causing telephone to ring with intent to annoy

Any person who, with or without intent to communicate but with intent to annoy any other person, causes any telephone or digital pager, not his own, to ring or to otherwise signal, and any person who permits or condones the use of any telephone under his control for such purpose shall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.

Any person who, with or without intent to converse, but with intent to annoy, harass, hinder or delay emergency personnel in the performance of their duties as such, causes a telephone to ring, which is owned or leased for the purpose of receiving emergency calls by a public or private entity providing fire, police or emergency medical service, and any person who knowingly permits the use of a telephone under his control for such purpose, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.

The Virginia attorneys and Law Offices of SRIS, P.C., is located in Fairfax, Manassas, Richmond and Virginia Beach but our sphere of activity is statewide. Our Virginia Telephone Threat defense lawyers and Curse & Abuse attorneys and staff speak various languages, including English, Tamil, Spanish, French, Hindi, Cantonese, Mandarin, and Telugu.

For more information or to make an appointment with SRIS, P.C., please call, send an e-mail or complete the on-line form.

In this case, the court ruled that it is up to the trier of fact to determine whether the person who received the alleged threat believed a threat was indeed made.

Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Matthew Dean WYATT,
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
No. 0554-97-3.
March 24, 1998.

"Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after conviction, it is our duty to consider it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). So viewed, the evidence proved that on August 8, 1996, Wyatt placed several telephone calls to the residence of James Allen Mills, Jr. Mills had known Wyatt for about six months and recognized Wyatt's voice from many conversations with Wyatt both in person and over the telephone. Mills was acquainted with Wyatt because Wyatt had dated Mills' daughter. Mills disapproved of Wyatt dating his daughter, and, on a prior occasion, when Wyatt and Mills' daughter were living together, Mills had tried to get them to separate.

Mills answered four or five of Wyatt's telephone calls. During each of the calls, Wyatt asked to speak with Mills' daughter. Each time, Mills refused to allow Wyatt to talk to his daughter. During Wyatt's last telephone call to the Mills' residence, Wyatt told Mills that he would "just have to come down there and whip your fat ass and burn your house down." After Wyatt hung up the telephone, Mills immediately dialed a telephone code to determine the location from which Wyatt was calling. However, because the call came from out of state, the telephone service could not provide the telephone number. Four days later, Mills sought a warrant for Wyatt's arrest.

The trial judge found that Wyatt made a threat to burn Mills' residence as proscribed by the statute and convicted Wyatt.

II.

In pertinent part, Code § 18.2-83 states that "[a]ny person ... who makes and communicates to another by any means any threat to bomb, burn, destroy or in any manner damage any place of assembly, building or other structure, or any means of transportation ... shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony." Noting that the language of the statute "is not vague," this Court has ruled that "[a] threat, in the criminal context, is recognized to be a communication avowing an intent to injure another's person or property." Perkins v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 7, 16, 402 S.E.2d 229, 234 (1991).

Code § 18.2-83 does not require the Commonwealth to prove that Wyatt intended to carry out his threat to burn Mills' house. Proof that the threat was made and communicated satisfies the statutory requirements. See Parnell v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 342, 346, 423 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1992). However, this Court has construed the statute to require proof that the threat to burn was malicious and "reasonably cause[d] the receiver to believe that the speaker will act according to his expression of intent." Perkins, 12 Va.App. at 15-16, 402 S.E.2d at 234.

*2 The evidence proved that Wyatt and Mills had an antagonistic relationship stemming from Wyatt's contact with Mills' daughter. Mills' refusal to allow Wyatt to talk to Mills' daughter angered Wyatt. When Wyatt threatened to burn Mills' home, Wyatt also expressed hostility toward Mills by threatening to assault Mills. This evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wyatt's threat to burn Mills' house was maliciously made. "Malice inheres in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will ... [, and i]t may be directly evidenced by words." Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 61, 41 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1947).

Wyatt argues that Mills' delay in seeking a warrant proves Mills was unconcerned about the threat. We disagree. Whether Mills reasonably believed that Wyatt intended to burn Mills' home was a question of fact for the trial judge. See Bennett v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 228, 233, 380 S.E.2d 17, 20 (1989). The evidence in the record supports the finding that Mills' belief was reasonable.

The evidence proved that Mills did take the threat seriously. Unlike several prior telephone conversations of that day, Mills attempted to locate Wyatt after the threat was made. Wyatt's threat to assault Mills, the animus between the men, and Mills' attempt to locate the place from which Wyatt called are sufficient to prove that Mills' belief was reasonable and that Mills was concerned about the threat.

Furthermore, Mills' delay in obtaining the warrant was a matter going toward Mills' credibility, an issue for the trier of fact. See Love v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 84, 90, 441 S.E.2d 709, 713 (1994). Mills' delay of four days to obtain a warrant is not conduct that necessarily evidenced that Mills did not believe Wyatt would act on the statement.

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wyatt's conduct was in violation of Code § 18.2-83.

Affirmed.

Va.App.,1998.

In this case, the defendant was given a suspended sentence for crimes he had previously committed. He was accused of violating the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence for making threatening telephone calls. The Court after viewing the actions of the defendant determined he had in fact violated the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence and convicted him.

Court of Appeals of Virginia.
David Martin WOODRUFF
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 1958-94-3.
Feb. 13, 1996.

1 David Martin Woodruff (appellant) was adjudged, in a bench trial, of having violated the conditions of a suspended sentence. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of threats made against individuals other than those named in the order suspending his sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.

On April 28, 1994, appellant pled guilty to four counts of destruction of property, two counts of making threatening telephone calls, and one count of making a false report of a crime to a law enforcement officer. The trial court sentenced him to forty-eight months in jail, suspending forty-two months conditioned on good behavior and on appellant having no contact with Teri Borkowski (Borkowski), Kyle Mohr (Mohr), Nicole Swann, and Lorie Ann Shelley (the victims of his crimes).

On May 9, 1994, the court issued a show cause summons for appellant to appear and show cause why his suspended sentence should not be reinstated. Before the show cause hearing, appellant filed notice of his intent to rely on an incompetency defense. At the show cause hearing on September 7, 1994, Borkowski testified that, on May 3, 1994, she received messages from appellant on her answering machine. The messages threatened Borkowski and Mohr, and a recording indicated that the calls originated from the Montgomery County Jail. Mohr testified that he received similar messages on his answering machine. Joe Francis testified that appellant gave him the telephone numbers of Borkowski and Mohr, and told him to call them and make threats.

The Commonwealth called Montgomery County Deputy Daniel Levesque (Levesque) to testify that appellant made threatening remarks regarding Borkowski, the Commonwealth's Attorney, and the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney. Appellant objected, arguing that any threats against the Commonwealth's Attorney and the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney were irrelevant to the conditions of his suspended sentences. FN1 The Commonwealth argued that the threats were admissible to counter appellant's mitigation evidence. The trial court ruled that Levesque could testify that appellant made threats against persons other than Borkowski or Mohr, but that he could not identify the objects of those threats . Appellant made no further objection.
FN1. On appeal, appellant also argues that Levesque's testimony was inadmissible evidence of other bad acts and that the Commonwealth was required to provide advance disclosure of its intent to present such evidence. These specific arguments were not raised before the trial court and are barred by Rule 5A:18.
Appellant denied making any threatening calls or asking Francis to do so. The trial court found that appellant had violated the conditions of his suspended sentence. The court allowed appellant to present the testimony of a psychologist and his father as mitigation evidence, but imposed the suspended forty-two month sentence.

"Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to establish a fact at issue in the case." Ragland v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 913, 918, 434 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1993). Evidence of appellant's threatening remarks was clearly relevant to prove whether he had violated the good behavior requirement of his suspended sentence. Additionally, "hearsay evidence, which would normally be inadmissible in a criminal trial, may be admitted into evidence in a revocation hearing based on the court's discretion." Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 81, 84, 402 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1991). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Levesque to testify that appellant made threats against persons other than Borkowski and Mohr.

*2 Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Va.App.,1996.

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