VIRGINIA SPEEDING TICKET DEFENSE LAWYERS

Contact us today if you have been given a speeding ticket in Virginia

One of the most commonly charged traffic offenses in Virginia is speeding. There are many different types of speeding tickets in Virginia. A conviction for a speeding ticket offense will result in a fine, points on your license and your insurance rate possibly going up. Speeding ticket offenses in Virginia can be charged as one of the following based on the speed:

1-9 mph over the posted speed limit in Virginia – 3 point DMV violation in Virginia
10-19 mph over the posted speed limit in Virginia – 4 point DMV violation in Virginia
20 or more mph over the posted speed limit in Virginia – 6 point DMV violation in Virginia

Note: Speeding in excess of 20 miles over the speed limit can also be charged as reckless driving in Virginia.

If you have been charged with speeding in Virginia, please contact us for assistance. We have two offices in Northern Virginia and four offices in the major metropolitan areas of Virginia to better defend you against traffic ticket violations.

• Northern Virginia Offices are in Fairfax & Manassas – 703-278-0405
• Central Virginia- 804-201-9009
• Hampton Roads/Tidewater Area – 757-512-5002
• Western Virginia – 888-437-7747

You can also email us or contact us on line.

The following are some of the statutes regarding speeding in Virginia:

• Maximum speed limits generally in Virginia
• Low-speed vehicles; operation on highways in Virginia; license required; registration required; safety and emissions inspections not required
• Minimum speed limits in Virginia
• Maximum speed limit in business and residence districts of Virginia
• Maximum speed limits in certain residence districts of counties, cities, and towns of Virginia; penalty
• No conviction for speeding in certain areas unless markers installed in Virginia
• Driving too fast for highway and traffic conditions in Virginia
• Maximum speed limits at school crossings in Virginia; penalty

VA Traffic Code § 46.2-870. Maximum speed limits generally in Virginia (top)

Except as otherwise provided in this article, the maximum speed limit shall be 55 miles per hour on interstate highways or other limited access highways with divided roadways, nonlimited access highways having four or more lanes, and all state primary highways.

The maximum speed limit on all other highways shall be 55 miles per hour if the vehicle is a passenger motor vehicle, bus, pickup or panel truck, or a motorcycle, but 45 miles per hour on such highways if the vehicle is a truck, tractor truck, or combination of vehicles designed to transport property, or is a motor vehicle being used to tow a vehicle designed for self-propulsion, or a house trailer.

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the maximum speed limit shall be 65 miles per hour where indicated by lawfully placed signs, erected subsequent to a traffic engineering study, on: (i) interstate highways, (ii) multilane, divided, limited access highways, and (iii) high-occupancy vehicle lanes if such lanes are physically separated from regular travel lanes. The maximum speed limit on Interstate Route 85 shall be 70 miles per hour where indicated by lawfully placed signs, erected subsequent to a traffic engineering study. The maximum speed limit shall be 60 miles per hour where indicated by lawfully placed signs, erected subsequent to a traffic engineering study, on U.S. Route 29, U.S. Route 58, U.S. Route 360, U.S. Route 460, and on U.S. Route 17 between the town of Port Royal and Saluda where they are nonlimited access, multilane, divided highways.

VA Traffic Code § 46.2-908.3. Low-speed vehicles; operation on highways in Virginia; license required; registration required; safety and emissions inspections not required (top)

Low-speed vehicles in Virginia may be operated on public highways where the maximum speed limit is no greater than thirty-five miles per hour, but this limitation shall not prohibit the operation of low-speed vehicles across intersections with highways whose maximum speed limits are greater than thirty-five miles per hour. Operation of low-speed vehicles shall be prohibited on any highway where the Department of Transportation or the local governing body of the locality having control of the highway, as the case may be, has prohibited their operation in the interest of safety and such prohibition is indicated by conspicuously posted signs.

Low-speed vehicles shall be operated on public highways only by persons who hold driver’s licenses or learner’s permits issued as provided in Chapter 3 (§ 46.2-300 et seq.) of this title.

Low-speed vehicles shall be titled and registered as provided in Chapter 6 (§ 46.2-600 et seq.) of this title and shall be subject to the same requirements as to insurance applicable to other motor vehicles under that chapter.

The operator of any low-speed vehicle being operated on the highways in the Commonwealth shall have in his possession: (i) the registration card issued by the Department or the registration card issued by the state or country in which the low-speed vehicle is registered, and (ii) his driver’s license, learner’s permit, or temporary driver’s permit.

VA Traffic Code § 46.2-877. Minimum speed limits in Virginia (top)

No person in Virginia shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.

Whenever the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner or local authorities within their respective jurisdictions determine on the basis of a traffic engineering and traffic investigation that slow speeds on any part of a highway consistently impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, the Commissioner or such local authority may determine and declare a minimum speed limit to be set forth on signs posted on such highway below which no person shall drive a vehicle except when necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.

VA Traffic Code § 46.2-874. Maximum speed limit in business and residence districts of Virginia (top)

The maximum speed shall be 25 miles per hour on highways in business or residence districts, except on interstate or other limited access highways with divided roadways or nonlimited access highways having four or more lanes and all state primary highways. The speed limit on all nonlimited access highways having four or more lanes and all state primary highways shall remain as indicated by signs posted prior to July 1, 2005, unless changed as provided by law.

VA Traffic Code § 46.2-878.2. Maximum speed limits in certain residence districts of counties, cities, and towns of Virginia; penalty (top)

Operation of any motor vehicle in Virginia in excess of a maximum speed limit established for a highway in a residence district of a county, city, or town, when indicated by appropriately placed signs displaying the maximum speed limit and the penalty for violations, shall be unlawful and constitute a traffic infraction punishable by a fine of $200, in addition to other penalties provided by law. No portion of the fine shall be suspended unless the court orders 20 hours of community service. The Commonwealth Transportation Board or any local governing body having jurisdiction over highways shall develop criteria for the overall applicability for the installation of signs. Such criteria shall not exclude highways, functionally classified as minor arterials, serving areas that either (i) were built as residential developments or (ii) have grown to resemble residential developments, provided, in either case, (i) such highways are experiencing documented speeding problems and (ii) the local governing body requests the application of this section to such highway. Such signs may be installed in any town and shall not require the approval of the county within which such town is located. Any such signs installed in any town shall be paid for by the town requesting the installation of the signs, or out of the county’s secondary system construction allocation.

VA Traffic Code § 46.2-879. No conviction for speeding in certain areas unless markers installed in Virginia (top)

No person in Virginia shall be convicted of a violation of a statute or an ordinance enacted by local authorities pursuant to the provisions of § 46.2-1300 decreasing the speed limit established in this article when such person has exceeded the speed limit in an area where the speed limit has been decreased unless such area is clearly indicated by a conspicuous marker at the termini of such area.

VA Traffic Code § 46.2-861. Driving too fast for highway and traffic conditions in Virginia (top)

A person shall be guilty of reckless driving in Virginia who exceeds a reasonable speed under the circumstances and traffic conditions existing at the time, regardless of any posted speed limit.

VA Traffic Code § 46.2-873. Maximum speed limits at school crossings in Virginia; penalty (top)

A. The maximum speed limit shall be twenty-five miles per hour between portable signs, tilt-over signs, or fixed blinking signs placed in or along any highway and bearing the word “school” or “school crossing.” Any signs erected under this section shall be placed not more than 600 feet from the limits of the school property or crossing in the vicinity of the school. However, “school crossing” signs may be placed in any location if the Department of Transportation or the council of the city or town or the board of supervisors of a county maintaining its own system of secondary roads approves the crossing for such signs. If the portion of the highway to be posted is within the limits of a city or town, such portable signs shall be furnished and delivered by such city or town. If the portion of highway to be posted is outside the limits of a city or town, such portable signs shall be furnished and delivered by the Department of Transportation. The principal or chief administrative officer of each school or a school board designee, preferably not a classroom teacher, shall place such portable signs in the highway at a point not more than 600 feet from the limits of the school property and remove such signs when their presence is no longer required by this section. Such portable signs, tilt-over signs, or fixed blinking signs shall be placed in a position plainly visible to vehicular traffic approaching from either direction, but shall not be placed so as to obstruct the roadway.

B. Such portable signs, tilt-over signs, or blinking signs shall be in a position, or be turned on, for thirty minutes preceding regular school hours, for thirty minutes thereafter, and during such other times as the presence of children on such school property or going to and from school reasonably requires a special warning to motorists. The governing body of any county, city, or town may, however, decrease the period of time preceding and following regular school hours during which such portable signs, tilt-over signs, or blinking signs shall be in position or lit if it determines that no children will be going to or from school during the period of time that it subtracts from the thirty-minute period.

C. The governing body of any city or town may, if the portion of the highway to be posted is within the limits of such city or town, increase or decrease the speed limit provided in this section only after justification for such increase or decrease has been shown by an engineering and traffic investigation, and no such increase or decrease in speed limit shall be effective unless such increased or decreased speed limit is conspicuously posted on the portable signs, tilt-over signs, or fixed blinking signs required by this section.

D. Any city having a population of 390,000 or more may establish school zones as provided in this section and mark such zones with flashing warning lights as provided in this section on and along all highways adjacent to Route 58.

E. Any person operating any motor vehicle in excess of a maximum speed limit established specifically for a school crossing zone, when such school crossing zone is (i) indicated by appropriately placed signs displaying the maximum speed limit and (ii) in operation pursuant to subsection B of this section shall be guilty of a traffic infraction punishable by a fine of not more than $250, in addition to other penalties provided by law.

For the purposes of this section, “school crossing zone” means an area located within the vicinity of a school at or near a highway where the presence of children on such school property or going to and from school reasonably requires a special warning to motorists. Such zones are marked and operated in accordance with the requirements of this section with appropriate warning signs or other traffic control devices indicating that a school crossing is in progress.

F. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the maximum speed limit in school zones in residential areas may be decreased to fifteen miles per hour if (i) the school board having jurisdiction over the school nearest to the affected school zone passes a resolution requesting the reduction of the maximum speed limit for such school zone from twenty-five miles per hour to fifteen miles per hour and (ii) the local governing body of the jurisdiction in which such school is located enacts an ordinance establishing the speed-limit reduction requested by the school board.

If you need assistance you can also call us toll free at 888-437-7747.

Frequently, our clients tell us that they did not intend to speed. Unfortunately in Virginia, speeding is a strict liability crime. Intent is not an element the prosecutor has prove to convict a person for speeding.

5 Va.App. 514, 365 S.E.2d 340
Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Billy Dean WILLIAMS
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
Record No. 0974-86-3.
Feb. 16, 1988.

Appellant, Billy Dean Williams, was convicted in a jury trial of speeding in violation of Code § 46.1-193 and fined twenty-five **341 dollars. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether his conviction was invalid because he was tried under a nonexistent code subsection; (2) whether the jury was improperly instructed upon the effect of calibration evidence in determining guilt or innocence and punishment for speeding in accordance with Code § 46.1-193.1; and (3) whether the trial court erred in not allowing defense counsel, during final argument, to discuss Williams’ potential liability for court costs. We answer each of these inquiries in the negative, and accordingly, we affirm.

I. FACTS

On March 27, 1986, Trooper G.E. Miller, Jr. clocked a 1985 Peterbuilt tractor trailer truck being operated by appellant, Billy Dean Williams, at a speed of fifty-nine miles per hour in a forty-*516 five mile per hour zone. The trooper was using a moving radar system. He issued Williams a traffic summons charging him with a violation of Code § “46.1-193″ which sets the minimum/maximum speed limits. The summons described the charge as “speed 59/45.”

At trial, the Commonwealth’s evidence consisted of Trooper Miller’s testimony and the result of the radar check. In his case-in-chief, Williams testified that he was aware of the forty-five mile per hour speed limit and that, according to his speedometer, he was traveling within that speed limit. He then introduced a calibration certificate showing the result of a test conducted about five weeks after the offense. The test disclosed that a speedometer reading of forty-five miles per hour on his truck was obtained when the truck actually was going fifty-eight miles per hour.

The jury returned a verdict finding Williams guilty of speeding “58 miles per hour in a 45 miles per hour zone,” and fined him twenty-five dollars. This appeal followed.

II. CONVICTION UPON NONEXISTENT CODE SUBSECTION

Williams first maintains that he was convicted of violating a nonexistent code subsection, and that therefore, his conviction must be reversed. At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Williams moved to strike the evidence, contending that he was charged under the incorrect statute. The court overruled the motion, finding that Williams was charged under the appropriate section, Code § 46.1-193, but erroneously amended the warrant to show the subsection as “46.1-193h(3),” a nonexistent subsection. We hold that the error is not fatal to the conviction.

A summons must describe the offense charged. Rule 3A:4(b). This description must comply with Rule 3A:6(a), which provides that an indictment must give an accused notice of the nature and character of the offense charged against him. Greenwalt v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 498, 501, 297 S.E.2d 709, 710-11 (1982). In Williams v. Petersburg, 216 Va. 297, 301-02, 217 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1975), the defendant argued that his conviction for refusing to take a breath test was invalid because the warrant inaccurately recited the applicable code section. In that case, instead of referring to Code § 18.1-55.1, which required that the *517 breath sample be given, the warrant referred to Code § 18.1-54.1 which addressed preliminary field sobriety tests. The court found it sufficient that the warrant specifically charged the defendant with refusing to take a breath test, and held that the “misrecital [did] not invalidate the conviction.” Id. at 302, 217 S.E.2d at 897.

In this case the traffic summons stated that Williams was charged with “speed 59/45.” This description was sufficient to give him notice of the nature and character of the offense for which he was charged. Williams does not contend that he did not know the nature of the charge against him or that he did not have an opportunity to defend against that charge. Accordingly, despite the misrecital of the applicable subsection of the statute, the description of the offense set out in the summons gave the defendant notice of the offense of which he was charged.

**342 III. INSTRUCTIONS ON CALIBRATION TEST

Next, Williams claims that the jury was incorrectly instructed upon Code § 46.1-193.1, which provides:

In the trial of any person charged with exceeding any maximum speed limit in this Commonwealth, the court shall receive as evidence a sworn report of the results of a calibration test of the accuracy of the speedometer in the motor vehicle operated by the defendant or the arresting officer at the time of the alleged offense. Such report shall be considered by the court or jury in both determining guilt or innocence and in fixing punishment.

He argues that the court erred in refusing to give three instructions he tendered because: (1) Code § 46.1-193.1 creates an absolute defense to a speeding charge where the speedometer reading on a motor vehicle is incorrect and is relied upon by the operator to determine his speed; (2) if the statute is not an absolute bar, it fashions a narrow and specific exemption to the malum prohibitum statute designed to protect those drivers who, without knowledge or intent, violate the maximum speed limit and in good faith rely upon the accuracy of their speedometers and find them incorrect; and (3) Code §§ 46.1-193.1 and 46.1-193 are conflicting and, therefore, the court gave inconsistent instructions to the jury.

*518 A.

The trial court refused to give the following instructions requested by the defendant:

Instruction 1:

The Court instructs the Jury that the defendant, Mr. Williams, is entitled to rely on the speed shown on his truck’s speedometer. If you believe that Mr. Williams’ speedometer showed him traveling at a lawful speed at the time he was stopped, and that because his speedometer was incorrect, Mr. Williams exceeded the speed limit, then you shall find the defendant, Mr. Williams, not guilty.

Instruction 2:

The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe from the evidence that the defendant, Mr. Williams’ speedometer showed Mr. Williams to be driving at a lawful speed at the time he was stopped by the State Trooper, then regardless of Mr. Williams’ actual speed as determined by radar, the defendant, Mr. Williams, shall be found not guilty.

Instruction 3:

The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe the evidence of the mechanic who performed the calibration on Mr. Williams’ truck that Mr. Williams’ speedometer was incorrect, and that it showed Mr. Williams to be traveling at a lawful speed when he actually was traveling at a speed greater than the posted speed, you shall find the defendant, Mr. Williams, not guilty.

We find that the legislature, in enacting Code § 46.1-193, did not intend to bar a conviction for speeding for persons with inaccurate speedometers. Such an interpretation would discourage motorists from repairing defective speedometers and encourage tampering with them so as to prevent a conviction for speeding. We do not think the legislature intended to encourage a result *519 that would foster unlawful activity. See Code § 46.1-308(ii) (illegal to operate motor vehicle with defective speedometer).

We find no language in the statute supporting the argument that the legislature intended an incorrect speedometer reading to constitute an absolute bar to a conviction for speeding. In a speeding case the only issue is whether the defendant’s vehicle was in fact exceeding the lawful maximum speed. If so, he is guilty; if not, he is innocent. The calibration report is admissible in evidence and the fact finder under the statute may give it such weight as it deems proper under the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

The gravamen of the three instructions tendered by the defendant is that they removed from the fact finder the element of discretion which the statute imposes upon it. The instructions told the fact finder **343 that if the speedometer showed Williams was traveling at a lawful rate of speed in accordance with the speedometer reading, although he was in fact exceeding the maximum speed limit permitted by law, then it must find him not guilty. The weight attached to the calibration test evidence under the terms of the statute is solely for the determination of the fact finder in arriving at its conclusion as to whether there is reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused in view of all the proven facts and circumstances. For this reason, we conclude that the trial court was correct in refusing the tendered instructions.

B.

Williams argues that if Code § 46.1-193.1 does not provide an absolute defense when the speedometer reading is inaccurate, it creates knowledge or intent as an element for a speeding charge, and the jury should have been so instructed.

The legislature may require knowledge or intent as an element of an offense, but we hold that neither Code § 46.1-193.1, nor language contained elsewhere in the Motor Vehicle Code, so provides. If the legislature intended to make knowledge or intent an element of the offense of speeding, it would have done so as it has with other offenses in the Motor Vehicle Code. See, e.g., Code § 46.1-15.1 (unlawful for one to sell car if he “knows or should reasonably know” that the odometer has been changed); Code § 46.1-363 (unlawful for one to make a “willful,” material false *520 statement on any application for a driver’s license); Code § 46.1-384(b) (unlawful to “knowingly” permit another to use one’s driver’s license). We, therefore, find that statutory language requiring a fact finder to “consider” calibration evidence in determining guilt or innocence of speeding was not meant to require proof of intent or knowledge as an element of a speeding conviction. Having concluded that Code § 46.1-193.1 was not intended to make knowledge or intent an element in a speeding charge when calibration evidence is introduced, we find that the trial court did not err in refusing to so instruct the jury.

C.

Williams contends that even if Code § 46.1-193.1 does not provide a defense to a speeding charge or make knowledge or intent an element of the offense, the jury was inadequately instructed because instructions D and F were incompatible and inconsistent with each other. We disagree. The instructions given were as follows:

Instruction D:

The result of the check of the speed of the defendant’s automobile by radar device is sufficient to prove his guilt unless other evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant in fact exceeded a speed of forty-five miles per hour.

Instruction F:

You have received as evidence a sworn report and testimony of the results of a calibration test of the accuracy of the speedometer in the motor vehicle operated by the defendant. You shall consider such report and testimony in both determining guilt or innocence and in fixing punishment.

Instruction D paraphrases Code § 46.1-198(a) which provides that the result of a radar check is prima facie evidence of speed. Instruction F paraphrases Code § 46.1-193.1 which provides that the fact finder shall consider the speedometer calibration test in both determining guilt or innocence and in fixing punishment. *521 Considering these two instructions together, the only conclusion that the jury could reasonably draw is that the radar check is sufficient to prove the speed of the defendant’s vehicle and that the calibration evidence must be considered by them to rebut it. In every case, the test will not prove the defendant’s innocence; in some cases, the test may prove his guilt. Such is the case at bar. Williams did not present any evidence to refute the radar check. Rather than help prove his innocence, the calibration test evidence bolstered the prima facie case made by the radar check by confirming that Williams was in fact exceeding the speed limit. Furthermore, even if the calibration test evidence in this case tended to **344 rebut the prima facie case of speed, the statute confers upon the fact finder absolute discretion concerning the weight to be attached to the test results.

Clearly, the calibration test evidence was relevant in fixing the punishment, and no doubt the jury considered it for this purpose. These two instructions stated the correct principles of law; therefore, we conclude that the court committed no error in giving them.

IV. REFUSAL TO PERMIT ARGUMENT ON COURT COSTS

During final argument, defense counsel commented to the jury that a finding of guilt would result in a fine, and also in payment of court costs by the defendant. The Commonwealth objected to the remark about court costs, and the court admonished the jury to disregard the statement. Williams asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to allow his counsel to mention his liability for court costs in the event he was found guilty.

The defendant’s liability for court costs is irrelevant in the jury’s determination of the defendant’s guilt and punishment, and, therefore, should not be addressed or alluded to in the final argument. “Payment of costs is no part of the sentence of the court, and constitutes no part of the penalty or punishment prescribed for the offense.” Anglea’s case, 10 Grat. (51 Va.) 696, 701 (1853). Rather, it constitutes an item of debt from the defendant to the Commonwealth for money “paid, laid out and expended for the purpose of repairing the consequences of the defendant’s wrong.” Id. Therefore, the trial court was correct in advising the *522 jury to disregard the statement of counsel pertaining to court costs.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Va.App.,1988.
Williams v. Com.
5 Va.App. 514, 365 S.E.2d 340

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