Posts Tagged ‘Amp Battery’
MARYLAND ASSAULT & BATTERY DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
DEFENDING CLIENTS CHARGED WITH ASSAULT & BATTERY & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CHARGES IN MARYLAND
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To obtain a general overview of assault and battery and domestic violence, please click here
To learn more about the laws pertaining to assault & battery or domestic violence in Virginia or Massachusetts, please click on the state.
The following are some of the different types of assault and battery charges one could face in the State of Maryland.
Click on any of the types of the Maryland assault and battery charges to learn more about them:
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Assault in the first degree
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Assault in the second degree
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Action for assault or defamation
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Child abuse
Maryland Assault and Battery
MD Code § 3-202. Assault in the first degree (top)
Prohibited
(a)(1) A person may not intentionally cause or attempt to cause serious physical injury to another.
(2) A person may not commit an assault with a firearm, including:
(i) a handgun, antique firearm, rifle, shotgun, short-barreled shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, as those terms are defined in § 4-201 of this article;
(ii) an assault pistol, as defined in § 4-301 of this article;
(iii) a machine gun, as defined in § 4-401 of this article; and
(iv) a regulated firearm, as defined in § 5-101 of the Public Safety Article.
Penalty
(b) A person who violates this section is guilty of the felony of assault in the first degree and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 25 years.
MD Code § 3-203. Assault in the second degree (top)
A person may not commit an assault.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person who violates subsection (a) of this section is guilty of the misdemeanor of assault in the second degree and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $2,500 or both.
(c)(1) In this subsection, “physical injury” means any impairment of physical condition, excluding minor injuries.
(2) A person may not intentionally cause physical injury to another if the person knows or has reason to know that the other is a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of the officer’s official duties.
(3) A person who violates paragraph (2) of this subsection is guilty of the felony of assault in the second degree and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both.
MD Code § 5-105. Action for assault or defamation (top)
An action for assault, libel, or slander shall be filed within one year from the date it accrues.
MD Code§ 3-601. Child abuse (top)
Definitions
(a)(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.
(2) “Abuse” means physical injury sustained by a minor as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a result of a malicious act under circumstances that indicate that the minor’s health or welfare is harmed or threatened by the treatment or act.
(3) “Family member” means a relative of a minor by blood, adoption, or marriage.
(4) “Household member” means a person who lives with or is a regular presence in a home of a minor at the time of the alleged abuse.
(5) “Severe physical injury” means:
(i) brain injury or bleeding within the skull;
(ii) starvation; or
(iii) physical injury that:
1. creates a substantial risk of death; or
2. causes permanent or protracted serious:
A. disfigurement;
B. loss of the function of any bodily member or organ; or
C. impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
Child abuse in the first degree (top)
(b)(1) A parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor may not cause abuse to the minor that:
(i) results in the death of the minor; or
(ii) causes severe physical injury to the minor.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person who violates paragraph (1) of this subsection is guilty of the felony of child abuse in the first degree and on conviction is subject to:
(i) imprisonment not exceeding 25 years; or
(ii) if the violation results in the death of the victim, imprisonment not exceeding 30 years.
Repeat offenders
(c) A person who violates this section after being convicted of a previous violation of this section is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to:
(1) imprisonment not exceeding 25 years; or
(2) if the violation results in the death of the victim, imprisonment not exceeding 30 years.
Child abuse in the second degree (top)
(d)(1)(i) A parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor may not cause abuse to the minor.
(ii) A household member or family member may not cause abuse to a minor.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person who violates paragraph (1) of this subsection is guilty of the felony of child abuse in the second degree and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 15 years.
Sentencing
(e) A sentence imposed under this section may be separate from and consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for any crime based on the act establishing the violation of this section.
For more information or to make an appointment with Maryland assault & battery attorney of SRIS, P.C., please call, send an e-mail or complete the on-line form
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ASALTO & AGRESIÓN (“ASSAULT & BATTERY”) & ABOGADOS DEFENSORES DE VIOLENCIA DOMÉSTICA (“Domestic Violence”)
Autorizados para ejercer en Virginia, Maryland, D.C., y Massachusetts
Generalmente asalto & agresión (“assault & battery”) es cuando una persona toca o intenta tocar a otro sin consentimiento de la persona que está siendo tocada o actuando de una manera amenazante, por consiguiente causando al otro de estar en temor de un daño inmediato.
En el pasado, asalto era diferente a agresión. Asalto era la amenaza de un manoseo no deseado. La agresión era el manoseo real. Ahora, la mayoría de estados no distinguen entre los términos y el término asalto & agresión (“assault & battery”) son usados de forma intercambiable.
La violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”) es una forma de asalto y agresión. La violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”) es el asalto & agresión (“assault & battery”) en una familia o miembro por otro miembro del grupo familiar. En el pasado, a la violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”) no se le prestaba mucha atención en el sistema de justicia. La sociedad lo veía como una materia familiar y se esperaba que las partes resolvieran sus diferencias sin intervención de un tercero. En el pasado reciente, la actitud de la sociedad ha cambiado hacia la violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”). Los tribunales ahora tratan la violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”) muy seriamente. El miembro familiar, usualmente al esposo ya no se le pueden descartar los cargos diciéndole al fiscal o a la corte que no desean que el miembro sea acusado para ser enjuiciado. Una vez que se llama a la policía, usualmente que el miembro de la familia sea procesado ya no es decisión de la víctima.
Un número de factores determinará el castigo de la persona que es condenada de violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”). Algunos de los factores son la severidad de las lesiones de la víctima, ya sea que un menor de edad estaba presente (y aun peor, si el menor de edad viese la violencia doméstica o fue una víctima de violencia doméstica) y finalmente si ésta es la primera vez que la persona ha sido condenada por violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”).
En un número de estados, un tercero o subsiguiente delito de violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”) puede resultar siendo condenado por un delito mayor.
Si usted desea hablar con un abogado defensor de asalto & agresión (“assault & battery”) o abogado defensor de violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”) en Virginia, Maryland o Massachusetts, por favor llámenos al 888-437-7747, por correo electrónico o nuestro rápido formulario en línea.
La oficina de abogados de SRIS, P.C. tiene oficinas en Virginia, Maryland y Massachusetts.
- Nuestras oficinas en Virginia están ubicadas en Fairfax, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond & Virginia Beach.
- Nuestras oficinas en Maryland están ubicadas en Rockville & Annapolis.
- Nuestra oficina en Massachusetts está en Boston.
Si desea ver algunas de las leyes que pueden aplicársele a usted si es acusado de latrocinio en
Virginia, Maryland y Massachusetts, por favor haga clic en los siguientes enlaces:
- Asalto & Agresión (“Assault & Battery”)/Violencia Doméstica (“Domestic Violence”) en Virginia
- Asalto & Agresión (“Assault & Battery”)/Violencia Doméstica (“Domestic Violence”) en Maryland
- Asalto & Agresión (“Assault & Battery”)/Violencia Doméstica (“Domestic Violence”) en Massachusetts
Para servirle mejor tenemos oficinas en Virginia, Maryland y Massachusetts. Por favor haga clic en el enlace para ver las diferentes ubicaciones de nuestras oficinas.
Nuestros abogados que proveen defensa de asalto & agresión (“assault & battery”) en Virginia, Maryland y Massachusetts hablan los siguientes idiomas además del inglés: español, francés, hindú, tamil, telugú, cantonés, mandarín y malayo.
Nuestros abogados están autorizados para manejar casos criminales de asalto & agresión (“assault & battery”) y casos de violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”) en Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania y Massachusetts. Sin embargo, nuestros abogados defienden casos de asalto & agresión (“assault & battery”) y violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”) sólo en Virginia, Maryland y Massachusetts en este momento.
Por favor haga clic sobre abogados para saber más acerca de los abogados defensores de asalto & agresión (“assault & battery”) y abogados defensores de casos de violencia doméstica (“domestic violence”) en Virginia, Maryland o Massachusetts.
VIRGINIA ASSAULT & BATTERY DEFENSE LAWYERS
DEFENDING CLIENTS CHARGED WITH ASSAULT & BATTERY & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA
In Virginia, the touching of another that is unconsented to is illegal. This is a serious offense that carries life changing consequences. The Virginia law offices of SRIS, P.C. have a number of excellent Virginia assault defense attorneys & battery defense lawyers in its offices in Fairfax, Fredericksburg, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond, Virginia Beach, Virginia. For more information or to make an appointment with SRIS, P.C., Virginia attorney who defends clients charged with assault & battery or domestic violence charges in Virginia, please call, send an e-mail or complete the on-line form
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There are many different types of assault and battery laws in Virginia. In Virginia, an assault and battery charge is also referred to as an A&B. For example, a person in Virginia can be charged with simple assault and battery, domestic assault and battery (a.k.a. domestic violence or assault on a family member) or felony assault and battery on a police officer. Simply because someone is charged with an offense of assault and battery or domestic violence in Virginia does not mean that they are going to be convicted as charged. The assault or domestic violence charge could be dismissed if the facts are such that the Commonwealth attorney in Virginia decides that they will not prevail at trial or there are some compelling reasons as to why the Virginia Commonwealth attorney should not pursue prosecution of the charge. There are also different plea bargain options available to the client if certain facts are present and the Virginia assault & battery attorney handling the matter is skilled at negotiating a good plea bargain. As always, there is the option of going to trial and proving one’s innocence at trial. However, this option should be considered as a last resort as there are no guarantees as to the outcome of the case at trial, unless one has absolutely no other options available or one is certain as to the outcome of one’s case. Only the client can ultimately decide what is best for them self. A good Virginia criminal lawyer will lay out the different options in a Virginia A&B charge or domestic violence charge and then the client will have to decide how to proceed.
To obtain a general overview of assault and battery or domestic violence, please click here
To learn more about the laws pertaining to assault and battery or domestic violence in Maryland or Massachusetts, please click on the state.
An assault and battery charge and domestic violence offense in Virginia are both class one misdemeanors at the very least. A class one misdemeanor carries up to one year in jail and or up to a $2500 fine. See Virginia Code Section 18.2-11.
The following are some of the different types of assault and battery charges one could face in the Commonwealth of Virginia:
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Assault and battery
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Assault and battery against a family or household member; penalty
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Assault or battery by mob
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Satisfaction and discharge of assault and similar charges
Virginia Code § 18.2-57. Assault and battery (top)
A. Any person who commits a simple assault or assault and battery shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor, and if the person intentionally selects the person against whom a simple assault is committed because of his race, religious conviction, color or national origin, the penalty upon conviction shall include a term of confinement of at least six months, 30 days of which shall be a mandatory minimum term of confinement.
B. However, if a person intentionally selects the person against whom an assault and battery resulting in bodily injury is committed because of his race, religious conviction, color or national origin, the person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony, and the penalty upon conviction shall include a term of confinement of at least six months, 30 days of which shall be a mandatory minimum term of confinement.
C. In addition, if any person commits an assault or an assault and battery against another knowing or having reason to know that such other person is a law-enforcement officer as defined hereinafter, a correctional officer as defined in § 53.1-1, a person employed by the Department of Corrections directly involved in the care, treatment or supervision of inmates in the custody of the Department, a firefighter as defined in § 65.2-102, or a volunteer firefighter or lifesaving or rescue squad member who is a member of a bona fide volunteer fire department or volunteer rescue or emergency medical squad regardless of whether a resolution has been adopted by the governing body of a political subdivision recognizing such firefighters or members as employees, engaged in the performance of his public duties as such, such person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony, and, upon conviction, the sentence of such person shall include a mandatory minimum term of confinement of six months.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect the right of any person charged with a violation of this section from asserting and presenting evidence in support of any defenses to the charge that may be available under common law.
D. In addition, if any person commits a battery against another knowing or having reason to know that such other person is a full-time or part-time teacher, principal, assistant principal, or guidance counselor of any public or private elementary or secondary school and is engaged in the performance of his duties as such, he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor and the sentence of such person upon conviction shall include a sentence of 15 days in jail, two days of which shall be a mandatory minimum term of confinement. However, if the offense is committed by use of a firearm or other weapon prohibited on school property pursuant to § 18.2-308.1, the person shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of confinement of six months.
E. As used in this section:
“Law-enforcement officer” means any full-time or part-time employee of a police department or sheriff’s office which is part of or administered by the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, who is responsible for the prevention or detection of crime and the enforcement of the penal, traffic or highway laws of this Commonwealth, and any conservation officer of the Department of Conservation and Recreation commissioned pursuant to § 10.1- 115, and game wardens appointed pursuant to § 29.1-200, and such officer also includes jail officers in local and regional correctional facilities, all deputy sheriffs, whether assigned to law-enforcement duties, court services or local jail responsibilities, auxiliary police officers appointed or provided for pursuant to §§ 15.2-1731 and 15.2-1733 and auxiliary deputy sheriffs appointed pursuant to § 15.2-1603.
“School security officer” means an individual who is employed by the local school board for the purpose of maintaining order and discipline, preventing crime, investigating violations of school board policies and detaining persons violating the law or school board policies on school property, a school bus or at a school-sponsored activity and who is responsible solely for ensuring the safety, security and welfare of all students, faculty and staff in the assigned school.
F. “Simple assault” or “assault and battery” shall not be construed to include the use of, by any teacher, principal, assistant principal, guidance counselor, or school security officer, in the course and scope of his acting official capacity, any of the following: (i) incidental, minor or reasonable physical contact or other actions designed to maintain order and control; (ii) reasonable and necessary force to quell a disturbance or remove a student from the scene of a disturbance that threatens physical injury to persons or damage to property; (iii) reasonable and necessary force to prevent a student from inflicting physical harm on himself; (iv) reasonable and necessary force for self-defense or the defense of others; or (v) reasonable and necessary force to obtain possession of weapons or other dangerous objects or controlled substances or associated paraphernalia that are upon the person of the student or within his control.
In determining whether a person was acting within the exceptions provided in this subsection, due deference shall be given to reasonable judgments that were made by a teacher, principal, assistant principal, guidance counselor, or school security officer at the time of the event.
§ 18.2-57.2. Assault and battery against a family or household member; penalty a.k.a domestic violence (top)
A. Any person who commits an assault and battery against a family or household member is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
B. Upon a conviction for assault and battery against a family or household member, where it is alleged in the warrant, information, or indictment on which a person is convicted, that such person has been previously convicted of two offenses against a family or household member of (i) assault and battery against a family or household member in violation of this section, (ii) malicious wounding in violation of § 18.2-51, (iii) aggravated malicious wounding in violation of § 18.2-51.2, (iv) malicious bodily injury by means of a substance in violation of § 18.2-52, or (v)an offense under the law of any other jurisdiction which has the same elements of any of the above offenses, in any combination, all of which occurred within a period of 20 years, and each of which occurred on a different date, such person is guilty of a Class 6 felony.
C. Whenever a warrant for a violation of this section is issued, the magistrate shall issue an emergency protective order as authorized by § 16.1-253.4, except if the defendant is a minor, an emergency protective order shall not be required.
D. The definition of “family or household member” in § 16.1-228 applies to this section.
§ 18.2-42. Assault or battery by mob (top)
Any and every person composing a mob which shall commit a simple assault or battery shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
In the event that you have been charged with a misdemeanor charge of assault and battery, there is a civil remedy available, but can only be applied if certain conditions are met. This is called accord and satisfaction. It is governed by the following statute:
§ 19.2-151. Satisfaction and discharge of assault and similar charges (top)
When a person is in jail or under a recognizance to answer a charge of assault and battery or other misdemeanor, or has been indicted for an assault and battery or other misdemeanor for which there is a remedy by civil action, unless the offense was committed (i) by or upon any law-enforcement officer, (ii) riotously in violation of §§ 18.2-404 to 18.2-407, (iii) against a family or household member in violation of § 18.2-57.2, or (iv) with intent to commit a felony, if the person injured appears before the court which made the commitment or took the recognizance, or before the court in which the indictment is pending, and acknowledges in writing that he has received satisfaction for the injury, the court may, in its discretion, by an order, supersede the commitment, discharge the recognizance, or dismiss the prosecution, upon payment by the defendant of costs accrued to the Commonwealth or any of its officers.Our Virginia assault & battery & domestic violence lawyers and staff speak various languages, including English, Tamil, Spanish, French, Hindi, Cantonese, Mandarin, and Telugu.
For more information or to make an appointment with SRIS, P.C., please call, send an e-mail or complete the on-line form
In the following case, the Court addressed the issue of what constitutes cohabiting under Code § 18.2-57.2 (the domestic violence statute) in Virginia
33 Va.App. 550, 535 S.E.2d 187
Court of Appeals of Virginia,
Salem.
James Edward RICKMAN,
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
Record No. 2265-99-3.
Oct. 10, 2000.
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Roanoke County, Diane McQ. Strickland, J., of assault and battery against a family or household member, as third offense within 10 years, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Elder, J., held that: (1) as matter of first impression, factors considered in determining whether defendant and victim were cohabiting, so as to establish victim was “family or household member,” included sharing of familial or financial responsibilities, consortium, and length and continuity of the relationship; and (2) there was sufficient evidence of cohabitation to establish that victim was family or household member.
Affirmed.
Present: COLEMAN, WILLIS and ELDER, JJ.
ELDER, Judge.
James Edward Rickman (appellant) appeals from his bench trial conviction for assault and battery against a family or household member in violation of Code § 18.2-57.2, his third such conviction within ten years, making it punishable as a Class 6 felony. On appeal, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the woman he was convicted of assaulting and battering was a “family or household member” within the meaning of the statute. We hold the evidence was sufficient to bring appellant’s victim within the statutory definition, and we affirm his conviction.
I.
BACKGROUND
On March 13, 1999, appellant “hit” and “smacked” Yvonne Brickey, “jerked [her] shirt,” and pushed her to the ground.
According to Brickey, appellant was residing with her on the date of the offense, and they had resided together for “a couple months.” Appellant repeatedly told one of the officers who responded to the scene that he and Brickey “had lived together for about three months.” Appellant worked out of town on an intermittent basis and stayed with Brickey “off and on, when [he] would come into town.” Although Brickey testified **189 that appellant sometimes stayed with her and sometimes stayed with his ex-wife, appellant testified that he and his wife were not “living together” during March 1999 and that some of his furniture was in storage. Brickey said she *553 and appellant started living together in this “off and on” fashion “a long time ago.”
Other evidence established that when appellant was in Brickey’s home, she and appellant were “boyfriend and girlfriend,” slept in the same bed and had sexual relations. Although Brickey would not take money appellant offered her for living expenses, appellant bought food and “tried to just help out.” While appellant was at Brickey’s, he stored clothes and other items of personal property there. Brickey’s mother, who lived next door to Brickey, washed appellant’s clothes for him, and appellant used the telephone at Brickey’s mother’s home because Brickey did not have a phone.
Appellant admitted to staying with Brickey “off and on” but said he did not reside there. He considered the trailer he and his wife owned as his residence during that time but admitted he was not actually living there. He said that most of the time he was in town, he stayed with his cousin Wanda, but he admitted that both his wife and Brickey also would come to Wanda’s to stay. He denied having a contemporaneous sexual relationship with Brickey but admitted the March 13 altercation arose because Brickey became jealous when her daughter told her appellant had been out with a younger woman. Appellant said Brickey’s daughter, a minor, became angry with him when he asked her and her friends not to consume alcohol or use illegal drugs in the house.
Appellant moved to strike at the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence. In denying the motions, the trial court made the following observations:
It is the finding of this Court that [appellant] was as much a member of the household where Ms. Brickey resides as he was of any household.
… [C]ertainly, the intent of the General Assembly in passing this legislation was to cover circumstances such as this where he was residing [in even an] on again and off again relationship with Ms. Brickey….
*554 The court found, in addition, the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant assaulted and battered Brickey, a household member, and that he had two previous convictions for the same offense. It convicted him of a Class 6 felony pursuant to Code § 18.2-57.2(B).
II.
ANALYSIS
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va.App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The fact finder is not required to believe all aspects of a witness’ testimony; it may accept some parts as believable and reject other parts as implausible. See Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 82, 92, 428 S.E.2d 16, 24 (1993).
The version of Code § 18.2-57.2 applicable to these proceedings provided as follows:
A. Any person who commits an assault and battery against a family or household member shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
B. On a third or subsequent conviction for assault and battery against a family or household member, where it is alleged in the warrant, information, or indictment on which a person is convicted, that (i) such person has been previously convicted twice of assault and battery against a family or household member … within ten years of the third or subsequent offense, and … (ii) each such assault and battery occurred on different dates, such person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
* * * * * *
D. As used in this section, “family or household member” means … (vi) any individual who cohabits or who, within the previous twelve months, cohabited with the defendant….
*555 Code § 18.2-57.2 (1995 Repl.Vol. (version effective July 1, 1997)) (emphasis added).
What constitutes cohabiting under Code § 18.2-57.2 is a question of first impression in Virginia. “[W]e construe a statute to promote the end for which it was enacted, if such an interpretation can reasonably be made from the language used.” Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1994). “The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction.” Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992). “Although penal laws are to be construed strictly [against the Commonwealth], they ‘ought not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.’ ” Willis v. Commonwealth, 10 Va.App. 430, 441, 393 S.E.2d 405, 411 (1990) (citation omitted).
Our prior consideration of the meaning of the term “cohabitation” has been limited mainly to the civil arena in the context of divorce and spousal support. Interpreting a property settlement agreement in Schweider v. Schweider, 243 Va. 245, 415 S.E.2d 135 (1992), the Virginia Supreme Court noted that, “[w]hile engaging in sexual relations is a factor in determining cohabitation, ‘ “matrimonial cohabitation” consists of more than sexual relations. It also imports the continuing condition of living together and carrying out the mutual responsibilities of the marital relationship.’ ” Id. at 248, 415 S.E.2d at 137 (quoting Petachenko v. Petachenko, 232 Va. 296, 299, 350 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1986)).
We revisited this issue in Frey v. Frey, 14 Va.App. 270, 416 S.E.2d 40 (1992), noting that financial support is “a factor which tends to prove the assumption of duties or obligations attendant to marriage” but that “other factors exclusive of support may be sufficient to establish that a relationship is analogous to marriage.” Id. at 275, 416 S.E.2d at 43. We acknowledged the holding of the Supreme Court in Schweider that phrases such as “cohabitation, analogous to marriage,” have been “consistently interpreted … as encompassing both *556 a permanency or continuity and an assumption of marital duties.” Id.
Appellant contends these principles are applicable to his conviction for domestic assault and battery and preclude a finding that he cohabited with Brickey because the evidence failed to establish the necessary permanence or any other characteristics of a marital relationship or common law marriage. Although we find Schweider and Frey instructive, we disagree that they control our interpretation of Code § 18.2-57.2. While we look to these interpretations for guidance, we are not bound by them because ” ‘cohabitation’ takes on different meanings in different contexts.” State v. Yaden, 118 Ohio App.3d 410, 692 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (1997); see also Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, ” Cohabitation” For Purposes of Domestic Violence Statutes, 71 A.L.R.5th 285, 294 (1999). Compare Colley v. Colley, 204 Va. 225, 228-29, 129 S.E.2d 630, 632-33 (1963) (under divorce jurisdiction statute, construing “cohabiting” to mean “having dwelled together under the same roof with more or less permanency”), with Tarr v. Tarr, 184 Va. 443, 448, 35 S.E.2d 401, 403-04 (1945) (in assessing what acts amount to condonation of adultery, construing “cohabiting” to mean “single voluntary act of sexual intercourse”).
We also seek guidance from the interpretations other courts have given “cohabitation” in the domestic abuse context. These courts acknowledge the obvious conclusion of their legislatures that “assault involving a family or household member deserves further protection than assault on a stranger.” See, e.g. State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 459, 683 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (1997). In Virginia, the legislature also has concluded that assault on a family or household member is more serious than assault on a stranger. See Code §§ 18.2-57, 18.2-57.2.FN1
FN1. Although the first and second offenses of assault and battery of a family or household member are punished as Class 1 misdemeanors in Virginia-the same punishment imposed for assault and battery on a non-family member who does not belong to any other special class-a third offense for assault and battery of a family or household member within ten years is subject to heightened punishment as a Class 6 felony. See Code §§ 18.2-57, 18.2-57.2 .
*557 In surveying the varying definitions of cohabitation in this context, the Ohio Supreme Court noted the prevailing view that “domestic violence arises out of the nature of **191 the relationship itself, rather than the exact living circumstances of the victim and perpetrator.” Williams, 683 N.E.2d at 1129.
[T]he essential elements of “cohabitation” are (1) sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and (2) consortium. Possible factors establishing shared familial or financial responsibilities might include provisions for shelter, food, clothing, utilities, and/or commingled assets. Factors that might establish consortium include mutual respect, fidelity, affection, society, cooperation, solace, comfort, aid of each other, friendship, and conjugal relations.
Id. at 1130 (citations omitted).
Other factors appropriate for consideration include the length and continuity of the relationship. See, e.g., State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 1996). Although “a person may have only one legal domicile at one time, … he may have more than one residence” for purposes of a statute proscribing domestic assault. State v. Archuletta, 85 Hawai’i 512, 946 P.2d 620, 622 (Ct.App.1997).
[A] defendant may cohabit simultaneously with two or more people at different locations, during the same time frame, if he maintains substantial ongoing relationships with each and lives with each for significant periods. A defendant who physically abuses a cohabitant cannot immunize himself from criminal liability merely by living part-time elsewhere with one or more other persons while continuing to reside the rest of the time with the first partner and maintaining a substantial relationship with that person.
People v. Moore, 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 256, 264 (1996). The factors to be applied “are unique to each case and how much weight, if any, to give to each of these factors must be decided on a case-by-case basis by the trier of fact.” *558 Williams, 683 N.E.2d at 1130 (emphasis added); see Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d at 518.
In construing Code § 18.2-57.2 to achieve the obvious intent of the legislature, we apply these same factors to a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis in appellant’s case. Under this analysis, we hold the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that appellant and Brickey cohabited as that term is used in Code § 18.2-57.2. Under the first prong of the Ohio Supreme Court’s test, the sharing of familial or financial responsibilities, the evidence established that appellant desired to contribute money to cover a portion of Brickey’s household expenses and gave her grocery money whenever he stayed at the residence. Brickey’s mother, who lived next door, washed appellant’s laundry and allowed appellant to use her phone. Appellant also felt comfortable enough in Brickey’s home to ask her daughter, a minor, not to consume alcohol or illegal drugs in Brickey’s house.
Under the second prong, consortium, the evidence supported a finding that Brickey and appellant slept in the same bed and had a sexual relationship. Although appellant insisted their relationship was platonic, he admitted they were very close and said they fought because Brickey thought he had been out with a younger woman and became jealous.
Finally, in addressing the duration, continuity and permanency of the relationship, as the holdings in Schweider and Frey suggest we should, see also Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d at 518, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supported a finding that appellant had resided with Brickey continuously for three months prior to March 13, 1999 and that he had stayed with her sporadically before that for “a long time,” as well. Although appellant said he remained married to another woman, he reported that some of his furniture was in storage and that he was not living with his wife during that period of time. Based on this evidence, the trial court concluded that appellant “was as much a member of the [victim's] household … as he was of any household” and that this was sufficient to establish cohabitation under *559 Code § 18.2-57.2. We agree and hold the fact that appellant sometimes worked out of town and may periodically have stayed elsewhere when in town did not preclude a finding that he cohabited with Brickey. See Archuletta, 946 P.2d at 622. The evidence supported the trial court’s implicit finding that appellant maintained a “substantial ongoing relationship[**192 ]” with Brickey during this period of time. Moore, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d at 264.
For these reasons, we hold the evidence of cohabitation was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction under Code § 18.2-57.2. Therefore, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
Va.App.,2000.
Rickman v. Com.
33 Va.App. 550, 535 S.E.2d 187
In the following case, the Court of Appeals sets out the elements (definition) for a general assault and battery and the elements for an assault and battery on a police officer.
Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Mary O’CONNELL, s/k/a Mary Kelly O’Connell,
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
No. 0286-00-4.
Jan. 30, 2001.
Present FITZPATRICK, Chief J., WILLIS, J., and OVERTON, Senior J.
OVERTON.
*1 Mary O’Connell (appellant) appeals her conviction for assault on a police officer in violation of Code § 18.2-57(C). She argues on appeal that the trial judge erred in giving his response to a jury question. Finding no error, we affirm her conviction.
BACKGROUND
Several police officers investigated a report of a “suspicious” event. When Officer Michael Spillars arrested appellant’s companion for being drunk in public, appellant tried to intervene in the arrest. Spillars then arrested appellant for being drunk in public. As the officers tried to handcuff appellant, she became combative, swung her arms, and tried to avoid their attempts to hold her. While sitting in a police car, appellant struck her head on the barrier in the car, lacerating her head.
At the hospital, appellant had “violent outbursts” and fought medical personnel who attempted to assist her. As Spillars tried to restrain appellant so she could get medical treatment, she attempted to bite him. Appellant also kicked Spillars in the leg. Officer James Nida testified that appellant fought and resisted the arresting officers and that she kicked Spillars while she was in the hospital. Nida testified appellant “attack[ed] the closest person” to her while in the hospital.
Appellant testified she did not remember whether she fought the police officers as they tried to put her in the police car. Appellant acknowledged that the officers were present when she was treated at the hospital. Appellant testified she asked the officers to have the nurse stop hurting her during the treatment. Appellant also testified that, while she was in the hospital, she was trying “to get away from” the medical personnel because they were hurting her with their medical treatment. She stated she did not intend to assault a police officer, and she did not recall kicking an officer.
After the jury deliberated for about twenty minutes, it asked the following question:
Does her striking out in general mitigate the charge of assaulting an officer, or does it have to be deliberate singling out of an officer?
Appellant’s counsel requested that the trial judge respond to the question with “a general answer of ‘[Y]ou’ve been presented with the evidence, you must rely on your collective understanding.’ ” She also asserted that the jury had been instructed on the statute, and it was within the jury’s “purview to determine what exactly that means.”
The trial judge concluded that telling the jurors to rely on their collective recollection of the evidence would not answer the question. The judge stated that “under the language of the statute,” the answer to the first part of the question was “No.” The trial judge found that Code § 18.2-57(C) does not provide for mitigation or require a “deliberate singling out.” He stated, “What the statute requires is the language contained in [Jury Instruction] 1 … that the defendant knew or had reason to know .” The trial judge answered the jury question, “No.”
ANALYSIS
*2 Code § 18.2-57(C) provides in pertinent part:
[I]f any person commits an assault or an assault and battery against another knowing or having reason to know that such other person is a law-enforcement officer … engaged in the performance of his public duties as such, such person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony….
Jury Instruction 1 stated, in pertinent part:
The Court instructs the jury that the defendant is charged with the crime of assault on a police officer. The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of that crime:
(1) That the defendant inflicted some bodily hurt on Officer Michael Spillars;
(2) That the act was done in an angry, rude, or vengeful manner; and
(3) That the defendant knew or had reason to know that Michael Spillars was a law enforcement officer who was engaged in the performance of his public duties as a law enforcement officer.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the offense as charged, then you shall find the defendant guilty of assaulting a police officer….
Appellant does not contend that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on the elements of the offense. Rather, appellant contends the trial judge should have answered the jury’s question by referring it to the jury instructions instead of answering the question “directly.” She contends the trial judge’s answer was “misleading” and “injected an interpretation of” Instruction 1. She also asserts that Code § 18.2-57(C) requires proof of specific intent and that the trial judge’s answer was “legally incorrect” because “striking out in general” is inconsistent with the intent requirement of the statute.
“It is proper for a trial court to fully and completely respond to a jury’s inquiry concerning its duties.” Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 619, 625, 347 S.E.2d 167, 171 (1986) (citation omitted). Indeed, it is error not to instruct the jury when the jury may make findings based upon a mistaken belief of the law. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 4, 7, 235 S.E.2d 304, 305 (1977) ( per curiam ). The trial court must “give a direct and correct response to an inquiry by the jury and its failure to do so is ground for reversal.” Shepperson v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 586, 591, 454 S.E.2d 5, 8 (1995).
Code § 18.2-57(C) does not require proof that the accused “intentionally select[ed]” the victim as does a violation of Code § 18.2-57(A) and Code § 18.2-57(B). FN1 A person violates Code § 18.2-57(C) if she commits an assault or an assault and battery against another person, knowing or having reason to know that the other person is a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his public duties. Nothing in the language of the statute indicates a desire by the legislature to mitigate the offense if an officer is accidentally assaulted by the accused “striking out in general.” Accordingly, the trial judge’s response clearly and correctly addressed the jury question. Furthermore, the trial judge did not provide a legally incorrect answer to the jury question or mislead the jury with his answer.
FN1. Code § 18.2-57(A) provides:
Any person who commits a simple assault or assault and battery shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor, and if the person intentionally selects the person against whom a simple assault is committed because of his race, religious conviction, color or national origin, the penalty upon conviction shall include a mandatory, minimum term of confinement of at least six months, thirty days of which shall not be suspended, in whole or in part.
Code § 18.2-57(B) provides, in part:
However, if a person intentionally selects the person against whom an assault and battery resulting in bodily injury is committed because of his race, religious conviction, color or national origin, the person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony….
*3 For these reasons, appellant’s conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Va.App.,2001.
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MASSACHUSETTS ASSAULT & BATTERY & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DEFENSE LAWYERS
DEFEND CLIENTS CHARGED WITH ASSAULT & BATTERY & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN MASSACHUSETTS
The penalties for being convicted of even a simple assault and battery in Massachusetts are severe. Jail is a definitely possibility and the fines are very steep. The penalties are even harsher if the alleged victim is under 14 or a public safety officer. Additionally, domestic violence is becoming a key area of concern around the country. The district attorneys in Massachusetts aggressively prosecute those charged with domestic violence. Don’t take a chance of going to a Massachusetts court alone or with an inexperienced Massachusetts defense counsel. We have defended many assault cases in Massachusetts. Our criminal defense attorneys in Massachusetts will advice you of your options. We will not force you to take a plea. Our Massachusetts criminal defense attorneys will ensure you receive the best defense possible.
The Massachusetts criminal defense attorneys of SRIS, P.C. have an office in the City of Boston, Massachusetts. If you wish to consult a SRIS, P.C. Massachusetts assault and battery attorney, please simply contact us via e-mail, phone, or by filling out our on-line form. A criminal defense lawyer from the Massachusetts SRIS, P.C. office will gladly consult with you regarding your matter.
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE:
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Boston, Massachusetts 02110
Phone: 888-437-7747
To obtain a general overview of assault and battery or domestic violence defense, please click here.
To learn more about the laws pertaining to assault and battery or domestic violence defense in Virginia or Maryland, please click on the state.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY LAWS IN THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS
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Assault or assault and battery; punishment
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Indecent assault and battery on child under fourteen; penalties; subsequent offenses; eligibility for parole, etc.
- Indecent assault and battery on mentally retarded person; assault and battery
- Indecent assault and battery on person fourteen or older; penalties
- Assault and battery upon a child; penalties
- Wanton or reckless behavior creating a risk of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse to a child; duty to act; penalty
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Mayhem; punishment
- Assault with intent to rob or murder; weapons; punishment; victim sixty years or older; minimum sentence for repeat offenders
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Dangerous weapon; assault in dwelling house; punishment
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Simple assault; intent to rob or steal; punishment
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Assault, confinement, etc. of person for purpose of stealing motor vehicle; weapons; punishment
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Attempted extortion; punishment
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Poison; use with intent to injure; punishment
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Assault; intent to commit felony; punishment
MA Code Section 13A. Assault or assault and battery; punishment (top)
Section 13A. (a) Whoever commits an assault or an assault and battery upon another shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 21/2 years in a house of correction or by a fine of not more than $1,000.
A summons may be issued instead of a warrant for the arrest of any person upon a complaint for a violation of any provision of this subsection if in the judgment of the court or justice receiving the complaint there is reason to believe that he will appear upon a summons.
(b) Whoever commits an assault or an assault and battery:
(i) upon another and by such assault and battery causes serious bodily injury;
(ii) upon another who is pregnant at the time of such assault and battery, knowing or having reason to know that the person is pregnant; or
(iii) upon another who he knows has an outstanding temporary or permanent vacate, restraining or no contact order or judgment issued pursuant to section 18, section 34B or 34C of chapter 208, section 32 of chapter 209, section 3, 4 or 5 of chapter 209A, or section 15 or 20 of chapter 209C, in effect against him at the time of such assault or assault and battery; shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years or in the house of correction for not more than 21/2 years, or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(c) For the purposes of this section, “serious bodily injury” shall mean bodily injury that results in a permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a bodily function, limb or organ, or a substantial risk of death.
MA Code Section 13B. Indecent assault and battery on child under fourteen; penalties; subsequent offenses; eligibility for parole, etc. (top)
Section 13B. Whoever commits an indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than ten years, or by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and one-half years; and whoever commits a second or subsequent such offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or any term of years; provided, however, that a prosecution commenced under the provisions of this section shall not be placed on file or continued without a finding.
No person serving a sentence for a second or subsequent such offense shall be eligible for furlough, temporary release, or education, training or employment programs established outside a correctional facility until such person shall have served two-thirds of such minimum sentence or if such person has two or more sentences to be served otherwise than concurrently, two-thirds of the aggregate of the minimum terms of such several sentences.
In a prosecution under this section, a child under the age of fourteen years shall be deemed incapable of consenting to any conduct of the defendant for which said defendant is being prosecuted.
MA Code Section 13F. Indecent assault and battery on mentally retarded person; assault and battery (top)
Section 13F. Whoever commits an indecent assault and battery on a mentally retarded person knowing such person to be mentally retarded shall for the first offense be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than five years or not more than ten years; and for a second or subsequent offense, by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than ten years. Except in the case of a conviction for the first offense for violation of this section, the imposition or execution of the sentence shall not be suspended, and no probation or parole shall be granted until the minimum imprisonment herein provided for the offense shall have been served. This section shall not apply to the commission of an indecent assault and battery by a mentally retarded person upon another mentally retarded person.
Whoever commits an assault and battery on a mentally retarded person knowing such person to be mentally retarded shall for the first offense be punished by imprisonment in a house of correction for not more than two and one-half years or by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years; and, for a second or subsequent offense, by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than ten years. This section shall not apply to the commission of an assault and battery by a mentally retarded person upon another mentally retarded person.
MA Code Section 13H. Indecent assault and battery on person fourteen or older; penalties (top)
Section 13H. Whoever commits an indecent assault and battery on a person who has attained age fourteen shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years, or by imprisonment for not more than two and one-half years in a jail or house of correction.
Whoever commits an indecent assault and battery on an elder or person with a disability, as defined in section 13K, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 10 years, or by imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than 2 1/2 years, and whoever commits a second or subsequent such offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 20 years. A prosecution commenced under this paragraph shall not be placed on file nor continued without a finding.
MA Code Section 13J. Assault and battery upon a child; penalties (top)
Section 13J. (a) For the purposes of this section, the following words shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:—
“Bodily injury”, substantial impairment of the physical condition including any burn, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, injury to any internal organ, any injury which occurs as the result of repeated harm to any bodily function or organ including human skin or any physical condition which substantially imperils a child’s health or welfare.
“Child”, any person under fourteen years of age.
“Person having care and custody”, a parent, guardian, employee of a home or institution or any other person with equivalent supervision or care of a child, whether the supervision is temporary or permanent.
“Substantial bodily injury”, bodily injury which creates a permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of a function of a body member, limb or organ, or substantial risk of death.
(b) Whoever commits an assault and battery upon a child and by such assault and battery causes bodily injury shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than two and one-half years.
Whoever commits an assault and battery upon a child and by such assault and battery causes substantial bodily injury shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than fifteen years or imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than two and one-half years.
Whoever, having care and custody of a child, wantonly or recklessly permits bodily injury to such child or wantonly or recklessly permits another to commit an assault and battery upon such child, which assault and battery causes bodily injury, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two and one-half years in the house of correction.
Whoever, having care and custody of a child, wantonly or recklessly permits substantial bodily injury to such child or wantonly or recklessly permits another to commit an assault and battery upon such child, which assault and battery causes substantial bodily injury, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years, or by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and one-half years.
MA Code Section 13L. Wanton or reckless behavior creating a risk of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse to a child; duty to act; penalty (top)
Section 13L. For the purposes of this section, the following words shall have the following meanings:—
“Child”, any person under 18 years of age.
“Serious bodily injury”, bodily injury which results in a permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of a bodily function, limb or organ, or substantial risk of death.
“Sexual abuse”, an indecent assault and battery on a child under 14 under section 13B of chapter 265; indecent assault and battery on a person age 14 or over under section 13H of said chapter 265; rape under section 22 of said chapter 265; rape of a child under 16 with force under section 22A of said chapter 265; rape and abuse of a child under section 23 of said chapter 265; assault with intent to commit rape under section 24 of said chapter 265; and assault of a child with intent to commit rape under section 24B of said chapter 265.
Whoever wantonly or recklessly engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse to a child or wantonly or recklessly fails to take reasonable steps to alleviate such risk where there is a duty to act shall be punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than 21/2 years.
For the purposes of this section, such wanton or reckless behavior occurs when a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his acts, or omissions where there is a duty to act, would result in serious bodily injury or sexual abuse to a child. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard of the risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
MA Code Section 14. Mayhem; punishment (top)
Section 14. Whoever, with malicious intent to maim or disfigure, cuts out or maims the tongue, puts out or destroys an eye, cuts or tears off an ear, cuts, slits or mutilates the nose or lip, or cuts off or disables a limb or member, of another person, and whoever is privy to such intent, or is present and aids in the commission of such crime, or whoever, with intent to maim or disfigure, assaults another person with a dangerous weapon, substance or chemical, and by such assault disfigures, cripples or inflicts serious or permanent physical injury upon such person, and whoever is privy to such intent, or is present and aids in the commission of such crime, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail for not more than two and one half years.
MA Code Section 18. Assault with intent to rob or murder; weapons; punishment; victim sixty years or older; minimum sentence for repeat offenders (top)
Section 18. (a) Whoever, being armed with a dangerous weapon, assaults a person sixty years or older with intent to rob or murder shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years. Whoever commits any offense described herein while armed with a firearm, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or assault weapon shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than ten years.
Whoever, after having been convicted of the crime of assault upon a person sixty years or older with intent to rob or murder while being armed with a dangerous weapon, commits a second or subsequent such crime, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two years. Said sentence shall not be reduced until two years of said sentence have been served nor shall the person convicted be eligible for probation, parole, furlough, work release or receive any deduction from his sentence for good conduct until he shall have served two years of such sentence; provided, however, that the commissioner of correction may, on the recommendation of the warden, superintendent, or other person in charge of a correctional institution, or the administrator of a county correctional institution, grant to said offender a temporary release in the custody of an officer of such institution for the following purposes only: to attend the funeral of next of kin or spouse; to visit a critically ill close relative or spouse; or to obtain emergency medical services unavailable at said institution. The provisions of section eighty-seven of chapter two hundred and seventy-six relating to the power of the court to place certain offenders on probation shall not apply to any person seventeen years of age or over charged with a violation of this subsection. Whoever, after having been convicted of the crime of assault upon a person 60 years or older with intent to rob or murder while armed with a firearm, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or assault weapon commits a second or subsequent such crime shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than 20 years.
(b) Whoever, being armed with a dangerous weapon, assaults another with intent to rob or murder shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years. Whoever, being armed with a firearm, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or assault weapon assaults another with intent to rob or murder shall be punished by imprisonment in state prison for not less than five years and not more than 20 years.
MA Code Section 18A. Dangerous weapon; assault in dwelling house; punishment (top)
Section 18A. Whoever, being armed with a dangerous weapon, enters a dwelling house and while therein assaults another with intent to commit a felony shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or for a term of not less than ten years. No person imprisoned under this paragraph shall be eligible for parole in less than five years.
Whoever, being armed with a dangerous weapon defined as a firearm, shotgun, rifle or assault weapon, enters a dwelling house and while therein assaults another with intent to commit a felony shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less than ten years. Such person shall not be eligible for parole prior to the expiration of ten years.
MA Code Section 20. Simple assault; intent to rob or steal; punishment (top)
Section 20. Whoever, not being armed with a dangerous weapon, assaults another with force and violence and with intent to rob or steal shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than ten years.
MA Code Section 21A. Assault, confinement, etc. of person for purpose of stealing motor vehicle; weapons; punishment (top)
Section 21A. Whoever, with intent to steal a motor vehicle, assaults, confines, maims or puts any person in fear for the purpose of stealing a motor vehicle shall, whether he succeeds or fails in the perpetration of stealing the motor vehicle be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than fifteen years or in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and one-half years and a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than fifteen thousand dollars; provided, however, that any person who commits any offense described herein while being armed with a dangerous weapon shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years or in a jail or house of correction for not less than one year nor more than two and one-half years and a fine of not less than five nor more than fifteen thousand dollars. Whoever commits any offense described in this section while being armed with a firearm, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or assault weapon, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than five years in state prison.
MA Code Section 25. Attempted extortion; punishment (top)
Section 25. Whoever, verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another of a crime or offence, or by a verbal or written or printed communication maliciously threatens an injury to the person or property of another, or any police officer or person having the powers of a police officer, or any officer, or employee of any licensing authority who verbally or by written or printed communication maliciously and unlawfully uses or threatens to use against another the power or authority vested in him, with intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage, or with intent to compel any person to do any act against his will, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than fifteen years, or in the house of correction for not more than two and one half years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both.
MA Code Section 28. Poison; use with intent to injure; punishment (top)
Section 28. Whoever mingles poison with food, drink or medicine with intent to kill or injure another person, or wilfully poisons any spring, well or reservoir of water with such intent, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years.
MA Code Section 29. Assault; intent to commit felony; punishment (top)
Section 29. Whoever assaults another with intent to commit a felony shall, if the punishment of such assault is not hereinbefore provided, be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than ten years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail for not more than two and one half years.
ASSAULT & BATTERY/DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
In Virginia, Maryland, D.C., & Massachusetts
In Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts, assault & battery is generally when one person touches or attempts to touch another without consent of the person being touched or acting in a threatening manner, thereby causing another to be in fear of immediate harm.
In the past, assault was different from battery. Assault was the threat of an unwanted touching. Battery was the actual touching. Now, like most states, Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts do not distinguish between the terms and the term assault & battery is used interchangeably.
Domestic violence is a form of assault and battery in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. In Massachusetts, Maryland & Virginia, domestic violence is the assault & battery on a household member or family by another household member. In the past, domestic violence was not paid a lot of attention to by the justice system in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. Society viewed it as a family matter and deemed that the parties would resolve their differences without third party intervention. In the recent past, society’s attitude has changed towards domestic violence. The Massachusetts, Maryland & Virginia courts now treat domestic violence very seriously. The family member , who is usually the spouse in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts can no longer have the charges dropped by telling the prosecutor or the court that they do not wish the family member charged to be prosecuted. Once the police are called, usually the matter of whether the family member is prosecuted is no longer up to the alleged victim.
A number of factors will determine the punishment of the person who is convicted of domestic violence in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. Some of the factors are the severity of the victim injuries, whether a minor was present (and even worse, if the minor saw the domestic violence or was a victim of the domestic violence) and lastly whether this is the first time the person has been convicted of domestic violence.
In a number of states such as Virginia, a third or subsequent offense of domestic violence can result with being convicted of a felony.
If you wish to speak with a assault & battery defense attorney or domestic violence defense lawyer in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts, please call us at 888-437-7747, email us or contact us via our fast on line form.
The Law Offices of SRIS, P.C. have offices in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts.
- Our offices in Virginia are in Northern Virginia, Central Virginia, Hampton Roads/Tidewater area & Western part of Virginia. You can visit us in Fairfax, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond & Virginia Beach.
- Our offices in Maryland are in Rockville & Annapolis.
- Our office in Massachusetts is in Boston.
If you wish to view some of the laws that pertain to being accused of being a assault & battery in Virginia, Maryland and Massachusetts, please click on the following links:
To better serve you we have offices in Virginia, Maryland and Massachusetts. Please click on the link to view our different office locations.
Our Massachusetts, Maryland & Virginia assault & battery & domestic violence defense attorneys and staff speak the following languages in addition to English: Spanish, French, Arabic, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Cantonese, Mandarin & Malaysian.
Our attorneys are licensed to handle assault & battery criminal cases and domestic violence cases in Virginia, Maryland, D.C. & Massachusetts. However, our attorneys defend assault & battery and domestic violence cases only in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts at the present time.
Please click on attorneys to learn more about the assault & battery defense lawyers and domestic violence defense attorneys who handle assault & battery and domestic violence cases in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DEFENSE
Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts
Domestic assault & battery is aggressively prosecuted in Virginia & Maryland. Frequently, clients are of the opinion that if they are charged with domestic violence in Virginia or domestic abuse in Maryland, they can have the case dropped in court if the spouse agrees to drop the case in court.
This is no longer the case in Virginia or Maryland. The prosecutor or states’ attorney will no longer drop a domestic assault & battery just because the other spouse does not want to pursue the domestic violence / domestic abuse charge.
If you have been charged with a domestic assault & battery against a family member in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts, contact the Virginia Lawyer, Maryland Lawyer, Massachusetts Lawyer SRIS Law Group domestic abuse lawyers for help at 888-437-7747.
VIRGINIA CLASS 1 MISDEMEANOR
A Virginia Class 1 misdemeanor is a very serious criminal charge. If you have been charged with Virginia Class 1 misdemeanor, do not take it lightly. The maximum penalties for a Virginia Class 1 misdemeanor is 1 year in jail & a $2500 fine. If you have been charged with a reckless driving in Virginia, DUI in Virginia, domestic assault & battery in Virginia, possession of marijuana in Virginia or any other similar charge in Virginia, you are facing a class 1 misdemeanor in Virginia.
Contact the SRIS Law Group at 888-437-7747 for help if you have been charged with a Virginia Class 1 misdemeanor.
