Posts Tagged ‘Embezzlement’

MASSACHUSETTS CRIMINAL LARCENY, MASSACHUSETTS SHOPLIFTING & MASSACHUSETTS EMBEZZLEMENT DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

DEFENDING CLIENTS CHARGED WITH THEFT CRIMES IN MASSACHUSETTS

No one wants the stigma of being called a thief following them around for the rest of their life. Unfortunately, that is exactly what happens if you are convicted of larceny in Massachusetts, embezzlement in Massachusetts, shoplifting in Massachusetts or plain and simple theft in Massachusetts. Today, almost every employer in Massachusetts wants to know whether you have ever been convicted of a larceny in Massachusetts or embezzlement in Massachusetts. This is especially true if you are seeking employment where you will be handling money. A conviction for any kind of Massachusetts larceny, Massachusetts embezzlement, Massachusetts shoplifting can stop you dead in your tracks if you are applying to a college or university. A lot of people in Massachusetts think that if you are convicted of shoplifting of some petty item, then it is not a big deal to plead guilty because there is little or no jail time at stake. What many people do not realize is that this conviction will be follow them for the rest of their lives. We cannot begin to tell you the number of clients in Massachusetts, that contact us trying to have their criminal record erased for a minor theft crime they committed when they were young and is now hindering them for getting any kind of decent job. Don’t let this happen to you. The SRIS, P.C. Massachusetts criminal defense attorneys who defend clients charged larceny in Massachusetts, embezzlement in Massachusetts or shoplifting in Massachusetts recognize the implication of being convicted of this type of an offense. If you have been charged with a theft offense in Massachusetts, the Massachusetts law offices of SRIS, P.C. have a number of excellent Massachusetts larceny lawyers & Massachusetts shoplifting attorneys & Massachusetts embezzlement defense lawyers in its office in Boston, Massachusetts. For more information or to make an appointment with SRIS, P.C., please call, send an e-mail or complete the on-line form, or call us at our toll free number (888-437-7747).

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE:
101 Federal Street, Suite 1900
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
Phone: 888-437-7747

To obtain a general overview of criminal larceny, shoplifting & embezzlement, please click here.

To learn more about the laws pertaining to criminal larceny, shoplifting & embezzlement in Virginia or Maryland, please click on the state.

Below are some of the different types of the Larceny/Shoplifting/Embezzlement laws in the State of Massachusetts:

LARCENY/SHOPLIFTING/EMBEZZLEMENT CRIMES IN THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

• Stealing in trucks, tractors, trailers or freight containers
• Stolen property; refusal to surrender
• Embezzlement of property at fire; effect
• Stealing at a fire; punishment
• Larceny by stealing; punishment; victim sixty-five or older; minimum sentence for repeat offenders
• Motor vehicle or trailer; theft or concealment; operation without owner’s consent after revocation of license; penalty
• Larceny; general provisions and penalties
• Shoplifting; penalty; arrest without warrant
• Signature; obtaining under false pretenses
• Fraudulent conversion of property by captain of vessel
• Larceny; false pretences relating to contracts, banking transactions or credit
• Obtaining computer services by fraud or misrepresentation; penalties
• Larceny; inducement to part with property
• Non-applicability of Secs. 30, 31 and 34
• Fraudulent checks, etc.; drawing or uttering
• Misuse of credit cards; definitions
• Misuse of credit cards; penalties; multiple possession, presumption; arrest
• Fraudulent use of credit cards to obtain money, goods or services; false embossment of credit cards, multiple possession, presumption; arrest
• Publishing credit card numbering or coding systems
• Use of personal identification of another; identity fraud; penalty; restitution
• Common and notorious thief

MA Code Section 20B. Stealing in trucks, tractors, trailers or freight containers (top)

Section 20B. Whoever steals in a truck, tractor/trailer unit, trailer, semi-trailer or freight container shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in jail for not more than two years.

MA Code Section 21. Stolen property; refusal to surrender (top)

Section 21. Whoever, having been convicted, either as principal or accessory, of burglary or robbery, or of any of the crimes described in sections seventeen to twenty, inclusive, of chapter two hundred and sixty-five, or of breaking and entering or of entering a building with intent to commit robbery or larceny, has in his possession or control money, goods, bonds or bank notes, or any paper of value, or any property of another, which was obtained or taken by means of such crime, and, upon being requested by the lawful owner thereof to deliver the same to him, refuses or fails so to do while having power to deliver the same, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or in jail or house of correction for not more than two years.

MA Code Section 23. Embezzlement of property at fire; effect (top)

Section 23. Whoever steals, conveys away or conceals any furniture, goods, chattels, merchandise or effects of persons whose houses or buildings are on fire or are endangered thereby, and does not, within two days thereafter, restore the same or give notice of his possession thereof to the owner, if known, or, if unknown, to the mayor or one of the aldermen, selectmen or firewards of the place, shall be guilty of larceny.

MA Code Section 24. Stealing at a fire; punishment (top)

Section 24. Whoever steals in a building which is on fire, or steals property which has been removed in consequence of an alarm caused by fire, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars and imprisonment in jail for not more than two years.

MA Code Section 25. Larceny by stealing; punishment; victim sixty-five or older; minimum sentence for repeat offenders (top)

Section 25. (a) Whoever commits larceny by stealing from the person of a person sixty-five years or older shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or in jail for not more than two and one-half years.
Whoever, after having been convicted of said crime commits a second or subsequent such crime, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two years. Said sentence shall not be reduced until one year of said sentence has been served nor shall the person convicted be eligible for probation, parole, furlough, work release or receive any deduction from his sentence for good conduct until he shall have served one year of such sentence; provided, however, that the commissioner of correction may, on the recommendation of the warden, superintendent, or other person in charge of a correctional institution, or the administrator of a county correctional institution, grant to said offender a temporary release in the custody of an officer of such institution for the following purposes only: to attend the funeral of next of kin or spouse; to visit a critically ill close relative or spouse; or to obtain emergency medical services unavailable at said institution. The provisions of section eighty-seven of chapter two hundred and seventy-six relating to the power of the court to place certain offenders on probation shall not apply to any person seventeen years of age or over charged with a violation of this subsection.
(b) Whoever commits larceny by stealing from the person of another shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or in jail for not more than two and one-half years.

MA Code Section 28. Motor vehicle or trailer; theft or concealment; operation without owner’s consent after revocation of license; penalty (top)

Section 28. (a) Whoever steals a motor vehicle or trailer, whoever maliciously damages a motor vehicle or trailer, whoever buys, receives, possesses, conceals, or obtains control of a motor vehicle or trailer, knowing or having reason to know the same to have been stolen, or whoever takes a motor vehicle without the authority of the owner and steals from it any of its parts or accessories, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than fifteen years or by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and one-half years or by a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Evidence that an identifying number or numbers of a motor vehicle or trailer or part thereof has been intentionally and maliciously removed, defaced, altered, changed, destroyed, obliterated, or mutilated, shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant knew or had reason to know that the motor vehicle, or trailer or part thereof had been stolen.
A prosecution commenced under this subdivision shall not be placed on file or continued without a finding and the sentence imposed upon a person convicted of violating this subdivision for a second or subsequent offense shall not be reduced to less than one year imprisonment, nor shall any sentence imposed upon any person be suspended, or reduced, until such person shall have served one year of such sentence if convicted of a second or subsequent such offense.
A person convicted of a second or subsequent offense of violating the provisions of this subdivision shall not be eligible for probation, parole, furlough or work release; provided, however that the commissioner of correction may, on the recommendation of warden, superintendent, or other person in charge of a correctional institution, or the administrator of a county correctional institution, grant to said offender a temporary release in the custody of an officer of such institution for the following purposes: to attend the funeral of next of kin or spouse; to visit a critically ill close relative or spouse; or to obtain emergency medical services unavailable at said institution.
(b) Whoever conceals any motor vehicle or trailer thief knowing him to be such, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years or by imprisonment in jail or house of correction for not more than two and one-half years or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both.
(c) A conviction of a violation of this section or any adjudication that a person is a delinquent child by reason thereof shall be reported forthwith by the court or magistrate to the registrar of motor vehicles who shall revoke immediately the license to operate motor vehicles or the right to operate motor vehicles of the person so convicted or adjudged, and no appeal, motion for new trial or exceptions shall operate to stay the revocation of such license or right to operate. The registrar of motor vehicles after having revoked the license or right to operate of any such person so convicted or adjudged shall issue a new license or reinstate such right to operate, if the prosecution of such person is finally terminated in his favor; otherwise, no new license shall be issued nor shall such right to operate be reinstated until one year after the date of revocation following his original conviction or adjudication if for a first offense, or until five years after the date of revocation following any subsequent conviction or adjudication.

MA Code Section 30. Larceny; general provisions and penalties (top)

Section 30. (1) Whoever steals, or with intent to defraud obtains by a false pretence, or whoever unlawfully, and with intent to steal or embezzle, converts, or secretes with intent to convert, the property of another as defined in this section, whether such property is or is not in his possession at the time of such conversion or secreting, shall be guilty of larceny, and shall, if the property stolen is a firearm, as defined in section one hundred and twenty-one of chapter one hundred and forty, or, if the value of the property stolen exceeds two hundred and fifty dollars, be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail for not more than two years; or, if the value of the property stolen, other than a firearm as so defined, does not exceed two hundred and fifty dollars, shall be punished by imprisonment in jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars; or, if the property was stolen from the conveyance of a common carrier or of a person carrying on an express business, shall be punished for the first offence by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than two and one half years, or by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than six hundred dollars, or both, and for a subsequent offence, by imprisonment for not less than eighteen months nor more than two and one half years, or by a fine of not less than one hundred and fifty nor more than six hundred dollars, or both.
(2) The term “property”, as used in the section, shall include money, personal chattels, a bank note, bond, promissory note, bill of exchange or other bill, order or certificate, a book of accounts for or concerning money or goods due or to become due or to be delivered, a deed or writing containing a conveyance of land, any valuable contract in force, a receipt, release or defeasance, a writ, process, certificate of title or duplicate certificate issued under chapter one hundred and eighty-five, a public record, anything which is of the realty or is annexed thereto, a security deposit received pursuant to section fifteen B of chapter one hundred and eighty-six, electronically processed or stored data, either tangible or intangible, data while in transit, telecommunications services, and any domesticated animal, including dogs, or a beast or bird which is ordinarily kept in confinement.
(3) The stealing of real property may be a larceny from one or more tenants, sole, joint or in common, in fee, for life or years, at will or sufferance, mortgagors or mortgagees, in possession of the same, or who may have an action of tort against the offender for trespass upon the property, but not from one having only the use or custody thereof. The larceny may be from a wife in possession, if she is authorized by law to hold such property as if sole, otherwise her occupation may be the possession of the husband. If such property which was of a person deceased is stolen, it may be a larceny from any one or more heirs, devisees, reversioners, remaindermen or others, who have a right upon such deceased to take possession, but not having entered, as it would be after entry. The larceny may be from a person whose name is unknown, if it would be such if the property stolen were personal, and may be committed by those who have only the use or custody of the property, but not by a person against whom no action of tort could be maintained for acts like those constituting the larceny.
(4) Whoever steals, or with intent to defraud obtains by a false pretense, or whoever unlawfully, and with intent to steal or embezzle, converts, secretes, unlawfully takes, carries away, conceals or copies with intent to convert any trade secret of another, regardless of value, whether such trade secret is or is not in his possession at the time of such conversion or secreting, shall be guilty of larceny, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail for not more than two years. The term “trade secret” as used in this paragraph means and includes anything tangible or intangible or electronically kept or stored, which constitutes, represents, evidences or records a secret scientific, technical, merchandising, production or management information, design, process, procedure, formula, invention or improvement.
(5) Whoever steals or with intent to defraud obtains by a false pretense, or whoever unlawfully, and with intent to steal or embezzle, converts, or secretes with intent to convert, the property of another, sixty years of age or older, or of a person with a disability as defined in section thirteen K of chapter two hundred and sixty-five, whether such property is or is not in his possession at the time of such conversion or secreting, shall be guilty of larceny, and shall, if the value of the property exceeds two hundred and fifty dollars, be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than ten years or in the house of correction for not more than two and one-half years, or by a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars or by both such fine and imprisonment; or if the value of the property does not exceed two hundred and fifty dollars, shall be punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than two and one-half years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by both such fine and imprisonment. The court may order, regardless of the value of the property, restitution to be paid to the victim commensurate with the value of the property.

MA Code Section 30A. Shoplifting; penalty; arrest without warrant (top)

Section 30A. Any person who intentionally takes possession of, carries away, transfers or causes to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use of benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the value thereof; or
any person who intentionally conceals upon his person or otherwise any merchandise offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of proceeds, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the value thereof; or
any person who intentionally alters, transfers or removes any label, price tag or marking indicia of value or any other markings which aid in determining value affixed to any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment and to attempt to purchase such merchandise personally or in consort with another at less than the full retail value with the intention of depriving the merchant of all or some part of the retail value thereof; or
any person who intentionally transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment from the container in or on which the same shall be displayed to any other container with intent to deprive the merchant of all or some part of the retail value thereof; or
any person who intentionally records a value for the merchandise which is less than the actual retail value with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value thereof; or
any person who intentionally removes a shopping cart from the premises of a store or other retail mercantile establishment, without the consent of the merchant given at the time of such removal, with the intention of permanently depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart; and where the retail value of the goods obtained is less than one hundred dollars, shall be punished for a first offense by a fine not to exceed two hundred and fifty dollars, for a second offense by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars and for a third or subsequent offense by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or imprisonment in a jail for not more than two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Where the retail value of the goods obtained equals or exceeds one hundred dollars, any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than two and one-half years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
If the retail value of the goods obtained is less than one hundred dollars, this section shall apply to the exclusion of section thirty.
Law enforcement officers may arrest without warrant any person he has probable cause for believing has committed the offense of shoplifting as defined in this section. The statement of a merchant or his employee or agent that a person has violated a provision of this section shall constitute probable cause for arrest by any law enforcement officer authorized to make an arrest in such jurisdiction.

MA Code Section 31. Signature; obtaining under false pretenses (top)

Section 31. Whoever by a false pretence, with intent to defraud, obtains the signature of a person to a written instrument, the false making whereof would be a forgery, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars and imprisonment in the jail for not more than two years.

MA Code Section 32. Fraudulent conversion of property by captain of vessel (top)

Section 32. Whoever, being a captain of a vessel, embezzles or fraudulently converts or appropriates money, goods or property, held or possessed by or delivered to him, which belong wholly or in part to the crew of such vessel, the owners of the vessel, or to those who have furnished supplies to the vessel, although he is a joint charterer or co-partner with the members of the crew or with the owners of the vessel, or with the person who furnished the supplies, shall be guilty of larceny.

MA Code Section 33. Larceny; false pretences relating to contracts, banking transactions or credit (top)

Section 33. (1) Whoever, with intent to defraud, obtains by a false pretence the making, acceptance or endorsement of a bill of exchange or promissory note, the release or substitution of collateral or other security, an extension of time for the payment of an obligation, or the release or alteration of the obligation of a written contract, or (2) whoever, with intent to defraud, by a false statement in writing respecting the financial condition, or means or ability to pay, of himself or of any other person, obtains credit from any bank or trust company or any banking institution or any retail seller of goods or services accustomed to give credit in any form whatsoever shall be guilty of larceny.

MA Code Section 33A. Obtaining computer services by fraud or misrepresentation; penalties (top)

Section 33A. Whoever, with intent to defraud, obtains, or attempts to obtain, or aids or abets another in obtaining, any commercial computer service by false representation, false statement, unauthorized charging to the account of another, by installing or tampering with any facilities or equipment or by any other means, shall be punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than two and one-half years or by a fine of not more than three thousand dollars, or both. As used in this section, the words “commercial computer service” shall mean the use of computers, computer systems, computer programs or computer networks, or the access to or copying of the data, where such use, access or copying is offered by the proprietor or operator of the computer, system, program, network or data to others on a subscription or other basis for monetary consideration.

MA Code Section 34. Larceny; inducement to part with property (top)

Section 34. Whoever, with intent to defraud and by a false pretence, induces another to part with property of any kind or with any of the benefits described in the preceding section shall be guilty of larceny.

MA Code Section 35. Non-applicability of Secs. 30, 31 and 34 (top)

Section 35. Sections thirty, thirty-one and thirty-four shall not apply to a purchase of property by means of a false pretence relative to the purchaser’s means or ability to pay, if, by the terms of the purchase, payment therefor is not to be made upon or before the delivery of the property purchased, unless such pretence is made in writing and is signed by the person to be charged.

MA Code Section 37. Fraudulent checks, etc.; drawing or uttering (top)

Section 37. Whoever, with intent to defraud, makes, draws, utters or delivers any check, draft or order for the payment of money upon any bank or other depositary, with knowledge that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds or credit at such bank or other depositary for the payment of such instrument, although no express representation is made in reference thereto, shall be guilty of attempted larceny, and if money or property or services are obtained thereby shall be guilty of larceny. As against the maker or drawer thereof, the making, drawing, uttering or delivery of such a check, draft or order, payment of which is refused by the drawee, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud and of knowledge of insufficient funds in, or credit with, such bank or other depositary, unless the maker or drawer shall have paid the holder thereof the amount due thereon, together with all costs and protest fees, within two days after receiving notice that such check, draft or order has not been paid by the drawee. The word “credit”, as used herein, shall be construed to mean an arrangement or understanding with the bank or depositary for the payment of such check, draft or order.

MA Code Section 37A. Misuse of credit cards; definitions (top)

Section 37A. As used in sections thirty-seven A to thirty-seven C, inclusive, the following words shall have the following meanings, unless the context otherwise requires:
“Cardholder”, the person named on the face of a credit card to whom or for whose benefit the credit card is issued by an issuer.
“Credit card”, any instrument or device, whether known as a credit card, credit plate, or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value on credit.
“Expired credit card”, a credit card which is no longer valid because the term shown on its face has elapsed.
“Falsely embosses”, completion of a credit card, without the authorization of the named issuer, by adding any of the matter, other than the signature of the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear on the credit card before it can be used by a cardholder.
“Falsely makes”, making or drawing, in whole or in part, a device or instrument which purports to be the credit card of a named issuer but which is not such a credit card because the issuer did not authorize the making or drawing, or altering a credit card which was validly issued.
“Incomplete credit card”, a credit card that does not contain all of the matter that must be stamped, embossed, imprinted or written on said card other than the signature, as required by the issuer before it can be used by a cardholder.
“Issuer”, the business organization or financial institution which issues a credit card or his duly authorized agent.
“Receives” or “receiving”, acquiring possession or control or accepting as security for a loan.
“Revoked credit card”, a credit card which is no longer valid because permission to use it has been suspended or terminated by the issuer.

MA Code Section 37B. Misuse of credit cards; penalties; multiple possession, presumption; arrest (top)

Section 37B. Whoever, with intent to defraud, (a) makes or causes to be made, either directly or indirectly, any false statement as to a material fact in writing, knowing it to be false and with intent that it be relied on, respecting his identity or that of any other person, or his financial condition or that of any other person, for the purpose of procuring the issuance of a credit card, or (b) takes a credit card from the person, possession, custody or control of another without the cardholder’s consent by any conduct which would constitute larceny, or who, with knowledge that it has been so taken, receives the credit card with intent to use it or to sell it, or to transfer it to a person other than the issuer or cardholder, or (c) receives a credit card that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the identity or address of the cardholder, and who retains possession with intent to use it or to sell it or to transfer it to a person other than the issuer or the cardholder, or (d) being a person other than the issuer or his authorized agent, sells a credit card, or buys a credit card from a person other than the issuer or his authorized agent, or (e) being a person other than the cardholder or a person authorized by him, signs a credit card, or (f) uses, for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value, a credit card obtained or retained in violation of clauses (b) to (e), inclusive, or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or revoked, where the value of money, goods or services obtained in violation of this section is not in excess of two hundred and fifty dollars, or (g) obtains money, goods, services or anything else of value by representing without the consent of the cardholder that he is said cardholder or by representing that he is the holder of a card and such card has not in fact been issued, where the value of money, goods or services obtained is not in excess of two hundred and fifty dollars, or (h) being a person authorized by an issuer to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder, or any agent or employees of such person, furnishes money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card which he knows was obtained or retained in violation of clauses (b) to (e), inclusive, or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or revoked where the value of the goods or services obtained is not in excess of two hundred and fifty dollars, or (i) being a person who is authorized by an issuer to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder, or any agent or employee of such person, fails to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value which he represents in writing to the issuer that he has furnished, and the difference between the value of all money, goods, services and anything else of value actually furnished and the value represented to the issuer to have been furnished does not exceed two hundred and fifty dollars, or (j) receives money, goods, services or anything else of value obtained in violation of clauses (f) to (i), inclusive, or (k) makes a false statement in reporting a credit card to be lost or stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than one year or both.
Whoever has in his possession or under his control stolen credit cards issued in the names of four or more other persons shall be presumed to have violated clause (b).
Whoever is discovered by a police officer in the act of violating this section, while such officer is lawfully at or within the place where such violation occurs, may be arrested without a warrant by such police officer.

MA Code Section 37C. Fraudulent use of credit cards to obtain money, goods or services; false embossment of credit cards, multiple possession, presumption; arrest (top)

Section 37C. Whoever, with intent to defraud, (a) obtains control over a credit card as security for debt, or (b) receives a credit card which he knows was taken or retained under circumstances which constitute credit card theft or a violation of clauses (a) or (d) of section thirty-seven B or clause (a) of this section, or (c) falsely makes or falsely embosses a purported credit card or utters such a credit card, or (d) obtains money, goods, services or anything else of value by use of a credit card obtained or retained in violation of clauses (b) to (e), inclusive, of section thirty-seven B, or by use of a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or revoked, where the value of the money, goods or services obtained in violation of this section is in excess of two hundred and fifty dollars, or (e) obtains money, goods or services or anything else of value by representing without the consent of the cardholder that he is said cardholder or by representing that he is the holder of a card and such card has not in fact been issued, where the value of money, goods or services obtained in violation of this section is in excess of two hundred and fifty dollars, or (f) being a person authorized by an issuer to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card which he knows was obtained in violation of subsections (b) to (e), inclusive, of section thirty-seven B, or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or revoked, when the value of the money, goods or services obtained is in excess of two hundred and fifty dollars, or (g) being a person authorized by an issuer to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder or any agent or employee of such person, fails to furnish money, goods or services or anything else of value which he represents in writing to the issuer that he has furnished, and the difference between the value of all money, goods, services and anything else of value actually furnished and the value represented to the issuer to have been furnished exceeds two hundred and fifty dollars, or (h) receives money, goods, services or anything else of value obtained in violation of subsections (f) or (g) of section thirty-seven B, or (i) possesses one or more incomplete credit cards, intending to complete them without the consent of the issuer, or (j) possesses, with knowledge of its character, machinery, plates or any other contrivance designed to reproduce instruments purporting to be the credit cards of an issuer who has not consented to the preparation of such credit cards, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and one half years or in the state prison for not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Whoever has in his possession or under his control four or more credit cards which are falsely embossed shall be presumed to have violated clause (c).
Whoever is discovered by a police officer in the act of violating this section, while such officer is lawfully at or within the place where such violation occurs, may be arrested without a warrant by such police officer.

MA Code Section 37D. Publishing credit card numbering or coding systems (top)

Section 37D. Whoever publishes or causes to be published the number or code of an existing, canceled, revoked, expired, or nonexistent credit card issued by a public utility company or the numbering or coding system which is employed in the issuance of such credit cards, or any method, scheme, instruction or information on how to fraudulently avoid payment for telecommunication services, with the intent that such number or coding system or information be used or with knowledge that such system or information are to be used to fraudulently avoid the payment of any lawful charges imposed by a public utility company shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than twelve months, or both.
As used in this section, “publishes” means the communication of information to any one or more persons, either orally, in person, or by telephone, radio, or television, or in a writing of any kind, including a letter or memorandum, circular, poster, or handbill, newspaper or magazine article, or book with the intent that such information be used or employed in violation of this section.

MA Code Section 37E. Use of personal identification of another; identity fraud; penalty; restitution (top)

Section 37E. (a) For purposes of this section, the following words shall have the following meanings:—
“Harass”, willfully and maliciously engage in an act directed at a specific person or persons, which act seriously alarms or annoys such person or persons and would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.
“Personal identifying information”, any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to assume the identity of an individual, including any name, address, telephone number, driver’s license number, social security number, place of employment, employee identification number, mother’s maiden name, demand deposit account number, savings account number, credit card number or computer password identification.
“Pose”, to falsely represent oneself, directly or indirectly, as another person or persons.
“Victim”, any person who has suffered financial loss or any entity that provided money, credit, goods, services or anything of value and has suffered financial loss as a direct result of the commission or attempted commission of a violation of this section.
(b) Whoever, with intent to defraud, poses as another person without the express authorization of that person and uses such person’s personal identifying information to obtain or to attempt to obtain money, credit, goods, services, anything of value, any identification card or other evidence of such person’s identity, or to harass another shall be guilty of identity fraud and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment in a house of correction for not more than two and one-half years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(c) Whoever, with intent to defraud, obtains personal identifying information about another person without the express authorization of such person, with the intent to pose as such person or who obtains personal identifying information about a person without the express authorization of such person in order to assist another to pose as such person in order to obtain money, credit, goods, services, anything of value, any identification card or other evidence of such person’s identity, or to harass another shall be guilty of the crime of identity fraud and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment in a house of correction for not more than two and one-half years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(d) A person found guilty of violating any provisions of this section shall, in addition to any other punishment, be ordered to make restitution for financial loss sustained by a victim as a result of such violation. Financial loss may include any costs incurred by such victim in correcting the credit history of such victim or any costs incurred in connection with any civil or administrative proceeding to satisfy any debt or other obligation of such victim, including lost wages and attorney’s fees.
(e) A law enforcement officer may arrest without warrant any person he has probable cause to believe has committed the offense of identity fraud as defined in this section.

MA Section 40. Common and notorious thief (top)

Section 40. Whoever, having been convicted, upon indictment, of larceny or of being accessory to larceny before the fact, afterward commits a larceny or is accessory thereto before the fact, and is convicted thereof upon indictment, and whoever is convicted at the same sitting of the court, as principal or accessory before the fact, of three distinct larcenies, shall be adjudged a common and notorious thief, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years or in jail for not more than two and one half years.

Our attorneys who defend clients charged with larceny in Massachusetts, embezzlement in Massachusetts and shoplifting in Massachusetts and staff in Boston, Massachusetts, speak the following languages in addition to English:Spanish, French, Arabic, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Cantonese, Mandarin & Malaysian.

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ATTORNEYS DEFENDING

Virginia Larceny, Virginia Embezzlement, Virginia Shoplifting, Virginia Credit Card fraud, Maryland Larceny, Maryland Embezzlement, Maryland Shoplifting, Maryland Credit Card fraud, Massachusetts Larceny, Massachusetts Embezzlement, Massachusetts Shoplifting & Massachusetts Credit Card fraud

Larceny (theft) is the taking of anything that has value without the consent of the owner. To be convicted of theft/larceny in Virginia, theft/larceny in Maryland or theft/larceny in Massachusetts, the taking must be coupled with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. In Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts, the law defines larceny as either grand larceny or petty larceny. The term grand larceny vs. petty larceny is used to identify the minimum threshold value of the item stolen. If a person is accused of shoplifting, in Virginia, shoplifting in Maryland or shoplifting in Massachusetts, the person can be charged with either grand larceny or petty larceny. The value of the stolen property in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts will determine whether the person will be charged with grand larceny or petty larceny. Virginia still spells petty larceny as petit larceny.  In some states, such as Virginia, the minimum threshold for a person to be charged for grand larceny is only $200.  A grand larceny in Virginia is treated as a felony.

If you wish to speak with a Maryland criminal larceny defense lawyer, Massachusetts criminal larceny defense attorney or Virginia criminal larceny defense attorney, please call us at 888-437-7747, email us or contact us via our fast on line form.

The Law Offices of SRIS, P.C. have offices in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts.

Our offices in Virginia are located in Fairfax, Fredericksburg, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond & Virginia Beach.

Our offices in Maryland are located in Rockville & Baltimore.

Our office in Massachusetts is located in Boston.

If you wish to view some of the laws that pertain to being accused of committing a larceny in Virginia, larceny in Maryland and larceny in Massachusetts, please click on the following links:

Virginia Larceny Crimes Defense
Maryland Larceny Crimes Defense
Massachusetts Larceny Crimes Defense

To better serve you, we have larceny defense lawyers in Virginia, larceny defense lawyers in Maryland and larceny defense lawyers in Massachusetts. Please click on the link to view our different office locations.

If you wish to speak with a Virginia larceny defense attorney, Maryland larceny defense attorney & Massachusetts larceny defense attorney please call us at 888-437-7747, email us or contact us via our fast on line form.

Our Maryland theft/larceny defense attorneys, Massachusetts theft/larceny defense attorneys & Virginia theft/larceny defense attorneys who provide larceny defense and staff in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts speak the following languages in addition to English: Spanish, French, Arabic, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Cantonese, Mandarin & Malaysian.

Our attorneys are licensed to handle larceny cases in Virginia, Maryland, D.C. & Massachusetts, however we only defend theft/larceny cases in Virginia, theft/larceny cases in Maryland & theft/larceny cases in Massachusetts at the present time.

Please click on attorneys to learn more about the criminal defense lawyers who assist clients with larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud offenses in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts.

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MARYLAND LARCENY ATTORNEYS

DEFENDING MARYLAND LARCENY/MARYLAND THEFT/MARYLAND SHOPLIFTING/MARYLAND CREDIT CARD FRAUD/MARYLAND EMBEZZLEMENT CHARGES

MARYLAND MISDEMEANOR AND FELONY THEFT DEFENSE

The penalty for a crime of mortal turpitude extends far beyond the conviction. A crime of moral turpitude is lying cheating or stealing in general. Almost every job that involves the handling of money asks whether you have been convicted of a theft crime. Institutions of higher learning do the same. Answer yes to these questions and you probably will not like the result. Theft of a even something so inexpensive as a candy bar whether you are juvenile or an adult can have dire results in regards to your future. The Maryland larceny defense attorneys in our Maryland offices who help defend clients charged with Maryland theft offenses recognize the implication of being convicted of a Maryland larceny offense. If you have been charged with a Maryland theft offense, the Maryland law offices of SRIS, P.C. have a number of excellent Maryland larceny & Maryland shoplifting attorneys & Maryland embezzlement defense lawyers in its offices in Rockville & Baltimore. For more information or to make an appointment with SRIS, P.C. Maryland larceny lawyer, please call, send an e-mail or complete the on-line form, or call us at our toll free number.

ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND OFFICE: 116 Defense Highway, Suite 502 Annapolis, Maryland 21401 Phone: (240) 399-0304

ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND OFFICE: One Research Court, Suite 450 Rockville, Maryland 20850 Phone: (240) 399-0304

To obtain a general overview of larceny, shoplifting, and embezzlement defense, please click here.

To learn more about the laws pertaining to larceny, shoplifting, and embezzlement in Virginia or Massachusetts, please click on the state.

The following are some of the different types of larceny charges one could face in the State of Maryland. Click on the issue you would like to learn more about:

• Rules of construction
• Unauthorized removal of property
• Prosecution as theft
• Failure to deliver documents for merchandise
• Using vehicle without owner’s consent
• Misappropriation by bailee
• Defalcation
• Fraud, theft, and related crimes

MARYLAND LARCENY

CRIMES INVOLVING THEFT (LARCENY)

MD Larceny Code, Criminal Law § 7-102. Rules of construction (top)

Interpretation of part

(a) Conduct described as theft in this part constitutes a single crime and includes the separate crimes formerly known as:
(1) larceny;
(2) larceny by trick;
(3) larceny after trust;
(4) embezzlement;
(5) false pretenses;
(6) shoplifting; and
(7) receiving stolen property.

MD Larceny Code § 7-203. Unauthorized removal of property (top)

Prohibited

(a) Without the permission of the owner, a person may not enter or be on the premises of another, and take and carry away from the premises or out of the custody or use of the other, or the other’s agent, or a governmental unit any property, including:
(1) a vehicle;
(2) a motor vehicle;
(3) a vessel; or
(4) livestock.

Penalty

(b) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction:
(1) is subject to imprisonment for not less than 6 months and not exceeding 4 years or a fine not less than $50 and not exceeding $100 or both; and
(2) shall restore the property taken and carried away in violation of this section or, if unable to restore the property, shall pay to the owner the full value of the property.

Prohibited defense

(c) It is not a defense to this section that the person intends to hold or keep the property for the person’s present use and not with the intent of appropriating or converting the property.

MD Larceny Code § 7-107. Bad checks–Prosecution as theft (top)

Scope of section

(a) A person who obtains property or a service by a bad check under the circumstances described in Title 8, Subtitle 1 of this article may not be prosecuted for theft under this part unless that person:
(1) makes a false representation that there are sufficient funds in the drawer bank to cover the check; and
(2) commits deception as provided under § 7-104(b) or (e) of this part.

Presumptions

(b) If a person is prosecuted for theft under this section, the presumptions of § 8-104 of this article apply to the same extent as if the person were prosecuted under § 7-104 of this part.

MD Larceny Code § 7-116. Failure to deliver documents for merchandise (top)

Scope of section

(a) This section applies to a person who is entrusted with money as an advance against grain or other merchandise:
(1) that is purchased and stored in an elevator; and
(2) for which a certificate or receipt has been delivered to an official of the elevator storage facility or to the party with whom the grain or other merchandise is stored for shipment and transport to the purchaser.

Prohibited

(b) A person may not, for the person’s own benefit and in bad faith, fail to deliver to the party who entrusted the person with money under the circumstances described in subsection (a) of this section as soon as the shipment of grain or other merchandise is completed and the bill of lading is delivered to the purchaser:
(1) the draft or bill of exchange and other document required for shipment of the cargo of grain or other merchandise; and
(2) any policy of insurance on the grain or other merchandise.

Penalty

(c) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment for not less than 1 year and not exceeding 10 years or a fine not less than $500 and not exceeding $5,000 or both.

Statute of limitations and in banc review

(d) A person who violates this section is subject to § 5-106(b) of the Courts Article.

MD Larceny Code, Transportation, § 14-102. Using vehicle without owner’s consent (top)

(a) A person may not drive any vehicle without the consent of its owner and with intent to deprive the owner temporarily of his possession of the vehicle, even if without intent to steal it.
(b) A person may not take a vehicle without the consent of the owner of the vehicle and with the intent to deprive the owner temporarily of the owner’s possession of the vehicle, even if without the intent to steal the vehicle.
(c) The consent of the owner of a vehicle to the driving or taking of the vehicle may not in any case be presumed or implied because of the owner’s consent on a previous occasion to the driving or taking of the vehicle by the same or a different person.

MD Larceny Code § 7-202. Misappropriation by bailee (top)

Prohibited

(a) A bailee for hire, or a servant, agent, or employee of the bailee, may not willfully appropriate and use, or allow the appropriation and use of, any property that is the subject matter of the bailment without the consent of the owner of that property.

Penalty

(b) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding $100 or both.

MD Larceny Code § 7-114. Defalcation (top)

Prohibited

(b) A revenue officer may not willfully detain and neglect to pay money due to the State, a county, or other governmental entity into the Treasury of the State or a county or to another revenue officer authorized to receive the money longer than:
(1) 60 days after the date specified by law for the revenue officer to make payment; or
(2) 6 months after the date that the money is collected, if the law does not specify a date for the revenue officer to make payment.

Penalty

(c)(1) A revenue officer who violates this section is guilty of the misdemeanor of defalcation.
(2) On conviction, and unless the revenue officer pays the amount in default sooner, a revenue officer who violates this section:
(i) for each violation, is subject to imprisonment for not less than 1 year and not exceeding 5 years; and
(ii) is subject to any other penalty provided by law.

Statute of limitations and in banc review

(d) A revenue officer who violates this section is subject to § 5-106(b) of the Courts Article.
Evidence(e) In a prosecution under this section, a certificate of the Comptroller of the State or of a revenue officer of a county showing that the defendant is a defaulter is admissible as prima facie evidence of defalcation under this section.

MD Larceny Code § 1-401. Proof of intent–Fraud, theft, and related crimes (top)

In a trial for counterfeiting, issuing, disposing of, passing, altering, stealing, embezzling, or destroying any kind of instrument, or theft by the obtaining of property by false pretenses, it is sufficient to prove that the defendant did the act charged with an intent to defraud without proving an intent by the defendant to defraud a particular person.
The Maryland larceny attorneys and Law Offices of SRIS, P.C., are located in Rockville & Baltimore but our sphere of activity is statewide. Our Maryland Larceny & Maryland Embezzlement attorneys and staff speak various languages, including English, Tamil, Spanish, French, Arabic, Hindi, Cantonese, Mandarin, and Telugu.

For more information or to make an appointment with SRIS, P.C. Maryland theft defense lawyer, please call, send an e-mail or complete the on-line form.

We Are a Designated Debt Relief Agency under Federal Law. We Provide Legal Assistance to Consumers Seeking Relief Under the Bankruptcy Code.

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MASSACHUSETTS, MARYLAND & VIRGINIA ATTORNEYS

Defense of Embezzlement in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts

In Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts, embezzlement is theft of assets by a person who is in a position of trust over the assets that are alleged to have been stolen.  Whether a person is charged with grand larceny embezzlement vs. petty larceny embezzlement is determined by the value of the assets that are stolen. Most crimes of embezzlement in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts usually arise from an employment environment.

If you wish to speak with a Maryland, Massachusetts & Virginia criminal embezzlement defense attorney, please call us at 888-437-7747, email us or contact us via our fast on line form.

The Law Offices of SRIS, P.C. have offices in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts.

Our offices in Virginia are located in Fairfax, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond & Virginia Beach.

Our offices in Maryland are located in Rockville & Annapolis.

Our office in Massachusetts is located in Boston.

If you wish to view some of the laws that pertain to being accused of committing a larceny in Virginia, Maryland and Massachusetts, please click on the following links:

Virginia Larceny Defense
Maryland Larceny Defense
Massachusetts Larceny Defense

To better serve you, we have offices in Virginia, Maryland and Massachusetts. Please click on the link to view our different office locations.

If you wish to speak with a Virginia larceny defense attorney, Maryland larceny defense attorney & Massachusetts larceny defense attorney please call us at 888-437-7747, email us or contact us via our fast on line form.

Our Maryland, Massachusetts & Virginia attorneys who provide larceny defense and staff in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts speak the following languages in addition to English: Spanish, French, Arabic, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Cantonese, Mandarin & Malaysian.

Our attorneys are licensed to handle cases in Virginia, Maryland, D.C. & Massachusetts, however we handle legal matters only in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts at the present time.

Please click on attorneys to learn more about the criminal defense lawyers who assist clients with larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud offenses in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts

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VIRGINIA LARCENY DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

DEFENDING CLIENTS CHARGED WITH VIRGINIA LARCENY CRIMES

In Virginia, the taking of property without the consent of the owner is illegal. This is a serious offense that carries life changing consequences. The Virginia law offices of SRIS, P.C. have a number of excellent Virginia larceny attorneys & embezzlement defense lawyers in its offices in Fairfax, Fredericksburg, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond & Virginia Beach, Virginia For more information or to make an appointment with SRIS, P.C., please call, send an e-mail or complete the on-line form

FAIRFAX OFFICE: 4008 Williamsburg Court Fairfax, Virginia 22032 Phone: (703) 278-0405	RICHMOND OFFICE: 7400 Beaufont Springs Drive, Suite 300 Richmond, Virginia 23225 Phone: (804) 201-9009
MANASSAS OFFICE: 8551 Sudley Road Manassas, Virginia 20110 Phone: (703) 278-0405	VIRGINIA BEACH OFFICE: 900 Commonwealth Pl, Suite 200 Virginia Beach, Virginia 23464 Phone: (757) 512-5002

LYNCHBURG OFFICE: 102 Oakley Ave. Lynchburg, Virginia 24501 Phone: (434) 509-4004

There are many different types of larceny offenses in Virginia. For example, a person in Virginia can be charged with simple larceny offense, which can cause a person to be charged with either misdemeanor larceny or felony larceny offense. A person can also be charged with an embezzlement offense. This too can result with a misdemeanor charge or a felony charge. However, this type of an offense could result in the judge imposing a much harsher sentence. Simply because someone is charged with a larceny offense in Virginia does not mean that they are going to be convicted as charged. The charge could be dismissed if the facts are such that the Virginia Commonwealth attorney decides that they will not prevail at trial or there are some compelling reasons as to why the Virginia Commonwealth attorney should not pursue prosecution of the charge. There are also different plea bargain option available to the client if certain facts are present and the attorney handling the matter is skilled at negotiating a good plea bargain. As always, there is the option of going to trial and proving one’s innocence at trial. However, this option should be considered as a last resort as there are no guarantees as to the outcome of the case at trial, unless one has absolutely no other options available or one is certain as to the outcome of one’s case. Only the client can ultimately decide what is best for themselves. A good lawyer will lay out the different options and then the client will have to decide how to proceed.

To obtain a general overview of larceny or embezzlement defense, please click here

To learn more about the laws pertaining to larceny or embezzlement defense in Maryland or Massachusetts, please click on the state.

An larceny charge can be charged as a class 1 misdemeanor. This would still be a criminal charge. However, a larceny charge could be charged as a felony as well. This would have much more serious consequences if a person were to be convicted of this resulting from a very lengthy probation to a lengthy period of incarceration. See Virginia Code Section 18.2-10 and 18.2-11.

The following are some of the different types of Virginia larceny charges one could face in the Commonwealth of Virginia:

• Grand larceny defined
• Petit larceny defined
• Larceny of bank notes, checks, etc., or any book of accounts
• Unauthorized use of animal, aircraft, vehicle or boat; consent; accessories or accomplices
• Concealing or taking possession of merchandise; altering price tags; transferring goods from one container to another; counseling, etc., another in performance of such acts
• Punishment for conviction of misdemeanor larceny
• Manufacture, sale, etc., of devices to shield against electronic detection of shoplifting prohibited; penalty
• Receiving stolen goods
• Larceny with intent to sell or distribute; sale of stolen property; penalty
• Receipt of stolen firearm
• Receipt or transfer of possession of stolen vehicle, aircraft or boat
• Embezzlement deemed larceny; indictment
• Fraudulent conversion or removal of property subject to lien or title to which is in another
• Failure of bailee to return animal, aircraft, vehicle or boat. Please see below for a more detailed reading of each statute.

§ 18.2-95. Grand larceny defined; how punished (top)

Any person in Virginia who (i) commits larceny from the person of another of money or other thing of value of $5 or more, (ii) commits simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of $200 or more, or (iii) commits simple larceny not from the person of another of any firearm, regardless of the firearm’s value, shall be guilty of grand larceny, punishable by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not less than one nor more than twenty years or, in the discretion of the jury or court trying the case without a jury, be confined in jail for a period not exceeding twelve months or fined not more than $2,500, either or both.

§ 18.2-96. Petit larceny defined; how punished (top)

Any person in Virginia who:

1. Commits larceny from the person of another of money or other thing of value of less than $5, or

2. Commits simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of less than $200, except as provided in subdivision (iii) of § 18.2-95, shall be deemed guilty of petit larceny, which shall be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.

§ 18.2-98. Larceny of bank notes, checks, etc., or any book of accounts (top)

If any person in Virginia steals any bank note, check, or other writing or paper of value, whether the same represents money and passes as currency, or otherwise, or any book of accounts, for or concerning money or goods due or to be delivered, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof, and receive the same punishment, according to the value of the thing stolen, prescribed for the punishment of the larceny of goods and chattels. The provisions of this section shall be construed to embrace all bank notes and papers of value representing money and passing as currency, whether the same be the issue of this Commonwealth or any other state, or of the United States, or of any corporation, and shall include all other papers of value, of whatever description. In a prosecution under this section, the money due on or secured by the writing, paper or book, and remaining unsatisfied, or which in any event might be collected thereon, or the value of the property or money affected thereby, shall be deemed to be the value of the article stolen.

§ 18.2-102. Unauthorized use of animal, aircraft, vehicle or boat; consent; accessories or accomplices (top)

Any person who shall take, drive or use any animal, aircraft, vehicle, boat or vessel, not his own, without the consent of the owner thereof and in the absence of the owner, and with intent temporarily to deprive the owner thereof of his possession thereof, without intent to steal the same, shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony; provided, however, that if the value of such animal, aircraft, vehicle, boat or vessel shall be less than $200, such person shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. The consent of the owner of an animal, aircraft, vehicle, boat or vessel to its taking, driving or using shall not in any case be presumed or implied because of such owner’s consent on a previous occasion to the taking, driving or using of such animal, aircraft, vehicle, boat or vessel by the same or a different person. Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to, or an accomplice in, any such unauthorized taking, driving or using shall be subject to the same punishment as if he were the principal offender.

§ 18.2-103. Concealing or taking possession of merchandise; altering price tags; transferring goods from one container to another; counseling, etc., another in performance of such acts (top)

Whoever in Virginia, without authority, with the intention of converting goods or merchandise to his own or another’s use without having paid the full purchase price thereof, or of defrauding the owner of the value of the goods or merchandise, (i) willfully conceals or takes possession of the goods or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment, or (ii) alters the price tag or other price marking on such goods or merchandise, or transfers the goods from one container to another, or (iii) counsels, assists, aids or abets another in the performance of any of the above acts, when the value of the goods or merchandise involved in the offense is less than $200, shall be guilty of petit larceny and, when the value of the goods or merchandise involved in the offense is $200 or more, shall be guilty of grand larceny. The willful concealment of goods or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment, while still on the premises thereof, shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to convert and defraud the owner thereof out of the value of the goods or merchandise.

§ 18.2-104. Punishment for conviction of misdemeanor larceny (top)

When a person is convicted of an offense of larceny or any offense deemed to be or punished as larceny under any provision of the Code, and it is alleged in the warrant, indictment or information on which he is convicted, and admitted, or found by the jury or judge before whom he is tried, that he has been before convicted in the Commonwealth of Virginia or in another jurisdiction for any offense of larceny or any offense deemed or punishable as larceny, or of any substantially similar offense in any other jurisdiction, regardless of whether the prior convictions were misdemeanors, felonies or a combination thereof, he shall be confined in jail not less than thirty days nor more than twelve months; and for a third, or any subsequent offense, he shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.

§ 18.2-105.2. Manufacture, sale, etc., of devices to shield against electronic detection of shoplifting prohibited; penalty (top)

It shall be unlawful to manufacture, sell, offer for sale, distribute or possess any specially coated or laminated bag or other device primarily designed and intended to shield shoplifted merchandise from detection by an anti-theft electronic alarm sensor, with the intention that the same be used to aid in the shoplifting of merchandise. A violation of this section shall be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.

§ 18.2-108. Receiving, etc., stolen goods (top)

If any person buy or receive from another person, or aid in concealing, any stolen goods or other thing, knowing the same to have been stolen, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof, and may be proceeded against, although the principal offender be not convicted.

§ 18.2-108.01. Larceny with intent to sell or distribute; sale of stolen property; penalty (top)

A. Any person who commits larceny of property with a value of $200 or more with the intent to sell or distribute such property is guilty of a felony punishable by confinement in a state correctional facility for not less than two years nor more than 20 years. The larceny of more than one item of the same product is prima facie evidence of intent to sell or intent to distribute for sale.

B. Any person who sells, attempts to sell or possesses with intent to sell or distribute any stolen property with an aggregate value of $200 or more where he knew or should have known that the property was stolen is guilty of a Class 5 felony.

C. A violation of this section constitutes a separate and distinct offense.

§ 18.2-108.1. Receipt of stolen firearm (top)

Notwithstanding the provisions of § 18.2-108, any person who buys or receives a firearm from another person or aids in concealing a firearm, knowing that the firearm was stolen, shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony and may be proceeded against although the principal offender is not convicted.

§ 18.2-109. Receipt or transfer of possession of stolen vehicle, aircraft or boat (top)

Any person who, with intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle, aircraft, boat or vessel, which he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen, shall receive or transfer possession of the same from one to another or who shall with like intent have in his possession any vehicle, aircraft, boat or vessel which he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen, and who is not an officer of the law engaged at the time in the performance of his duty as an officer, shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.

§ 18.2-111. Embezzlement deemed larceny; indictment (top)

If any person wrongfully and fraudulently use, dispose of, conceal or embezzle any money, bill, note, check, order, draft, bond, receipt, bill of lading or any other personal property, tangible or intangible, which he shall have received for another or for his employer, principal or bailor, or by virtue of his office, trust, or employment, or which shall have been entrusted or delivered to him by another or by any court, corporation or company, he shall be guilty of embezzlement. Proof of embezzlement shall be sufficient to sustain the charge of larceny. Any person convicted hereunder shall be deemed guilty of larceny and may be indicted as for larceny and upon conviction shall be punished as provided in § 18.2-95 or § 18.2-96.

§ 18.2-115. Fraudulent conversion or removal of property subject to lien or title to which is in another (top)

Whenever any person is in possession of any personal property, including motor vehicles or farm products, in any capacity, the title or ownership of which he has agreed in writing shall be or remain in another, or on which he has given a lien, and such person so in possession shall fraudulently sell, pledge, pawn or remove such property from the premises where it has been agreed that it shall remain, and refuse to disclose the location thereof, or otherwise dispose of the property or fraudulently remove the same from the Commonwealth, without the written consent of the owner or lienor or the person in whom the title is, or, if such writing be a deed of trust, without the written consent of the trustee or beneficiary in such deed of trust, he shall be deemed guilty of the larceny thereof.

In any prosecution hereunder, the fact that such person after demand therefor by the lienholder or person in whom the title or ownership of the property is, or his agent, shall fail or refuse to disclose to such claimant or his agent the location of the property, or to surrender the same, shall be prima facie evidence of the violation of the provisions of this section. In the case of farm products, failure to pay the proceeds of the sale of the farm products to the secured party, lienholder or person in whom the title or ownership of the property is, or his agent, within ten days after the sale or other disposition of the farm products unless otherwise agreed by the lender and borrower in the obligation of indebtedness, note or other evidence of the debt shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of the provisions of this section. The venue of prosecutions against persons fraudulently removing any such property, including motor vehicles, from the Commonwealth shall be the county or city in which such property or motor vehicle was purchased or in which the accused last had a legal residence.

This section shall not be construed to interfere with the rights of any innocent third party purchasing such property, unless such writing shall be docketed or recorded as provided by law.

§ 18.2-117. Failure of bailee to return animal, aircraft, vehicle or boat (top)

If any person comes into the possession as bailee of any animal, aircraft, vehicle, boat or vessel, and fail to return the same to the bailor, in accordance with the bailment agreement, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof and receive the same punishment, according to the value of the thing stolen, prescribed for the punishment of the larceny of goods and chattels. The failure to return to the bailor such animal, aircraft, vehicle, boat or vessel, within five days from the time the bailee has agreed in writing to return the same shall be prima facie evidence of larceny by such bailee of such animal, aircraft, vehicle, boat or vessel.

The Virginia criminal defense attorneys and Law Offices of SRIS, P.C., is located in Fairfax, Manassas, Richmond and Virginia Beach but our sphere of activity is statewide.

We have Virginia attorneys and an office located in Fairfax, Manassas, Richmond and Virginia Beach but our Virginia lawyers provide legal representation to clients all throughout Virginia.

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The following cases are examples of how important it is to force the prosecutors in the Commonwealth of Virginia to prove the value of an item that is allegedly stolen when a person is charged with grand larceny.

16 Va.App. 78, 428 S.E.2d 14
Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Afeez A. OWOLABI
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
Record No. 0706-91-4.

March 9, 1993.

The defendant appeals his three convictions of grand larceny challenging the sufficiency of the proof of both the larceny and the value of the property allegedly stolen. We hold that, although the evidence supports a finding of larceny, it does not support a finding that the value of the credit cards stolen was in excess of **15 $200. Neither the value of goods purchased using the stolen credit cards nor the amount of credit available through use of the credit cards is evidence of the value of the credit cards.

In applying for three credit cards, the defendant used a Social Security number that was not his own. After obtaining the credit cards, he used them to purchase merchandise or obtain cash advances in an amount in excess of $200 with each card.

Defendant was charged with common law larceny, an offense punishable under Code § 18.2-95.FN1 Larceny by trick occurs when one obtains the property of another by making a false representation of a past event or an existing fact with the intent to defraud the owner of the property by causing the owner to part with the property. People v. Long, 93 Mich.App. 579, 582, 286 N.W.2d 909, 911 (1979); see also Lafave & Scott, Criminal Law § 85, at 627, § 90, at 655-58, 660-65 (1972); cf. Baker v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 192, 194, 300 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1983). The defendant contends that the use of a false Social Security number did not cause the issuers of each of the credit cards to issue the cards. However, representatives from the issuers of the credit *80 cards testified that in each instance the issuers relied on the false Social Security numbers given to them by the defendant in issuing the cards. The jury could have found from this evidence that the issuers of the credit cards relied on the defendant’s false representation to part with the credit cards and, therefore, that the defendant obtained the credit cards through larceny.
FN1. We, therefore, do not address the applicability of Code § 18.2-186 (false statements to obtain property or credit) or Code § 18.2-195.2 (fraudulent application for credit card).
At trial, the Commonwealth did not prove the actual value of the credit cards. Instead, it offered proof of the value of the property the defendant later purchased through the use of two of the cards and the amount of a cash advance he later received on the third card. In each instance, the amount charged on the cards was in excess of $200.

The defendant, however, was not charged with larceny of the merchandise or the cash advances. The indictments charged him only with having stolen the credit cards that were each alleged to have a value in excess of $200.

Even if the defendant’s multiple uses of the credit cards were acts of larceny, they were separate acts of larceny not charged in the indictments. The Commonwealth cannot prosecute a defendant for a specific larceny and prevail by proof of another act of larceny for which the defendant “was not prosecuted, and on which the jury was not instructed.” Baker, 225 Va. at 195, 300 S.E.2d at 789.

The defendant’s convictions of grand larceny, therefore, must rest on evidence that the credit cards issued to him had a value of $200 or more. Under Code § 18.2-95, as at common law, only money or “goods and chattels” are the subject of larceny. “[N]either time nor services may be taken and carried away” and are not, therefore, contemplated as the subject of larceny. Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 692, 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1977) (unauthorized use of a computer not the subject of larceny).

At common law, choses in action were not the subject of larceny. People v. Marques, 184 Colo. 262, 266, 520 P.2d 113, 116 (1974); State v. West, 157 W.Va. 209, 212-13, 200 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1973); Tillery v. State, 44 Ala.App. 369, 371, 209 So.2d 432, 434 (1968); Felkner v. State, 218 Md. 300, 309, 146 A.2d 424, 430 (1958 Md.Ct.App.). Bank notes, checks and other writings and papers of value were not the subject of larceny at common law. West, 157 W.Va. at 212-13, 200 S.E.2d at 862. However, the taking of the paper on which *81 they were written could be larceny. Felkner, 218 Md. at 309, 146 A.2d at 430.

A credit card is “any instrument or device … issued … by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services, or any other thing of value.” Code § 11-30(b). A credit card is a token of credit extended to the cardholder. **16 See Code § 8.5-103. Thus, at common law only the card itself, not the line of credit it represented, could be the subject of larceny. The same limitation applies under Code § 18.2-95. See Lund, 217 Va. at 692, 232 S.E.2d at 748.

No evidence was presented of the value of the credit cards, only of the lines of credit they represented. Consequently, the evidence did not support a finding that the card had a value greater than $200, and the defendant could be convicted only of petit larceny, not grand larceny. Contra Miller v. People, 193 Colo. 415, 418, 566 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1977) ( en banc ) (evidence of “illegitimate” market value and “dollar amount which may be purchased by using the credit card” are admissible to prove value).

For these reasons, we reverse the judgments of conviction of grand larceny and remand the matter for a trial on a charge of petit larceny, if the Commonwealth so chooses. See Knight v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 85, 90, 300 S.E.2d 600, 602-03 (1983).

Reversed and remanded.

Va.App.,1993.
Owolabi v. Com.
16 Va.App. 78, 428 S.E.2d 14

44 Va.App. 574, 606 S.E.2d 518

Briefs and Other Related Documents
Court of Appeals of Virginia,
Alexandria.
Laura L. FOSTER
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
Record No. 2535-03-4.
Dec. 21, 2004.

Any person who, with intent to defraud, shall make or draw or utter or deliver any check, draft, or order for the payment of money … knowing, at the time of such making, drawing, uttering or delivering, that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds in, or credit with, such bank … shall be guilty of larceny; and, if this check, draft, or order has a represented value of $200 or more, such person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. In cases in which such value is less than $200, the person shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
FN2. Code § 19.2-8 provides, in part:

A prosecution for a misdemeanor, or any pecuniary fine, forfeiture, penalty or amercement, shall be commenced within one year next after there was cause therefor, except that a prosecution for petit larceny may be commenced within five years….
The defendant uttered a bad check to Wal-Mart for $140.88. Wal-Mart did not obtain a warrant until fourteen months later. The trial court ruled the five-year statute of limitations for petit larceny applied and denied the plea of the statute of limitations.

Generally, felonies are not subject to a statute of limitations. See generally Ronald J. Bacigal, Criminal Procedure § 14-9, 413 (2004). Generally, misdemeanors are subject to a one-year limitation, but petit larceny is subject to a five-year limitation. Code § 19.2-8.

At early common law, larceny was the only theft crime, but it required a taking from the possession of another. New crimes such as embezzlement and false pretenses developed to fill the gaps caused by the intricacies of proving possession in larceny prosecutions. See Roger D. Groot, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Virginia 284, 503 (2004). In 1847-48, the General Assembly began enacting statutes that declared persons who committed various acts of theft “shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof.” 1847-48 Va. Acts, ch. 4. It employed that legal fiction in an effort to consolidate the law of theft and to eliminate the “indistinct,” “almost imaginary” differences in what “all amount to a criminal and fraudulent conversion by one man to his own use of another man’s *577 property.” Anable v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 563, 580-81 (1873) (Moncure, P., dissenting). The General Assembly has continued that practice to the present. 2003 Va. Acts, ch. 733.

Code § 18.2-181 declares that any person who utters a bad check “shall be guilty of larceny.” The defendant concedes she was convicted of larceny, but she argues her conviction was not petit larceny to which the five-year limitation applies. She argues that Code § 18.2-96 defines the term “petit larceny,” FN3 and only violations of that single code section receive the five-year statute of limitations.
FN3. Code § 18.2-96. Petit larceny defined; how punished.-Any person who:

1. Commits larceny from the person of another of money or other thing of value of less than $5, or

2. Commits simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of less than $200, except as provided in subdivision (iii) of § 18.2-95, shall be deemed guilty of petit larceny, which shall be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.

The term larceny is defined as “the wrongful or fraudulent taking of personal goods of some intrinsic value, belonging to another, without his assent, and with the intention to deprive the owner thereof permanently.” Dunlavey v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 521, 524, 35 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1945) (citing Vaughan v. Lytton, 126 Va. 671, 679, 101 S.E. 865, 867 (1920)). Larceny is either grand or petit, “offenses, which are considerably distinguished in their punishment, but not otherwise.” 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England ch. 17, 229 (1765).

The Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw., ch. 15 (1275), first created the classifications of petit and grand larceny and distinguished the two by the punishment prescribed. “Both were felonies.” Bell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 526, 531, 189 S.E. 441, 444 (1937). Grand larceny and petit larceny were not different crimes, but they were penalty gradations for the single offense, larceny. “At common law, there was no distinction between grand and petit larceny except in the punishment*578 , which was death in the one case and whipping in the other,-by statute extended to transportation for seven years. 4 George 1, chapter 11, 4th Blackstone, pages 229, 238.” Id. The term ” larceny” includes both petit and grand grades of the offense.

The value of the goods taken is not an element of petit larceny, but the value of the goods is an essential element of grand larceny. Knight v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 85, 88, 300 S.E.2d 600, 601 (1983). “Proof that an article has some value is sufficient to warrant a conviction of petit larceny, but where the value of the thing stolen determines the grade of the offense, the value must be alleged and the Commonwealth must prove the value to be the statutory amount.” Wright v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 132, 139, 82 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1954).

From its first enactment in 1920, the bad check law has provided that anyone who obtained property by means of a worthless check shall be deemed guilty of larceny. Page v. Wilson, 168 Va. 447, 450-51, 191 S.E. 678, 680 (1937). The original act did not include any penalty provision. The penalty was supplied by the provisions applicable to larceny. In 1926, the offense became a misdemeanor. 1926 Va. Acts, ch. 292. In 1930, the General Assembly changed the offense to grand larceny when a sufficient sum was involved. 168 Va. at 451, 191 S.E. at 680. Final amendments in 1934 established the act in its present form.

Despite the “frequent raising and lowering of the degree of crime dealt with,” the bad check statute has retained a uniform, “practically identical” definition of the crime. Cook v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 251, 256, 16 S.E.2d 635, 637 (1941) (tracing the evolution of the bad check statute). From its first enactment, the bad check statute encompassed both the misdemeanor and felony grades of the crime with the term “larceny.” The statute punished the taking of property with no intent to pay for it as a form of larceny, and it adopted the gradations applicable to larceny. “The giving of bad checks *579 for what purports to be cash purchases is discouraged.” Page, 168 Va. at 452, 191 S.E. at 681.

The 1934 Act consisted of a single section of the Code broken into three numbered paragraphs. “The first paragraph of the statute, containing the definition of the offense and designating it as larceny, remains virtually unchanged since the statute was originally passed by the General Assembly in 1920.” Bray v. Commonwealth, 9 Va.App. 417, 422, 388 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1990). The “Third” paragraph, which created the inference of intent, is unchanged, but now appears as separate Code § 18.2-183.

The “Second” paragraph of the 1934 Act stated the penalty if the defendant “would be guilty of grand larceny.” It made no mention of the penalty if the defendant would have been guilty of petit larceny.

Any person who, under the provisions of this act, would be guilty of grand larceny shall, in the discretion of the jury or court trying the case without a jury, be confined in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than five years, or be confined in jail not exceeding twelve months and fined not exceeding five hundred dollars.

1934 Va. Acts, ch. 363. The first phrase in the “Second” paragraph, “would be guilty of grand larceny,” clearly linked directly with the last phrase in the “First” paragraph, “guilty of larceny” and implied grand larceny is only one form of that larceny.

By 1934, the maximum penalty for felony bad check was lower than that for simple grand larceny. The bad check statute required a special provision prescribing the penalty for the felony grade because it differed from the general provision for grand larceny. The statute had no need to provide a penalty for the misdemeanor. The general provisions applicable to petit larceny supplied the penalty for the misdemeanor offense, just as it had done for both grades of the offense in the earlier versions of the statute.

Code § 18.2-181 now prescribes the penalty for both the misdemeanor and felony grades of the offense. The misdemeanor*580 offense required a separate penalty provision after misdemeanors were divided into four classes. 1975 Va. Acts, chs. 14, 15. A more important reason for including penalty provisions for both misdemeanor and felony grades is to clarify that the face amount of the check determines the grade of offense. It eliminates a problem that arose as intangible property became a common object of the various acts of larceny.

“Bank notes, checks and other writings and papers of value were not the subject of **521 larceny at common law.” Owolabi v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 78, 80, 428 S.E.2d 14, 15 (1993). Without evidence of the actual value of the instrument, only the paper was taken and only petit larceny was proven. Id. at 81, 428 S.E.2d at 15. Present Code § 18.2-98 rectified the problem by making the face value of an instrument proof of its actual value. “Indeed, no proof of its actual value was required, as the law deems it to be of the value expressed on its face.” Whalen v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 544, 549, 19 S.E. 182, 183 (1894).

The penalty clause of Code § 18.2-181 makes clear that face value of an instrument determines the grade of the offense just as Code § 18.2-98 does for takings. If the “represented value” was $200 or more, the act was a Class 6 felony; if less than $200, a Class I misdemeanor. Code § 18.2-181. The General Assembly used the same standard to distinguish between felony and misdemeanor bad checks in Code § 18.2-181 that it used to distinguish between felony and misdemeanor larcenies in Code §§ 18.2-95 and -96. The demarcation in both is $200, and both of the misdemeanor offenses are punished as Class 1 misdemeanors.

Code § 18.2-96 does not define “petit larceny” as a term of art that provides the precise meaning of the term applicable to other titles of the Code. The title of the statute might suggest that interpretation, “Petit larceny defined; how punished.” However, the title of a statute does not give meaning to a statute. Code § 1-13.9. Titles are for information and convenience. *581 Jones v. Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Owens, 19 Va.App. 184, 189, 450 S.E.2d 172, 175 (1994).

The wording of the statute provides no definition of “petit larceny.” The first provision fixes the monetary boundary between felony and misdemeanor larceny from the person. Larceny from the person has never been a form of simple larceny, though petit larceny is. Larceny “is distinguished by the law into two sorts; the one called simple larceny, or plain theft unaccompanied with any other atrocious circumstance; and mixt or compound larceny, which also includes in it the aggravation of a taking from one’s house or person.” Blackstone, supra, at 229.

In addition, the statute provides that the two acts shall be “deemed petit larceny.” This Court has interpreted similar phrases as only relating to the punishment characteristics of the deemed offense. Davis v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 709, 713, 419 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1992); Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 35 Va.App. 339, 345-46, 544 S.E.2d 895, 898 (2001). That rationale does not impart the definition of the deemed offense to the defined term.

Code § 18.2-96 merely designates the monetary standard for the misdemeanor grade of two forms of theft, larceny from the person and simple larceny, and prescribes the penalty for the lower grade of the crimes. As with other common law crimes, case law as rendered over time establishes the elements of the offenses and gives definition to the term. Code § 18.2-96 does not define the term “petty larceny” as a term of art. It simply prescribes the penalty for two forms of misdemeanor taking.

The statute of limitations applies a five-year limitation to prosecutions of “petit larceny.” That term means the misdemeanor grade of larceny. The punishment imposed for any offense determines its grade. Code § 18.2-8. Offenses punishable by death or imprisonment are felonies; those punishable by jail or fine are misdemeanors. Benton v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 570, 572, 16 S.E. 725, 725 (1893). Petit larceny has never borne the penalty of death or imprisonment. *582 It is the misdemeanor level of those acts that the General Assembly defines as larceny.

The defendant concedes that her rationale would mean the five-year statute of limitations would only apply to violations of Code § 18.2-96. The long history of designating various unlawful takings as larceny shows the General Assembly did not intend such a restrictive meaning. “[W]e are required to adopt the plain meaning of the statute rather than a curious, narrow or strained construction.” Sylvestre v. Commonwealth, 10 Va.App. 253, 257, 391 S.E.2d 336, 339 (1990). To do so, we hold the General Assembly intended the five-year statute **522 of limitations to apply to misdemeanor bad check offenses.

The General Assembly defined uttering a bad check as larceny. This offense involved uttering a check of $140.88. The penalty for the offense makes it a misdemeanor. By designating uttering a bad check to be a form of larceny, Code § 18.2-181 makes the misdemeanor grade of the offense a form of larceny. The lesser grade of larceny has been known as petit larceny for centuries. The trial court correctly applied the five-year statute of limitations applicable to this misdemeanor violation of the bad check statute. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

BENTON, J., dissenting.
The Commonwealth prosecuted Laura L. Foster for the misdemeanor of uttering a check in the amount of $140.88, with the intent to defraud in violation of Code § 18.2-181. In pertinent part, the statute reads as follows:

Any person who, with intent to defraud, shall make or draw or utter or deliver any check … for the payment of money, upon any bank, … knowing, at the time of such making, drawing, uttering or delivering, that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds in, or credit with, such bank, for the payment of such check, … although no express representation is made in reference thereto, shall be guilty *583 of larceny; and, if this check, draft, or order has a represented value of $200 or more, such person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. In cases in which such value is less than $200, the person shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.

The Commonwealth instituted this prosecution more than one year after the event occurred. Except as provided in the following statute, however, the legislature has put a one-year limitation on the prosecution for misdemeanors:

A prosecution for a misdemeanor, or any pecuniary fine, forfeiture, penalty or amercement, shall be commenced within one year next after there was cause therefor, except that a prosecution for petit larceny may be commenced within five years, and for an attempt to produce abortion, within two years after commission of the offense.

Code § 19.2-8. Although this statute expressly bars “prosecution for a misdemeanor” after one year, and Code § 18.2-181 expressly denotes the offense as a “Class 1 misdemeanor,” the Commonwealth contends that the exception contained within the statute of limitation applies. I disagree.

“[A] statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment that, after a certain time, no quantum of evidence is sufficient to convict.” Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 615-16, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 2452, 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003). To give effect to this legislative judgment, “courts are obligated to enforce statutes of limitation strictly and to construe any exception thereto narrowly.” Westminster Invest. Corp. v. Lamps Unltd., 237 Va. 543, 547, 379 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1989). Accord Arrington v. Peoples Security Life Ins., 250 Va. 52, 55, 458 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1995).

No language within the text of Code § 18.2-181 denotes the offense to be petit larceny. No other statute denotes the offense to be petit larceny. Indeed, the term “petit larceny” is a creature of statute and is defined as follows:

§ 18.2-96. Petit larceny defined; how punished.-Any person who:

1. Commits larceny from the person of another of money or other thing of value of less than $5, or

*584 2. Commits simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of less than $200, except as provided in subdivision (iii) of § 18.2-95, shall be deemed guilty of petit larceny, which shall be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.

This statute distinguishes between “larceny,” see subpart 1. and “simple larceny,” see subpart 2. The rule has long been established in Virginia that “[s]imple larceny … is: ‘the wrongful or fraudulent taking of personal goods of some intrinsic value, belonging to another, without his assent, and with the intention to deprive the owner thereof permanently.’ ” **523 Vaughan v. Lytton, 126 Va. 671, 679, 101 S.E. 865, 867 (1920). Simply put, Code § 18.2-181 does not create an offense that falls within the definition of “simple larceny” because it is neither a taking “without … assent,” id., nor a taking involving “complete and absolute possession of the stolen property,” Jones v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 295, 301, 349 S.E.2d 414, 418 (1986).

Significantly, the Supreme Court has unambiguously held that “[t]he elements of the statutory [bad check] offense are materially different from those of common law larceny.” Payne v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 485, 488, 281 S.E.2d 873, 874 (1981). Unlike simple larceny, which requires a showing that the accused obtained possession of the property, “[t]o prove a bad-check offense, ‘[i]t need not be shown … that anything was received in return for the check,’ for ‘the offense is complete when, with the requisite intent, a person utters a check he knows to be worthless.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, we have held in Snead v. Commonwealth, 11 Va.App. 643, 647, 400 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1991), that “bad check charges … brought under Code § 18.2-181 … [are] not violations of [Code] § 18.2-95[, which defines grand larceny,] or [Code] § 18.2-96[, which defines petit larceny].” Although it could have, the legislature did not write Code § 18.2-181 so as to designate the bad check offense involving a value less than $200 to be “petit larceny.” By express terms, the legislature designated a violation of Code § 18.2-181 to be a “Class 1 misdemeanor.”

*585 Code § 19.2-8, therefore, bars this prosecution, which was not commenced within one year after there was a cause giving rise to the violation, because a violation of Code § 18.2-181 does not constitute either simple larceny or petit larceny, but does constitute “a misdemeanor” offense.

The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity. For these reasons and others, … “criminal limitations statutes are ‘to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.’ ”

Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15, 90 S.Ct. 858, 860, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970) (citations omitted).

“If[, as in this case,] the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly clear and definite, effect must be given to it regardless of what courts think of its wisdom or policy.” Temple v. City of Petersburg, 182 Va. 418, 423, 29 S.E.2d 357, 358 (1944). We may not extend the meaning of the statute “simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation that, if the legislature had thought of it very likely broader words would have been used.” McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 341, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931). Therefore, I dissent.

Va.App.,2004.
Foster v. Com.
44 Va.App. 574, 606 S.E.2d 518

The following case discusses the purpose of the statute that makes it illegal to conceal merchandise with the intent of shoplifting.

Court of Appeals of Virginia,
Richmond.
Mark Thomas HULCHER
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
Record No. 0367-02-2.
Jan. 28, 2003.

BACKGROUND

On May 25, 2001, employees of a Henrico County video store called the police after observing appellant acting suspiciously while inside the store. An officer responded to the scene and asked appellant whether he “had any property of the store.” Appellant admitted he had some “cover boxes” but said he “didn’t feel they were of any value.” Appellant removed the cover boxes from his jacket and gave them to the officer, who returned them to store personnel.

The evidence established a cover box is a movie or video box used to advertise videos that the video store offers for rent. A cover box comprises either a video box inside a clear plastic case or a shrink-wrapped video **580 box with a piece of styrofoam inside instead of a video tape. The box itself bears the name of the movie and related pictures. It summarizes the movie’s plot and lists the cast and any awards the movie may have won. The cover box is placed “on the shelf in front of the actual videos [the store is] trying to rent.” A video box, while in use as a cover box, is an advertising aid only. It bears no price tag or bar code, has no price in the store’s computer, and is not offered for sale or rent.

Although a cover box is used only for advertising and is not available for rent with the videotape it advertises, the video store always receives as many cover boxes for a movie as it does videotapes of that movie. On some occasions, the store receives the video box in cover box form with styrofoam and shrink wrap. On other occasions, the store receives the videotape inside the video box and has to remove the videotape and use its own supplies to convert the video box into a cover box.

*604 When a movie has “been on the wall for a while and it no longer rents as well,” the store may decide to sell it as a previously viewed product. Under these circumstances, an employee “put[s] the rental product video [ ] … back in [its] cover box[ ] and … sell[s]” the box and video together. On other occasions, the video store is required to reunite the video with the box and return both to “the actual studio that sen[t] … the movies.” Under some circumstances, the video store might give away a video box “after it ha[s] served its useful purpose.”

The investigating officer issued appellant a summons charging him with concealment of merchandise with a value of $5.00. The officer testified that the boxes bore no price tags and that the figure on the warrant was “[a] replacement cost … suggested to him” when he “investigate[d] through another party not in the store.” Appellant elicited this testimony from the investigating officer on cross-examination and did not object to the officer’s testimony about replacement cost.

Appellant argued at trial that the cover boxes he concealed did not qualify as goods or merchandise at the time of concealment because they were not offered for sale. He conceded that they had some value when used as cover boxes and that some cover boxes eventually become “goods or merchandise” when reunited with a videotape and offered for sale, but he argued that the cover boxes at issue were not goods or merchandise when he concealed them.

The trial court gave counsel an opportunity to submit legal memoranda on the issue. After receiving those memoranda, the trial court ruled the legislature intended “goods” as used in the concealment statute to encompass “tangible or moveable personal property” other than merchandise. Thus, it found appellant’s behavior constituted concealment under Code § 18.2-103, and it convicted him of the charged offense.

II.

ANALYSIS

Appellant was convicted of violating Code § 18.2-103, which provides as follows:

*605 § 18.2-103. Concealing or taking possession of merchandise; altering price tags; transferring goods from one container to another; counseling, etc., another in performance of such acts.

Whoever, without authority, with the intention of converting goods or merchandise to his own or another’s use without having paid the full purchase price thereof, or of defrauding the owner of the value of the goods or merchandise, (i) willfully conceals or takes possession of the goods or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment, or (ii) alters the price tag or other price marking on such goods or merchandise, or transfers the goods from one container to another, or (iii) counsels, assists, aids or abets another in the performance of any of the above acts, when the value of the goods or merchandise involved in the offense is less than $200, shall be guilty of petit larceny and, when the value of the goods or merchandise involved in the offense is $200 or more, shall be guilty of grand larceny. The willful concealment of goods or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment, while still on the premises thereof, shall be prima facie evidence of an **581 intent to convert and defraud the owner thereof out of the value of the goods or merchandise.

(Emphases added).

Appellant contends that the language in the statute shows the legislature’s intent to equate “goods” with “merchandise,” proscribing concealment only of wares offered for sale by a merchant. We disagree.

Under accepted principles of statutory construction, “words and phrases used in a statute should be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a different intention is fairly manifest.” Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994). In addition,

Proper construction seeks to harmonize the provisions of a statute both internally and in relation to other statutes…. [L]egislative purpose can best be ” ‘ascertained from the act itself when read in light of other statutes relating to the *606 same subject matter.’ ” Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va.App. 190, 197, 480 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1997) (citation omitted). The doctrine of pari materia teaches that ” ‘statutes are not to be considered as isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a great, connected homogenous system, or a simple and complete statutory arrangement.’ ” Id. at 198, 480 S.E.2d at 796 (citation omitted).

DMV v. Wallace, 29 Va.App. 228, 233-34, 511 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1999) (citation omitted).

In order to ascertain the intent of the legislature, we turn first to the dictionary definitions of “goods” and “merchandise.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “[g]oods” as “[t]angible or movable personal property other than money; esp., articles of trade or items of merchandise.” Black’s Law Dictionary 701 (7th ed.1999). “Merchandise” is defined as “[g]oods that are bought and sold in business; commercial wares.” Id. at 1000. Thus, although “goods” may be synonymous with “merchandise,” the dictionary recognizes a definition of “goods” which is broader than the definition of “merchandise.” Under the broader of these definitions, the term “goods” includes not only merchandise offered for sale but also any other items of tangible personal property belonging to the merchant, including advertising materials, display racks, mirrors and the like.

“Although any ambiguity or reasonable doubt as to the proper construction of a penal statute must be resolved in favor of the accused, a defendant is not entitled to benefit from an ‘ unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute.’ ” O’Banion v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 47, 57, 531 S.E.2d 599, 604 (2000) ( en banc) (quoting Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 198, 269 S.E.2d 356, 357 (1980) (quoting Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979))).

It would be absurd to conclude that the legislature would say the same thing twice in one statutory provision…. The rules of statutory interpretation argue against reading any legislative enactment in a manner that will make a portion *607 of it useless, repetitious, or absurd. On the contrary, it is well established that every act of the legislature should be read so as to give reasonable effect to every word and to promote the ability of the enactment to remedy the mischief at which it is directed.

Clark v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 673, 683, 472 S.E.2d 663, 667-68 (1996), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 24 Va.App. 253, 481 S.E.2d 495 (1997). These principles support the conclusion that the legislature intended to use the broader definition of goods so as to encompass more than just merchandise.

In addition, in Code § 18.2-103, the legislature employed the disputed terms in the disjunctive, as “goods or merchandise,” which reinforces the conclusion that the legislature intended the terms would not be synonymous. Code § 18.2-103 (emphasis added). Further, the legislature could reasonably have feared that, if it had used only the term “goods,” the statute would be misconstrued to apply only to the narrower definition of “goods,” i.e., “articles of trade or items of merchandise.” Black’s, supra, at 701. Finally, although appellant points out that the statute proscribes concealment “with the intention of converting goods or merchandise … without having paid the full purchase price thereof,” it also proscribes concealment “with the intention … of defrauding the owner of the value of the goods or merchandise,”**582 which makes clear that the item concealed need not have a purchase price as long as it has some value. Code § 18.2-103 (emphases added).

The legislature’s use of only the word “goods” in proscribing “transfers [of] goods from one container to another” does not require a different result.FN1 The statute also covers the transfer*608 of “merchandise” from one container to another because, under the above definitions, items which are merchandise also are goods.
FN1. Despite appellant’s claims to the contrary, how the terms “goods” and “merchandise” are used in the title of the statute or various judicial opinions is of little importance to our resolution of this issue for two reasons. First, with limited exceptions not applicable here, the body of a statute rather than its title determines its application. See Cavalier Vending Corp. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 195 Va. 626, 629-30, 79 S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (1954) (holding Virginia’s constitutional provision that ” ‘[n]o law shall embrace more than one object which shall be expressed in its title’ ” is intended to “prevent the members of the legislature and the people from being misled” as to the character of the legislation but does not “require that the caption of an act state its full purpose as completely as the act itself”); see also Code § 1-13.9 (“The headlines of the several sections of this Code printed in black-face type are intended as mere catchwords to indicate the contents of the sections and shall not be deemed or taken to be titles of such sections, nor as any part thereof, nor, unless expressly so provided, shall they be so deemed when any of such sections, including the headlines, are amended or reenacted.”) (made applicable to “the construction of this Code and of all statutes” by Code § 1-13); Thurston Metals & Supply Co. v. Taylor, 230 Va. 475, 484, 339 S.E.2d 538, 543-44 (1986) (recognizing that headline of statute in black-face type is “codifier’s headline” as opposed to “legislative title”). Second, as appellant concedes, none of the judicial decisions he cites directly addressed the meaning of the phrase, “goods or merchandise,” as used in Code § 18.2-103.
Appellant argues the concealment statute was intended to combat shoplifting and cites the definition of “shoplift” contained in Code § 8.01-44.4(F), which governs civil actions brought by merchants to recover losses from shoplifting and employee theft. FN2 Appellant argues this definition supports his position that “goods” and “merchandise” are synonymous under the concealment statute. We reach the opposite conclusion. Code § 8.01-44.4(F) refers only to the theft of “merchandise”; *609 it does not mention the theft of “goods.” Thus, the doctrine of pari materia supports the conclusion that the legislature meant to prescribe more than the theft of merchandise under Code § 18.2-103. If it had intended to proscribe only the theft of merchandise, it would have used only the term “merchandise” as it did in Code § 8.01-44.4(F).
FN2. Code § 8.01-44.4 provides in relevant part as follows:

F. For purposes of this section:
* * *
“Shoplift” means any one or more of the following acts committed by a person without the consent of the merchant and with the purpose or intent of appropriating merchandise to that person’s own use without payment, obtaining merchandise at less than its stated sales price, or otherwise depriving a merchant of all or any part of the value or use of merchandise: (i) removing any merchandise from the premises of the merchant’s establishment; (ii) concealing any merchandise; (iii) substituting, altering, removing, or disfiguring any label or price tag; (iv) transferring any merchandise from a container in which that merchandise is displayed or packaged to any other container; (v) disarming any alarm tag attached to any merchandise; or (vi) obtaining or attempting to obtain possession of any merchandise by charging that merchandise to another person without the authority of that person or by charging that merchandise to a fictitious person.
Appellant’s contention that such an interpretation turns Code § 18.2-103 into a general larceny statute misses the point. Code § 18.2-103 is a larceny statute and provides that the behavior prescribed therein constitutes grand larceny or petit larceny depending on the value of the item or items involved in the offense. The statute’s express language indicates the legislature’s intent merely to make larcenous intent easier to prove in cases involving the theft of articles from merchants, who necessarily allow the general public largely unrestricted access to both the merchandise they offer for sale and to other goods also on their premises.FN3 **583 This interpretation of Code § 18.2-103 effects the intent of the legislature and does no harm to the larger legislative scheme of which it is a part.
FN3. We decline appellant’s invitation to consider newspaper and journal articles written contemporaneously with the passage of the concealment statute as an appropriate source of “legislative history.” See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rayl, 8 Kan.App.2d 690, 665 P.2d 1117, 1119 (Kan.Ct.App.1983) (rejecting newspaper article as conclusive proof of legislative intent); 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland’s Statutes & Statutory Construction § 48.11, at 461 (6th ed., 2000 rev.). Furthermore, even if we were to consider the content of those articles, they do not compel the conclusion appellant advances. Those articles indicate that, under the law in effect at that time, a merchant had no legal recourse against a shopper who concealed an item belonging to the store in his clothing or other possessions until the shopper took the stolen item off the premises. The stated intent of the concealment statute was “to protect a storekeeper against crooks.” Thus, the intent of the concealment statute-to permit apprehension and prosecution of individuals who conceal the property of a store without leaving the premises-could be applied just as appropriately to items offered for sale to the public as to other items of tangible personal property which were not offered for sale at the time of their theft.
For these reasons, we conclude the legislature, in enacting Code § 18.2-103, intended to proscribe the concealment of *610 both merchandise offered for sale and other types of goods not offered for sale. Thus, we affirm appellant’s conviction.

Affirmed.

Va.App.,2003.
Hulcher v. Com.
39 Va.App. 601, 575 S.E.2d 579

The following is an example of a case regarding credit card fraud and what level of proof is required by the Commonwealth to prove fraud.

Court of Appeals of Virginia,
Richmond.
Darrell Deon HARRISON
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
Record No. 1098-98-2.
May 30, 2000.

The trial judge convicted Darrell Deon Harrison of three counts of forgery, three counts of uttering, grand larceny, credit card theft, and credit card fraud. Harrison contends the trial judge erred in finding the evidence sufficient to prove *528 that he took, obtained, or withheld a credit card number, in violation of Code § 18.2-192, and that he used a credit card number with intent to defraud, in violation of Code § 18.2-195. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions.

I.

On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and accord to that evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1975). The evidence at trial concerning the credit card offenses proved that Delia Pitchford, an employee of the Sunglass Hut, sold Harrison a pair of sunglasses for $274.99. Harrison told Pitchford that he was out of checks, showed her his empty checkbook, and asked if he could use his credit card number. Pitchford testified that Harrison paid for the sunglasses using a Visa credit card number, which he had “written down in the front of [his] checkbook.” Pitchford further testified that Harrison explained “he did not have his **332 card with him [and] his girlfriend had the card.” Harrison gave Pitchford his own name and showed her his identification. He then used the credit card number to make the purchase and filled out the warranty card with his own name.

The credit card number Harrison used to purchase the sunglasses belonged to Harold Lloyd Kretzer, Jr. Kretzer testified that he owned a Visa card with the same number and that someone made charges to the account without his permission. He and his wife always had the cards in their possession. He further testified that he did not give anyone permission to use his credit card number for making a purchase at the Sunglass Hut.

Harrison testified that he received the credit card number from “a female friend” named Linda Brown, who told him that it was hers. He testified that she gave him the credit card number because “she wanted to give [him] a gift” as a token of “friendship … [and] romance.” He did not know her address. *529 Harrison never had possession of Kretzer’s credit card, only the credit card number.

The trial judge convicted Harrison of various offenses, including credit card theft and credit card fraud. This appeal followed.

II.

Code § 18.2-192 provides, in pertinent part, the following:

(1) A person is guilty of credit card or credit card number theft when:

(a) He takes, obtains or withholds a credit card or credit card number from the person, possession, custody or control of another without the cardholder’s consent.

Harrison contends the evidence was insufficient to convict him because the Commonwealth “failed to prove that the card number was taken or obtained from the person, possession, custody or control of … Kretzer or that Harrison received the card number with the knowledge that it had been so taken or obtained.” Harrison argues that, because he did not obtain physical control or custody of the credit card to the exclusion of the cardholder and did not receive the number directly from the cardholder, he could not be convicted of credit card number theft.

The statute, however, does not require the Commonwealth to prove that Harrison received the credit card number directly from Kretzer. The statute prohibits the receipt of the number “from the person, possession, custody or control of another without the cardholder’s consent.” Code § 18.2-192. Although we must strictly construe penal statutes against the Commonwealth, we are required to “construe a statute to promote the end for which it was enacted, if such an interpretation can reasonably be made from the language used[, and we must] read [statutes] to give reasonable effect to the words used ‘and to promote the ability of the enactment to remedy the mischief at which it is directed.’ ” *530 Mayhew v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 484, 489, 458 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1995) (citations omitted).

Clearly, the statute criminalizes the improper acquisition of both credit cards and credit card numbers. The statute does not exclude individuals who obtain credit card numbers from discarded receipts, via the telephone or the Internet, or any of the myriad ways in which credit card numbers can be fraudulently acquired without possession of the credit card or without the cardholder’s consent.

The evidence proved that Kretzer did not consent to this use of his credit card number. Moreover, Harrison testified at trial that he received the number from a woman under peculiar circumstances. “The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995). Harrison testified that Linda Brown gave him the number, but he did not know where Brown lived or even whether Linda Brown was her real name. Harrison told Pitchford, however, that the credit card number belonged to him. This evidence permits the inference that Harrison knew the credit card number did not belong to Linda Brown. Thus, we cannot say the trial judge **333 erred as a matter of law in rejecting Harrison’s testimony that he believed the card number belonged to Brown and that Brown was “buying [him] a gift.” See Robertson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 854, 858, 406 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1991) (holding that the fact finder’s determination that a witness was credible can only be disturbed on appeal if that “testimony was ‘inherently incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief’ “).

Harrison acquired Kretzer’s credit card number without his consent; therefore, the taking element of Code § 18.2-192 was proved because Harrison interfered with Kretzer’s right to determine who shall have the right to use his credit card number. Cf. Clay v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 254, 259, 516 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1999) ( en banc) (noting that in the context of *531 robbery, a taking from the person does not require actual contact with the person, but can be simply taking the property from that person’s personal protection and presence).

III.

In pertinent part, Code § 18.2-195 provides as follows:

(1) A person is guilty of credit card fraud when, with intent to defraud any person, he:

(a) Uses for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value a credit card or credit card number obtained or retained in violation of [Code] § 18.2-192 or a credit card or credit card number which he knows is expired or revoked;

(b) Obtains money, goods, services or anything else of value by representing (i) without the consent of the cardholder that he is the holder of a specified card or credit card number.

The evidence proved that Harrison used the credit card number to purchase sunglasses after having obtained the number in violation of Code § 18.2-192. To prove fraud, however, the Commonwealth also had to prove that Harrison had the specific intent to commit a crime. See Campbell v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 988, 990, 421 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1992) (defining intent to defraud as “act[ing] with an evil intent, or with the specific intent to deceive or trick”). ” ‘Intent is a state of mind that may be proved by an accused’s acts or by his statements and that may be shown by circumstantial evidence.’ ” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 101, 452 S.E.2d 669, 673-74 (1995) (citation omitted).

Harrison told Pitchford that the credit card number was his and then testified at trial that Linda Brown gave him the number. Harrison would have no reason to tell Pitchford the credit card number was his if he had not known the status of the number. Moreover, as the trial judge noted, Harrison gave Pitchford a false address when he filled out the warranty card. This evidence was sufficient for the trial judge to find *532 beyond a reasonable doubt that Harrison had the requisite intent to defraud.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions.

Affirmed.

Va.App.,2000.
Harrison v. Com.
32 Va.App. 525, 529 S.E.2d 330

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MASSACHUSETTS LARCENY DEFENSE, MARYLAND THEFT DEFENSE & VIRGINIA THEFT DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

DEFENDING LARCENY/THEFT/ SHOPLIFTING/EMBEZZLEMENT/CREDIT CARD FRAUD CHARGES

in Virginia, Maryland, D.C. & Massachusetts

Larceny, commonly referred to as theft is the taking of anything that has value without the consent of the owner. To be convicted of theft/larceny in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts, the taking must be coupled with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. In most states, the law defines larceny as either grand larceny or petty larceny. The term grand larceny vs. petty larceny is used to identify the minimum threshold value of the item stolen in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. If a person is accused of shoplifting in Virginia, shoplifting in Maryland or shoplifting in Massachusetts, the person can be charged with either grand larceny or petty larceny in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. The value of the stolen property will determine whether the person will be charged with grand larceny or petty larceny in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. Some states still spell petty larceny as petit larceny.  In some states, such as Virginia, the minimum threshold for a person to be charged for grand larceny is only $200.  A grand larceny in Virginia is treated as a felony.

In Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts, embezzlement is theft of assets by a person who is in a position of trust over the assets that are alleged to have been stolen. Again, like shoplifting, whether a person is charged with grand larceny embezzlement vs. petty larceny embezzlement is determined by the value of the assets that are stolen. Most crimes of embezzlement in Virginia, embezzlement in Maryland & embezzlement in Massachusetts usually arise from an employment environment.

Credit Card fraud in Virginia, Credit Card fraud in Maryland & credit card fraud in Massachusetts are becoming very serious crimes as people used credit cards more and more. Credit card fraud occurs when a person fraudulently obtain, takes, signs, uses, sells, buys or forges someone else’s credit or debit card or their card information. Another form of credit card fraud is selling something to someone knowing that the credit card being used to pay for the item or services is illegally obtained or being used without authorization. Each time a credit card or debit card transaction occurs without authorization of the real owner can constitute as a new criminal act in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. Thus, if an illegally obtained credit card is used for five different transactions, each transaction is criminal act. Therefore, each of five transactions can result in a separate charge. Due to the high rate of credit card fraud at the present time, unlike other type of theft crimes, in most states, regardless of the value of the transaction, each transaction is usually classified as a felony.

If you wish to speak with a Maryland larceny defense lawyer, Massachusetts larceny defense lawyer & Virginia criminal larceny defense attorney, please call us at 888-437-7747, email us or contact us via our fast on line form.

The Law Offices of SRIS, P.C. have offices in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts.

Our offices in Virginia are located in Fairfax, Fredericksburg, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond & Virginia Beach.

Our offices in Maryland are located in Rockville & Baltimore.

Our office in Massachusetts is located in Boston.

If you wish to view some of the laws that pertain to being accused of committing a larceny in Virginia, larceny in Maryland and larceny in Massachusetts, please click on the following links:

Virginia Larceny Defense
Maryland Larceny Defense
Massachusetts Larceny Defense

To better serve you, we have offices in Virginia, Maryland and Massachusetts. Please click on the link to view our different office locations.

If you wish to speak with a Virginia larceny defense attorney, Maryland larceny defense attorney & Massachusetts larceny defense attorney please call us at 888-437-7747, email us or contact us via our fast on line form.

Our Maryland, Massachusetts & Virginia attorneys who provide larceny defense and staff in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts speak the following languages in addition to English: Spanish, French, Arabic, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Cantonese, Mandarin & Malaysian.

Our attorneys are licensed to handle larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud in Virginia, larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud in Maryland, larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud in D.C. & larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud in Massachusetts, however we handle larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud only in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts at the present time.

Please click on attorneys to learn more about the criminal defense lawyers who assist clients with larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud offenses in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts.

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MASSACHUSETTS LARCENY DEFENSE, MARYLAND THEFT DEFENSE & VIRGINIA THEFT DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

DEFENDING LARCENY/THEFT/ SHOPLIFTING/EMBEZZLEMENT/CREDIT CARD FRAUD CHARGES

in Virginia, Maryland, D.C. & Massachusetts

Larceny, commonly referred to as theft is the taking of anything that has value without the consent of the owner. To be convicted of theft/larceny in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts, the taking must be coupled with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. In most states, the law defines larceny as either grand larceny or petty larceny. The term grand larceny vs. petty larceny is used to identify the minimum threshold value of the item stolen in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. If a person is accused of shoplifting in Virginia, shoplifting in Maryland or shoplifting in Massachusetts, the person can be charged with either grand larceny or petty larceny in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. The value of the stolen property will determine whether the person will be charged with grand larceny or petty larceny in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. Some states still spell petty larceny as petit larceny.  In some states, such as Virginia, the minimum threshold for a person to be charged for grand larceny is only $200.  A grand larceny in Virginia is treated as a felony.

In Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts, embezzlement is theft of assets by a person who is in a position of trust over the assets that are alleged to have been stolen. Again, like shoplifting, whether a person is charged with grand larceny embezzlement vs. petty larceny embezzlement is determined by the value of the assets that are stolen. Most crimes of embezzlement in Virginia, embezzlement in Maryland & embezzlement in Massachusetts usually arise from an employment environment.

Credit Card fraud in Virginia, Credit Card fraud in Maryland & credit card fraud in Massachusetts are becoming very serious crimes as people used credit cards more and more. Credit card fraud occurs when a person fraudulently obtain, takes, signs, uses, sells, buys or forges someone else’s credit or debit card or their card information. Another form of credit card fraud is selling something to someone knowing that the credit card being used to pay for the item or services is illegally obtained or being used without authorization. Each time a credit card or debit card transaction occurs without authorization of the real owner can constitute as a new criminal act in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. Thus, if an illegally obtained credit card is used for five different transactions, each transaction is criminal act. Therefore, each of five transactions can result in a separate charge. Due to the high rate of credit card fraud at the present time, unlike other type of theft crimes, in most states, regardless of the value of the transaction, each transaction is usually classified as a felony.

If you wish to speak with a Maryland larceny defense lawyer, Massachusetts larceny defense lawyer & Virginia criminal larceny defense attorney, please call us at 888-437-7747, email us or contact us via our fast on line form.

The Law Offices of SRIS, P.C. have offices in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts.

Our offices in Virginia are located in Fairfax, Fredericksburg, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond & Virginia Beach.

Our offices in Maryland are located in Rockville & Baltimore.

Our office in Massachusetts is located in Boston.

If you wish to view some of the laws that pertain to being accused of committing a larceny in Virginia, larceny in Maryland and larceny in Massachusetts, please click on the following links:

Virginia Larceny Defense
Maryland Larceny Defense
Massachusetts Larceny Defense

To better serve you, we have offices in Virginia, Maryland and Massachusetts. Please click on the link to view our different office locations.

If you wish to speak with a Virginia larceny defense attorney, Maryland larceny defense attorney & Massachusetts larceny defense attorney please call us at 888-437-7747, email us or contact us via our fast on line form.

Our Maryland, Massachusetts & Virginia attorneys who provide larceny defense and staff in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts speak the following languages in addition to English: Spanish, French, Arabic, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Cantonese, Mandarin & Malaysian.

Our attorneys are licensed to handle larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud in Virginia, larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud in Maryland, larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud in D.C. & larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud in Massachusetts, however we handle larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud only in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts at the present time.

Please click on attorneys to learn more about the criminal defense lawyers who assist clients with larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud offenses in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts.

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