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Importancia de la decision de la Corte Suprema en el caso de Padilla v. Kentucky

Lo siguiente es un analysis por el SRIS Grupo Legal Abogados de Inmigracion en Virginia. Si Ud. necesita ayuda con un caso criminal que pudiera tener consequencias de inmigracion, contactenos para ayuda. Nuestros abogados de derecho criminal y inmigracion ayudan a clientes en Virginia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina & California.

Sumario:

El Peticionante Padilla, un residente permanente legal de los Estados Unidos por mas de 40 anos, fue sometido al proceso de deportacion despues de admitir culpabilidad (tomar un “guilty plea”) a unos cargos de distribucion de drogas en Kentucky. Teniendo un abogado, Padilla admitio culpabilidad a tres cargos de drogas para la despedida del ultimo cargo y una sentencia de 10 anos en todos los cargos. Como parte del acuerdo de sentencia, Padilla accepto el servir 5 anos de su sentencia y de permanecer en periodo de probacion por el resto de los 5 ultimos anos. Padilla dijo que el admitio culpabilidad fiandose sobre los consejos de su abogado “que no tenia que preocuparse sobre su status de inmigracion porque llevaba tanto tiempo en el pais.” Bajo la ley federal, la sentencia de Padilla por una felonia de drogas es una felonia de seria categoria, y por lo tanto un crimen de deportacion. Padilla entonces apelo y ataco su sentencia con un remedio que se llama “post-conviction” recurso. Padilla arguyo que si no fuera sido por la mala y erronoa representacion legal de las consequencias de su “plea deal”, el no hubiera hecho tal acuerdo. Eventualmente la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos encontro que los derechos legales de Padilla habian sido violados. Puesto que un abogado tiene que informar a un cliente cuando su admission de culpabilidad lleva un riesgo de deportacion, un acusado que no es informado de tal tiene recursos legales para defenderse contra la deportacion. Si Ud. o alguien que Ud quiere ayudar en una situacion parecida favor de ponerse en contacto con nuestros abogados de inmigracion y de derecho criminal.

Tenemos Inmigracion Abogados en Virginia, Maryland, Massachussetts, New York, North Carolina, California para servirles. Llame:  1-888-437-7747

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JOSE PADILLA, PETITIONER v. KENTUCKY

No. 08-651

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October 13, 2009, Argued
March 31, 2010, Decided

Petitioner Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over 40 years, faces deportation after pleading guilty to drug-distribution charges in Kentucky. In postconviction proceedings, he claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence before he entered the plea, but also told him not to worry about deportation since he had lived in this country so long. He alleges that he would have gone to trial had he not received this incorrect advice. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla postconviction relief on the ground that the Sixth Amendment’s effective-assistance-of-counsel guarantee does not protect defendants from erroneous deportation advice because deportation is merely a “collateral” consequence of a conviction.

Held: Because counsel must inform a client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation, Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter not addressed here.

(a) Changes to immigration law have dramatically raised  [*2] the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited judges’ authority to alleviate deportation’s harsh consequences. Because the drastic measure of deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes, the importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important. Thus, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes. Pp. 2-6.

(b) Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, applies to Padilla’s claim. Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to “the effective assistance of competent counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763. The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla’s ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he sought about deportation concerned only collateral matters. However, this Court has never distinguished between direct and  [*3] collateral consequences in defining the scope of constitutionally “reasonable professional assistance” required under Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The question whether that distinction is appropriate need not be considered in this case because of the unique nature of deportation. Although removal proceedings are civil, deportation is intimately related to the criminal process, which makes it uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence. Because that distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation, advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Pp. 7-9.

(c) To satisfy Strickland’s two-prong inquiry, counsel’s representation must fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, and there must be “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id., at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The first, constitutional deficiency, is necessarily linked to the legal community’s practice and expectations. Id., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The weight of prevailing professional norms supports  [*4] the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the deportation risk. And this Court has recognized the importance to the client of “‘[p]reserving the . . . right to remain in the United States’” and “preserving the possibility of” discretionary relief from deportation. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347. Thus, this is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was incorrect. There will, however, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a plea are unclear. In those cases, a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was here, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. Accepting Padilla’s allegations as true, he has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy Strickland’s first prong. Whether he can satisfy the second prong, prejudice, is left for the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance.  [*5] Pp. 9-12.

(d) The Solicitor General’s proposed rule — that Strickland should be applied to Padilla’s claim only to the extent that he has alleged affirmative misadvice — is unpersuasive. And though this Court must be careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the validity of guilty pleas, the 25 years since Strickland was first applied to ineffective-assistance claims at the plea stage have shown that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than convictions after a trial. Also, informed consideration of possible deportation can benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants, who may be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties. This decision will not open the floodgates to challenges of convictions obtained through plea bargains. Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203. Pp. 12-16.

253 S. W. 3d 482, reversed and remanded.

JUDGES: STEVENS  , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY  , GINSBURG  , BREYER  , and SOTOMAYOR  , JJ., joined. ALITO  , J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which ROBERTS  , C. J., joined. SCALIA  , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS  , J., joined.

OPINION BY: STEVENS 
OPINION
JUSTICE STEVENS   delivered  [*6] the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than 40 years. Padilla served this Nation with honor as a member of the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. He now faces deportation after pleading guilty to the transportation of a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. 1

FOOTNOTES

1 Padilla’s crime, like virtually every drug offense except for only the most insignificant marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
In this postconviction proceeding, Padilla claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but also told him that he “‘did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.’” 253 S. W. 3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). Padilla relied on his counsel’s erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made his deportation virtually mandatory. He alleges that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had not received incorrect advice from his attorney.

Assuming the truth of his allegations, the Supreme Court of Kentucky  [*7] denied Padilla postconviction relief without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from erroneous advice about deportation because it is merely a “collateral” consequence of his conviction. Id., at 485. In its view, neither counsel’s failure to advise petitioner about the possibility of removal, nor counsel’s incorrect advice, could provide a basis for relief.

We granted certiorari, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1317, 173 L. Ed. 2d 582 (2009), to decide whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla’s counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country. We agree with Padilla that constitutionally competent counsel would have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter that we do not address.

I

The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority  [*8] to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. The “drastic measure” of deportation or removal, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S. Ct. 374, 92 L. Ed. 433 (1948), is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.

The Nation’s first 100 years was “a period of unimpeded immigration.” C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 1.(2)(a), p. 5 (1959). An early effort to empower the President to order the deportation of those immigrants he “judge[d] dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,” Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 571, was short lived and unpopular. Gordon § 1.2, at 5. It was not until 1875 that Congress first passed a statute barring convicts and prostitutes from entering the country, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. Gordon § 1.2b, at 6. In 1891, Congress added to the list of excludable persons those “who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.” Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. 2

FOOTNOTES

2 In 1907, Congress expanded the class  [*9] of excluded persons to include individuals who “admit” to having committed a crime of moral turpitude. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 899.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 (1917 Act) brought “radical changes” to our law. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 54-55 (1950). For the first time in our history, Congress made classes of noncitizens deportable based on conduct committed on American soil. Id., at 55. Section 19 of the 1917 Act authorized the deportation of “any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States . . . .” 39 Stat. 889. And § 19 also rendered deportable noncitizen recidivists who commit two or more crimes of moral turpitude at any time after entry. Ibid. Congress did not, however, define the term “moral turpitude.”

While the 1917 Act was “radical” because it authorized deportation as a consequence of certain convictions, the Act also included a critically important procedural protection to minimize the risk of unjust deportation: At the time of sentencing  [*10] or within 30 days thereafter, the sentencing judge in both state and federal prosecutions had the power to make a recommendation “that such alien shall not be deported.” Id., at 890. 3 This procedure, known as a judicial recommendation against deportation, or JRAD, had the effect of binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute was “consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation,” Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (CA2 1986). Thus, from 1917 forward, there was no such creature as an automatically deportable offense. Even as the class of deportable offenses expanded, judges retained discretion to ameliorate unjust results on a case-by-case basis.

FOOTNOTES

3 As enacted, the statute provided:

“That the provision of this section respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned, nor shall such deportation be made or directed if the court, or judge thereof, sentencing such alien for such crime shall, at the time of imposing judgment or passing sentence or within thirty days  [*11] thereafter, . . . make a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor that such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of this Act.” 1917 Act, 39 Stat. 889-890.

This provision was codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994 ed.) (transferred to § 1227 (2006 ed.)). The judge’s nondeportation recommendation was binding on the Secretary of Labor and, later, the Attorney General after control of immigration removal matters was transferred from the former to the latter. See Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (CA2 1986).
Although narcotics offenses — such as the offense at issue in this case — provided a distinct basis for deportation as early as 1922, 4 the JRAD procedure was generally available to avoid deportation in narcotics convictions. See United States v. O’Rourke, 213 F.2d 759, 762 (CA8 1954). Except for “technical, inadvertent and insignificant violations of the laws relating to narcotics,” ibid., it appears that courts treated narcotics offenses as crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of the 1917 Act’s broad JRAD provision. See ibid. (recognizing that until 1952 a JRAD in a narcotics case “was effective to prevent deportation” (citing Dang Nam v. Bryan, 74 F.2d 379, 380-381 (CA9 1934))).

FOOTNOTES

4 Congress  [*12] first identified narcotics offenses as a special category of crimes triggering deportation in the 1922 Narcotic Drug Act. Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596. After the 1922 Act took effect, there was some initial confusion over whether a narcotics offense also had to be a crime of moral turpitude for an individual to be deportable. See Weedin v. Moy Fat, 8 F.2d 488, 489 (CA9 1925) (holding that an individual who committed narcotics offense was not deportable because offense did not involve moral turpitude). However, lower courts eventually agreed that the narcotics offense provision was “special,” Chung Que Fong v. Nagle, 15 F.2d 789, 790 (CA9 1926); thus, a narcotics offense did not need also to be a crime of moral turpitude (or to satisfy other requirements of the 1917 Act) to trigger deportation. See United States ex rel. Grimaldi v. Ebey, 12 F.2d 922, 923 (CA7 1926); Todaro v. Munster, 62 F.2d 963, 964 (CA10 1933).
In light of both the steady expansion of deportable offenses and the significant ameliorative effect of a JRAD, it is unsurprising that, in the wake of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the Second Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective  [*13] assistance of counsel applies to a JRAD request or lack thereof, see Janvier, 793 F.2d 449. See also United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557 (CA5 1994). In its view, seeking a JRAD was “part of the sentencing” process, Janvier, 793 F.2d at 452, even if deportation itself is a civil action. Under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, the impact of a conviction on a noncitizen’s ability to remain in the country was a central issue to be resolved during the sentencing process — not merely a collateral matter outside the scope of counsel’s duty to provide effective representation.

However, the JRAD procedure is no longer part of our law. Congress first circumscribed the JRAD provision in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 5 and in 1990 Congress entirely eliminated it, 104 Stat. 5050. In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General’s authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation, 110 Stat. 3009-596, an authority that had been exercised to prevent the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during the 5-year period prior to 1996, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2001). Under contemporary law, HN1 if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after the 1996 effective  [*14] date of these amendments, his removal is practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses. 6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Subject to limited exceptions, this discretionary relief is not available for an offense related to trafficking in a controlled substance. See § 1101(a)(43)(B); § 1228.

FOOTNOTES

5 The Act separately codified the moral turpitude offense provision and the narcotics offense provision within 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994 ed.) under subsections (a)(4) and (a)(11), respectively. See 66 Stat. 201, 204, 206. The JRAD procedure, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994 ed.), applied only to the “provisions of subsection (a)(4),” the crimes-of-moral-turpitude provision. 66 Stat. 208; see United States v. O’Rourke, 213 F.2d 759, 762 (CA8 1954) (recognizing that, under the 1952 Act, narcotics offenses were no longer eligible for JRADs).

6 The changes to our immigration law have also involved a change in nomenclature; the statutory text now uses the term “removal” rather than “deportation.” See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350, n. 1, 121 S. Ct. 2268, 150 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2001).
These  [*15] changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important. These changes confirm our view that, HN2 as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part — indeed, sometimes the most important part 7 — of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.

FOOTNOTES

7 See Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae 12-27 (providing real-world examples).
II

HN3 Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to “the effective assistance of competent counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); Strickland, 466 U.S., at 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla’s ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he sought about the risk of deportation concerned only collateral matters, i.e., those matters not within the sentencing authority of the state trial court. 8 253 S. W. 3d, at 483-484 (citing Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S. W. 3d 384 (2005)). In its view, “collateral consequences are outside the scope of representation required by the Sixth Amendment,”  [*16] and, therefore, the “failure of defense counsel to advise the defendant of possible deportation consequences is not cognizable as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.” 253 S. W. 3d, at 483. The Kentucky high court is far from alone in this view. 9

FOOTNOTES

8 There is some disagreement among the courts over how to distinguish between direct and collateral consequences. See Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 119, 124, n. 15 (2009). The disagreement over how to apply the direct/collateral distinction has no bearing on the disposition of this case because, as even JUSTICE ALITO   agrees, counsel must, at the very least, advise a noncitizen “defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences,” post, at 1 (opinion concurring in judgment). See also post, at 14 (“I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does no more than require defense counsel to avoid misinformation”). In his concurring opinion, JUSTICE ALITO   has thus departed from the strict rule applied by the Supreme Court of Kentucky and in the two federal cases that he cites, post, at 2.

9 See, e.g.,  [*17] United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (CA1 2000); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 284 U.S. App. D.C. 90 (CADC 1990); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (CA4 1988); Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327 (CA5 2008); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (CA10 2004); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (CA11 1985); Oyekoya v. State, 558 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rosas, 183 Ariz. 421, 904 P.2d 1245 (App. 1995); State v. Montalban, 2000-2739 (La. 2/26/02), 810 So. 2d 1106; Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555 A.2d 92 (1989).
We, however, have never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally “reasonable professional assistance” required under Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.

We have long recognized that HN4 deportation is a particularly severe “penalty,” Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905 (1893); but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984), deportation  [*18] is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century, see Part I, supra, at 2-7. And, importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it “most difficult” to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38, 222 U.S. App. D.C. 313 (CADC 1982). Moreover, we are quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation for a particular offense find it even more difficult. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 322, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (“There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions”).

HN5 Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation. We conclude that  [*19] advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.

III

HN6 Under Strickland, we first determine whether counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Then we ask whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The first prong — constitutional deficiency — is necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal community: “The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. We long have recognized that “[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable . . . .” Ibid.; Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 13, 175 L. Ed. 2d 255, 259 (2009) (per curiam); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191, 125 S. Ct. 551, 160 L. Ed. 2d 565, and n. 6 (2004); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). Although they are “only guides,” Strickland, 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, and  [*20] not “inexorable commands,” Bobby, 558 U.S., at ___ , 130 S. Ct. 13, 175 L. Ed. 2d 255, 259, these standards may be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation, especially as these standards have been adapted to deal with the intersection of modern criminal prosecutions and immigration law.

The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that HN7 counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation. National Legal Aid and Defender Assn., Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation § 6.2 (1995); G. Herman, Plea Bargaining § 3.03, pp. 20-21 (1997); Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 713-718 (2002); A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 13:23, pp. 555, 560 (3d ed. 2004); Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2 Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems, Standards for Attorney Performance, pp. D10, H8-H9, J8 (2000) (providing survey of guidelines across multiple jurisdictions); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function 4-5.1(a), p. 197 (3d ed. 1993); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty 14-3.2(f), p. 116 (3d  [*21] ed. 1999). “[A]uthorities of every stripe — including the American Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and city bar publications — universally require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation consequences for non-citizen clients . . . .” Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae 12-14 (footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia, National Legal Aid and Defender Assn., Guidelines, supra, §§ 6.2-6.4 (1997); S. Bratton & E. Kelley, Practice Points: Representing a Noncitizen in a Criminal Case, 31 The Champion 61 (Jan./Feb. 2007); N. Tooby, Criminal Defense of Immigrants § 1.3 (3d ed. 2003); 2 Criminal Practice Manual §§ 45:3, 45:15 (2009)).

We too have previously recognized that “‘[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.’” St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 323, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (quoting 3 Criminal Defense Techniques §§ 60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999)). Likewise, we have recognized that “preserving the possibility of” discretionary relief from deportation under § 212(c) of the 1952 INA, 66 Stat. 187, repealed  [*22] by Congress in 1996, “would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 323, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347. We expected that counsel who were unaware of the discretionary relief measures would “follo[w] the advice of numerous practice guides” to advise themselves of the importance of this particular form of discretionary relief. Ibid., n. 50.

In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla’s conviction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (HN8 “Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . ., other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable”). Padilla’s counsel could have easily determined that his plea would make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, which addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically commands  [*23] removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession offenses. Instead, Padilla’s counsel provided him false assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal from this country. This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was incorrect.

Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in it. There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of the private practitioner in such cases is more limited. HN9 When the law is not succinct and straightforward (as it is in many of the scenarios posited by JUSTICE ALITO  ), a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. 10 But when the deportation consequence  [*24] is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.

FOOTNOTES

10 As JUSTICE ALITO   explains at length, deportation consequences are often unclear. Lack of clarity in the law, however, does not obviate the need for counsel to say something about the possibility of deportation, even though it will affect the scope and nature of counsel’s advice.
Accepting his allegations as true, Padilla has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy the first prong of Strickland. Whether Padilla is entitled to relief on his claim will depend on whether he can satisfy Strickland’s second prong, prejudice, a matter we leave to the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance.

IV

The Solicitor General has urged us to conclude that Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim only to the extent that he has alleged affirmative misadvice. In the United States’ view, “counsel is not constitutionally required to provide advice on matters that will not be decided in the criminal case . . . ,” though counsel is required to provide accurate advice if she chooses to discusses these matters. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10.

Respondent and Padilla both find the Solicitor  [*25] General’s proposed rule unpersuasive, although it has support among the lower courts. See, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (CA2 2002); United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (CA9 2005); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882 (CA6 1988); United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 222 U.S. App. D.C. 313 (CADC 1982); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, 125 P. 3d 930, 935; In re Resendiz, 25 Cal. 4th 230, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 19 P. 3d 1171 (2001). Kentucky describes these decisions isolating an affirmative misadvice claim as “result-driven, incestuous . . . [,and] completely lacking in legal or rational bases.” Brief for Respondent 31. We do not share that view, but we agree that there is no relevant difference “between an act of commission and an act of omission” in this context. Id., at 30; Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (“The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance”); see also State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 2004 NMSC 36, 136 N. M. 533, 538-539, 101 P.3d 799.

A holding limited to affirmative misadvice would invite two absurd results. First, it would give counsel an incentive to remain silent on matters of great importance, even  [*26] when answers are readily available. Silence under these circumstances would be fundamentally at odds with the critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of “the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement.” Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-51, 116 S. Ct. 356, 133 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1995). When attorneys know that their clients face possible exile from this country and separation from their families, they should not be encouraged to say nothing at all. 11 Second, it would deny a class of clients least able to represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is readily available. HN10 It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with available advice about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so “clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985) (White, J., concurring in judgment).

FOOTNOTES

11 As the Commonwealth conceded at oral argument, were a defendant’s lawyer to know that a particular offense would result in the client’s deportation and that, upon deportation, the client and his family might well be killed due to circumstances in the client’s home country, any decent attorney would inform the client  [*27] of the consequences of his plea. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38. We think the same result should follow when the stakes are not life and death but merely “banishment or exile,” Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-391, 68 S. Ct. 10, 92 L. Ed. 17 (1947).
We have given serious consideration to the concerns that the Solicitor General, respondent, and amici have stressed regarding the importance of protecting the finality of convictions obtained through guilty pleas. We confronted a similar “floodgates” concern in Hill, see id., at 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, but nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty. 12

FOOTNOTES

12 However, we concluded that, even though Strickland applied to petitioner’s claim, he had not sufficiently alleged prejudice to satisfy Strickland’s second prong. Hill, 474 U.S., at 59-60, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203. This disposition further underscores the fact that it is often quite difficult for petitioners who have acknowledged their guilt to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong.

JUSTICE ALITO   believes that the Court misreads Hill, post, at 10-11. In Hill, the Court recognized — for the first time — that Strickland applies to advice respecting a guilty plea.  [*28] 474 U.S., at 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (“We hold, therefore, that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel”). It is true that Hill does not control the question before us. But its import is nevertheless clear. Whether Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim follows from Hill, regardless of the fact that the Hill Court did not resolve the particular question respecting misadvice that was before it.
A flood did not follow in that decision’s wake. Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task. See, e.g., 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (HN11 “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential”); id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (observing that “[a]ttorney errors . . . are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial”). Moreover, HN12 to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 145 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2000). There is no reason to doubt that lower courts — now quite experienced with applying Strickland — can effectively and efficiently use its framework to separate  [*29] specious claims from those with substantial merit.

It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains. For at least the past 15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a client’s plea. See, supra, at 11-13. We should, therefore, presume that counsel satisfied their obligation to render competent advice at the time their clients considered pleading guilty. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674.

Likewise, although we must be especially careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the validity of guilty pleas, in the 25 years since we first applied Strickland to claims of ineffective assistance at the plea stage, practice has shown that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than convictions obtained after a trial. Pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions. 13 But they account for only approximately 30% of the habeas petitions filed. 14 The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea — an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial  [*30] — imposes its own significant limiting principle: Those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. Thus, a different calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas proceeding because, ultimately, the challenge may result in a less favorable outcome for the defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to a conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar downside potential.

FOOTNOTES

13 See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 418 (31st ed. 2005) (Table 5.17) (only approximately 5%, or 8,612 out of 68,533, of federal criminal prosecutions go to trial); id., at 450 (Table 5.46) (only approximately 5% of all state felony criminal prosecutions go to trial).

14 See V. Flango, National Center for State Courts, Habeas Corpus in State and Federal Courts 36-38 (1994) (demonstrating that 5% of defendants whose conviction was the result of a trial account for approximately 70% of the habeas petitions filed).
Finally, informed consideration of possible deportation can only benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants during the plea-bargaining process.  [*31] By bringing deportation consequences into this process, the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties. As in this case, a criminal episode may provide the basis for multiple charges, of which only a subset mandate deportation following conviction. Counsel who possess the most rudimentary understanding of the deportation consequences of a particular criminal offense may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence. At the same time, the threat of deportation may provide the defendant with a powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a dismissal of a charge that does.

In sum, we have long recognized that HN13 the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Hill, 474 U.S., at 57, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203; see also Richardson, 397 U.S., at 770-771, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763. The severity of deportation — “the equivalent of banishment  [*32] or exile,” Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-391, 68 S. Ct. 10, 92 L. Ed. 17 (1947) — only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation. 15

FOOTNOTES

15 To this end, we find it significant that the plea form currently used in Kentucky courts provides notice of possible immigration consequences. Ky. Admin. Office of Courts, Motion to Enter Guilty Plea, Form AOC-491 (Rev. 2/2003), http://courts.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/55E1F54E-ED5C-4A30-B1D5-4C43C7ADD63C/0/491.pdf (as visited Mar. 29, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Further, many States require trial courts to advise defendants of possible immigration consequences. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3)(C) (2009-2010); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1016.5 (West 2008); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-1j (2009); D. C. Code § 16-713 (2001); Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.172(c)(8) (Supp. 2010); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-93(c) (1997); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 802E-2 (2007); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 2.8(2)(b)(3) (Supp. 2009); Md. Rule 4-242 (Lexis 2009); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 278, § 29D (2009); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 15.01 (2009); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-12-210 (2009); N. M. Rule Crim. Form 9-406 (2009); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law Ann. § 220.50(7)  [*33] (West Supp. 2009); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1022 (Lexis 2007); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2943.031 (West 2006); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 135.385 (2007); R. I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-22 (Lexis Supp. 2008); Tex. Code. Ann. Crim. Proc., Art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6565(c)(1) (Supp. 2009); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.40.200 (2008); Wis. Stat. § 971.08 (2005-2006).
V

HN14 It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant — whether a citizen or not — is left to the “mercies of incompetent counsel.” Richardson, 397 U.S., at 771, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763. To satisfy this responsibility, we now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand no less.

Taking as true the basis for his motion for postconviction relief, we have little difficulty concluding that Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient. Whether Padilla is entitled to relief will depend on whether he can demonstrate prejudice as  [*34] a result thereof, a question we do not reach because it was not passed on below. See Verizon Communs., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 530, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 152 L. Ed. 2d 701 (2002).

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

CONCUR BY: ALITO 
CONCUR
JUSTICE ALITO  , with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in the judgment.

I concur in the judgment because a criminal defense attorney fails to provide effective assistance within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), if the attorney misleads a noncitizen client regarding the removal consequences of a conviction. In my view, such an attorney must (1) refrain from unreasonably providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, if the alien wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an immigration attorney. I do not agree with the Court that the attorney must attempt to explain what those consequences may be. As the Court concedes, “[i]mmigration law can be complex”; “it is a legal specialty of its own”; and “[s]ome members of the bar who represent clients facing  [*35] criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in it.” Ante, at 11. The Court nevertheless holds that a criminal defense attorney must provide advice in this specialized area in those cases in which the law is “succinct and straightforward” — but not, perhaps, in other situations. Ante, at 11-12. This vague, halfway test will lead to much confusion and needless litigation.

I

Under Strickland, an attorney provides ineffective assistance if the attorney’s representation does not meet reasonable professional standards. 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Until today, the longstanding and unanimous position of the federal courts was that reasonable defense counsel generally need only advise a client about the direct consequences of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 28 (CA1 2000) (ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails if “based on an attorney’s failure to advise a client of his plea’s immigration consequences”); United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 355 (CA5 1993) (holding that “an  [*36] attorney’s failure to advise a client that deportation is a possible consequence of a guilty plea does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel”); see generally Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 699 (2002) (hereinafter Chin & Holmes) (noting that “virtually all jurisdictions” — including “eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia” — “hold that defense counsel need not discuss with their clients the collateral consequences of a conviction,” including deportation). While the line between “direct” and “collateral” consequences is not always clear, see ante, at 7, n. 8, the collateral-consequences rule expresses an important truth: Criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings. They are not expected to possess — and very often do not possess — expertise in other areas of the law, and it is unrealistic to expect them to provide expert advice on matters that lie outside their area of training and experience.

This case happens to involve removal, but criminal convictions can carry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction  [*37] and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses. Chin & Holmes 705-706. A criminal conviction may also severely damage a defendant’s reputation and thus impair the defendant’s ability to obtain future employment or business opportunities. All of those consequences are “seriou[s],” see ante, at 17, but this Court has never held that a criminal defense attorney’s Sixth Amendment duties extend to providing advice about such matters.

The Court tries to justify its dramatic departure from precedent by pointing to the views of various professional organizations. See ante, at 9 (“The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation”). However, ascertaining the level of professional competence required by the Sixth Amendment is ultimately a task for the courts. E.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 145 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2000). Although we may appropriately consult standards promulgated by private bar groups, we cannot  [*38] delegate to these groups our task of determining what the Constitution commands. See Strickland, supra, at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (explaining that “[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides”). And we must recognize that such standards may represent only the aspirations of a bar group rather than an empirical assessment of actual practice.

Even if the only relevant consideration were “prevailing professional norms,” it is hard to see how those norms can support the duty the Court today imposes on defense counsel. Because many criminal defense attorneys have little understanding of immigration law, see ante, at 11, it should follow that a criminal defense attorney who refrains from providing immigration advice does not violate prevailing professional norms. But the Court’s opinion would not just require defense counsel to warn the client of a general risk of removal; it would also require counsel in at least some cases, to specify what the removal consequences of a conviction would be. See ante, at 11-12.

The Court’s new approach is particularly problematic because providing advice on whether  [*39] a conviction for a particular offense will make an alien removable is often quite complex. “Most crimes affecting immigration status are not specifically mentioned by the [Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)], but instead fall under a broad category of crimes, such as crimes involving moral turpitude or aggravated felonies.” M. Garcia & L. Eig, CRS Report for Congress, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity (Sept. 20, 2006) (summary) (emphasis in original). As has been widely acknowledged, determining whether a particular crime is an “aggravated felony” or a “crime involving moral turpitude [(CIMT)]” is not an easy task. See R. McWhirter, ABA, The Criminal Lawyer’s Guide to Immigration Law: Questions and Answers 128 (2d ed. 2006) (hereinafter ABA Guidebook) (“Because of the increased complexity of aggravated felony law, this edition devotes a new [30-page] chapter to the subject”); id., § 5.2, at 146 (stating that the aggravated felony list at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) is not clear with respect to several of the listed categories, that “the term ‘aggravated felonies’ can include misdemeanors,” and that the determination of whether a crime is an “aggravated felony” is made “even  [*40] more difficult” because “several agencies and courts interpret the statute,” including Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and Federal Circuit and district courts considering immigration-law and criminal-law issues); ABA Guidebook § 4.65, at 130 (“Because nothing is ever simple with immigration law, the terms ‘conviction,’ ‘moral turpitude,’ and ‘single scheme of criminal misconduct’ are terms of art”); id., § 4.67, at 130 (“[T]he term ‘moral turpitude’ evades precise definition”).

Defense counsel who consults a guidebook on whether a particular crime is an “aggravated felony” will often find that the answer is not “easily ascertained.” For example, the ABA Guidebook answers the question “Does simple possession count as an aggravated felony?” as follows: “Yes, at least in the Ninth Circuit.” § 5.35, at 160 (emphasis added). After a dizzying paragraph that attempts to explain the evolution of the Ninth Circuit’s view, the ABA Guidebook continues: “Adding to the confusion, however, is that the Ninth Circuit has conflicting opinions depending on the context on whether simple drug possession constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).”  [*41] Id., § 5.35, at 161 (citing cases distinguishing between whether a simple possession offense is an aggravated felony “for immigration purposes” or for “sentencing purposes”). The ABA Guidebook then proceeds to explain that “attempted possession,” id., § 5.36, at 161 (emphasis added), of a controlled substance is an aggravated felony, while “[c]onviction under the federal accessory after the fact statute is probably not an aggravated felony, but a conviction for accessory after the fact to the manufacture of methamphetamine is an aggravated felony,” id., § 537, at 161 (emphasis added). Conspiracy or attempt to commit drug trafficking are aggravated felonies, but “[s]olicitation is not a drug-trafficking offense because a generic solicitation offense is not an offense related to a controlled substance and therefore not an aggravated felony.” Id., § 5.41, at 162.

Determining whether a particular crime is one involving moral turpitude is no easier. See id., at 134 (“Writing bad checks may or may not be a CIMT” (emphasis added)); ibid. (“[R]eckless assault coupled with an element of injury, but not serious injury, is probably not a CIMT” (emphasis added)); id., at 135 (misdemeanor driving  [*42] under the influence is generally not a CIMT, but may be a CIMT if the DUI results in injury or if the driver knew that his license had been suspended or revoked); id., at 136 (“If there is no element of actual injury, the endangerment offense may not be a CIMT” (emphasis added)); ibid. (“Whether [a child abuse] conviction involves moral turpitude may depend on the subsection under which the individual is convicted. Child abuse done with criminal negligence probably is not a CIMT” (emphasis added)).

Many other terms of the INA are similarly ambiguous or may be confusing to practitioners not versed in the intricacies of immigration law. To take just a few examples, it may be hard, in some cases, for defense counsel even to determine whether a client is an alien, 1 or whether a particular state disposition will result in a “conviction” for purposes of federal immigration law. 2 The task of offering advice about the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction is further complicated by other problems, including significant variations among Circuit interpretations of federal immigration statutes; the frequency with which immigration law changes; different rules governing the immigration  [*43] consequences of juvenile, first-offender, and foreign convictions; and the relationship between the “length and type of sentence” and the determination “whether [an alien] is subject to removal, eligible for relief from removal, or qualified to become a naturalized citizen,” Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1, at 2-2 to 2-3.

FOOTNOTES

1 Citizens are not deportable, but “[q]uestions of citizenship are not always simple.” ABA Guidebook § 4.20, at 113 (explaining that U.S. citizenship conferred by blood is “‘derivative,’” and that “[d]erivative citizenship depends on a number of confusing factors, including whether the citizen parent was the mother or father, the immigration laws in effect at the time of the parents’ and/or defendant’s birth, and the parents’ marital status”).

2 “A disposition that is not a ‘conviction,’ under state law may still be a ‘conviction’ for immigration purposes.” Id., § 4.32, at 117 (citing Matter of Salazar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 231 (BIA 2002) (en banc)). For example, state law may define the term “conviction” not to include a deferred adjudication, but such an adjudication would be deemed a conviction for purposes of federal immigration law. See ABA Guidebook § 4.37; accord,  [*44] D. Kesselbrenner & L. Rosenberg, Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1, p. 2-2 (2008) (hereinafter Immigration Law and Crimes) (“A practitioner or respondent will not even know whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) will treat a particular state disposition as a conviction for immigration purposes. In fact, the [BIA] treats certain state criminal dispositions as convictions even though the state treats the same disposition as a dismissal”).
In short, the professional organizations and guidebooks on which the Court so heavily relies are right to say that “nothing is ever simple with immigration law” — including the determination whether immigration law clearly makes a particular offense removable. ABA Guidebook § 4.65, at 130; Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1. I therefore cannot agree with the Court’s apparent view that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense attorneys to provide immigration advice.

The Court tries to downplay the severity of the burden it imposes on defense counsel by suggesting that the scope of counsel’s duty to offer advice concerning deportation consequences may turn on how hard it is to determine  [*45] those consequences. Where “the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence[s]” of a conviction, the Court says, counsel has an affirmative duty to advise the client that he will be subject to deportation as a result of the plea. Ante, at 11. But “[w]hen the law is not succinct and straightforward . . ., a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.” Ante, at 11-12. This approach is problematic for at least four reasons.

First, it will not always be easy to tell whether a particular statutory provision is “succinct, clear, and explicit.” How can an attorney who lacks general immigration law expertise be sure that a seemingly clear statutory provision actually means what it seems to say when read in isolation? What if the application of the provision to a particular case is not clear but a cursory examination of case law or administrative decisions would provide a definitive answer? See Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1, at 2-2 (“Unfortunately, a practitioner or respondent cannot tell easily whether a conviction  [*46] is for a removable offense . . . . [T]he cautious practitioner or apprehensive respondent will not know conclusively the future immigration consequences of a guilty plea”).

Second, if defense counsel must provide advice regarding only one of the many collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, many defendants are likely to be misled. To take just one example, a conviction for a particular offense may render an alien excludable but not removable. If an alien charged with such an offense is advised only that pleading guilty to such an offense will not result in removal, the alien may be induced to enter a guilty plea without realizing that a consequence of the plea is that the alien will be unable to reenter the United States if the alien returns to his or her home country for any reason, such as to visit an elderly parent or to attend a funeral. See ABA Guidebook § 4.14, at 111 (“Often the alien is both excludable and removable. At times, however, the lists are different. Thus, the oddity of an alien that is inadmissible but not deportable. This alien should not leave the United States because the government will not let him back in” (emphasis in original)). Incomplete legal advice  [*47] may be worse than no advice at all because it may mislead and may dissuade the client from seeking advice from a more knowledgeable source.

Third, the Court’s rigid constitutional rule could inadvertently head off more promising ways of addressing the underlying problem — such as statutory or administrative reforms requiring trial judges to inform a defendant on the record that a guilty plea may carry adverse immigration consequences. As amici point out, “28 states and the District of Columbia have already adopted rules, plea forms, or statutes requiring courts to advise criminal defendants of the possible immigration consequences of their pleas.” Brief for State of Louisiana et al. 25; accord, Chin & Holmes 708 (“A growing number of states require advice about deportation by statute or court rule”). A nonconstitutional rule requiring trial judges to inform defendants on the record of the risk of adverse immigration consequences can ensure that a defendant receives needed information without putting a large number of criminal convictions at risk; and because such a warning would be given on the record, courts would not later have to determine whether the defendant was misrepresenting  [*48] the advice of counsel. Likewise, flexible statutory procedures for withdrawing guilty pleas might give courts appropriate discretion to determine whether the interests of justice would be served by allowing a particular defendant to withdraw a plea entered into on the basis of incomplete information. Cf. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 39-40, 222 U.S. App. D.C. 313 (CADC 1982) (explaining that a district court’s discretion to set aside a guilty plea under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be guided by, among other considerations, “the possible existence of prejudice to the government’s case as a result of the defendant’s untimely request to stand trial” and “the strength of the defendant’s reason for withdrawing the plea, including whether the defendant asserts his innocence of the charge”).

Fourth, the Court’s decision marks a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law. This Court decided Strickland in 1984, but the majority does not cite a single case, from this or any other federal court, holding that criminal defense counsel’s failure to provide advice concerning the removal consequences of a criminal conviction violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As noted above, the  [*49] Court’s view has been rejected by every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the issue thus far. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 28; Banda, 1 F.3d at 355; Chin & Holmes 697, 699. The majority appropriately acknowledges that the lower courts are “now quite experienced with applying Strickland,” ante, at 14, but it casually dismisses the longstanding and unanimous position of the lower federal courts with respect to the scope of criminal defense counsel’s duty to advise on collateral consequences.

The majority seeks to downplay its dramatic expansion of the scope of criminal defense counsel’s duties under the Sixth Amendment by claiming that this Court in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985), similarly “applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty.” Ante, at 14. That characterization of Hill obscures much more than it reveals. The issue in Hill was whether a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated where counsel misinformed the client about his eligibility for parole. The Court found it “unnecessary to determine whether there may be circumstances under which erroneous  [*50] advice by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, because in the present case we conclude that petitioner’s allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington requirement of ‘prejudice.’” 474 U.S., at 60, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203. Given that Hill expressly and unambiguously refused to decide whether criminal defense counsel must avoid misinforming his or her client as to one consequence of a criminal conviction (parole eligibility), that case plainly provides no support whatsoever for the proposition that counsel must affirmatively advise his or her client as to another collateral consequence (removal). By the Court’s strange logic, Hill would support its decision here even if the Court had held that misadvice concerning parole eligibility does not make counsel’s performance objectively unreasonable. After all, the Court still would have “applied Strickland” to the facts of the case at hand.

II

While mastery of immigration law is not required by Strickland, several considerations support the conclusion that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a conviction may constitute ineffective assistance.

First, a rule prohibiting  [*51] affirmative misadvice regarding a matter as crucial to the defendant’s plea decision as deportation appears faithful to the scope and nature of the Sixth Amendment duty this Court has recognized in its past cases. In particular, we have explained that “a guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not ‘a reasonably competent attorney’ and the advice was not ‘within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); emphasis added). As the Court appears to acknowledge, thorough understanding of the intricacies of immigration law is not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” See ante, at 11 (“Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in it”). By contrast, reasonably competent attorneys should know that it is not appropriate or responsible to hold themselves out as authorities on a difficult and complicated subject matter with which they are  [*52] not familiar. Candor concerning the limits of one’s professional expertise, in other words, is within the range of duties reasonably expected of defense attorneys in criminal cases. As the dissenting judge on the Kentucky Supreme Court put it, “I do not believe it is too much of a burden to place on our defense bar the duty to say, ‘I do not know.’” 253 S. W. 3d 482, 485 (2008).

Second, incompetent advice distorts the defendant’s decisionmaking process and seems to call the fairness and integrity of the criminal proceeding itself into question. See Strickland, 466 U.S., at 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (“In giving meaning to the requirement [of effective assistance of counsel], we must take its purpose — to ensure a fair trial — as the guide”). When a defendant opts to plead guilty without definitive information concerning the likely effects of the plea, the defendant can fairly be said to assume the risk that the conviction may carry indirect consequences of which he or she is not aware. That is not the case when a defendant bases the decision to plead guilty on counsel’s express misrepresentation that the defendant will not be removable. In the latter case, it seems hard to say that the plea was entered  [*53] with the advice of constitutionally competent counsel — or that it embodies a voluntary and intelligent decision to forsake constitutional rights. See ibid. (“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result”).

Third, a rule prohibiting unreasonable misadvice regarding exceptionally important collateral matters would not deter or interfere with ongoing political and administrative efforts to devise fair and reasonable solutions to the difficult problem posed by defendants who plead guilty without knowing of certain important collateral consequences.

Finally, the conclusion that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a conviction can give rise to ineffective assistance would, unlike the Court’s approach, not require any upheaval in the law. As the Solicitor General points out, “[t]he vast majority of the lower courts considering claims of ineffective assistance in the plea context have [distinguished] between defense counsel who remain silent and defense counsel who give affirmative misadvice.”  [*54] Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8 (citing cases). At least three Courts of Appeals have held that affirmative misadvice on immigration matters can give rise to ineffective assistance of counsel, at least in some circumstances. 3 And several other Circuits have held that affirmative misadvice concerning nonimmigration consequences of a conviction can violate the Sixth Amendment even if those consequences might be deemed “collateral.” 4 By contrast, it appears that no court of appeals holds that affirmative misadvice concerning collateral consequences in general and removal in particular can never give rise to ineffective assistance. In short, the considered and thus far unanimous view of the lower federal courts charged with administering Strickland clearly supports the conclusion that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s position goes too far.

FOOTNOTES

3 See United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015-1017 (CA9 2005); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (CA2 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1540-1541 (CA11 1985) (limiting holding to the facts of the case); see also Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 333-334 (CA5 2008) (concluding that counsel’s advice was  [*55] not objectively unreasonable where counsel did not purport to answer questions about immigration law, did not claim any expertise in immigration law, and simply warned of “possible” deportation consequence; use of the word “possible” was not an affirmative misrepresentation, even though it could indicate that deportation was not a certain consequence).

4 See Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009, 1010 (CA8 1990) (en banc) (“[T]he erroneous parole-eligibility advice given to Mr. Hill was ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington”); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (CA6 1988) (“[G]ross misadvice concerning parole eligibility can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel”); id., at 886 (KENNEDY  , J., concurring) (“When the maximum possible exposure is overstated, the defendant might well be influenced to accept a plea agreement he would otherwise reject”); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 65 (CA4 1979) (“[T]hough parole eligibility dates are collateral consequences of the entry of a guilty plea of which a defendant need not be informed if he does not inquire, when he is grossly misinformed about it by his lawyer, and relies upon that misinformation, he is deprived  [*56] of his constitutional right to counsel”).
In concluding that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a criminal conviction may constitute ineffective assistance, I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does no more than require defense counsel to avoid misinformation. When a criminal defense attorney is aware that a client is an alien, the attorney should advise the client that a criminal conviction may have adverse consequences under the immigration laws and that the client should consult an immigration specialist if the client wants advice on that subject. By putting the client on notice of the danger of removal, such advice would significantly reduce the chance that the client would plead guilty under a mistaken premise.

III

In sum, a criminal defense attorney should not be required to provide advice on immigration law, a complex specialty that generally lies outside the scope of a criminal defense attorney’s expertise. On the other hand, any competent criminal defense attorney should appreciate the extraordinary importance that the risk of removal might have in the client’s determination whether to enter a guilty plea. Accordingly, unreasonable and incorrect  [*57] information concerning the risk of removal can give rise to an ineffectiveness claim. In addition, silence alone is not enough to satisfy counsel’s duty to assist the client. Instead, an alien defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is satisfied if defense counsel advises the client that a conviction may have immigration consequences, that immigration law is a specialized field, that the attorney is not an immigration lawyer, and that the client should consult an immigration specialist if the client wants advice on that subject.

DISSENT BY: SCALIA 
DISSENT
JUSTICE SCALIA  , with whom JUSTICE THOMAS   joins, dissenting.

In the best of all possible worlds, criminal defendants contemplating a guilty plea ought to be advised of all serious collateral consequences of conviction, and surely ought not to be misadvised. The Constitution, however, is not an all-purpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world; and when we ignore its text in order to make it that, we often find ourselves swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is needed.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a lawyer “for his defense” against a “criminal prosecutio[n]” — not for sound advice about the collateral consequences of conviction.  [*58] For that reason, and for the practical reasons set forth in Part I of JUSTICE ALITO  ‘s concurrence, I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to provide accurate advice concerning the potential removal consequences of a guilty plea. For the same reasons, but unlike the concurrence, I do not believe that affirmative misadvice about those consequences renders an attorney’s assistance in defending against the prosecution constitutionally inadequate; or that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to warn immigrant defendants that a conviction may render them removable. Statutory provisions can remedy these concerns in a more targeted fashion, and without producing permanent, and legislatively irreparable, overkill.

* * *

The Sixth Amendment as originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel, or to use volunteered services of counsel. See, United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173, 11 S. Ct. 758, 11 S. Ct. 941, 35 L. Ed. 399 (1891); W. Beaney, Right to Counsel in American Courts 21, 28-29 (1955). We have held, however, that the Sixth Amendment requires the provision of counsel to indigent defendants at government expense, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-345, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963),  [*59] and that the right to “the assistance of counsel” includes the right to effective assistance, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Even assuming the validity of these holdings, I reject the significant further extension that the Court, and to a lesser extent the concurrence, would create. We have until today at least retained the Sixth Amendment’s textual limitation to criminal prosecutions. “[W]e have held that ‘defence’ means defense at trial, not defense in relation to other objectives that may be important to the accused.” Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 171 L. Ed. 2d 366, 385 (2008) (ALITO  , J., concurring) (summarizing cases). We have limited the Sixth Amendment to legal advice directly related to defense against prosecution of the charged offense — advice at trial, of course, but also advice at postindictment interrogations and lineups, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-206, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-238, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967), and in general advice at all phases of the prosecution where the defendant would be at a disadvantage when pitted alone against the legally trained agents of the state, see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986).  [*60] Not only have we not required advice of counsel regarding consequences collateral to prosecution, we have not even required counsel appointed to defend against one prosecution to be present when the defendant is interrogated in connection with another possible prosecution arising from the same event. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 149 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2001).

There is no basis in text or in principle to extend the constitutionally required advice regarding guilty pleas beyond those matters germane to the criminal prosecution at hand — to wit, the sentence that the plea will produce, the higher sentence that conviction after trial might entail, and the chances of such a conviction. Such matters fall within “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970). See id., at 769-770, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (describing the matters counsel and client must consider in connection with a contemplated guilty plea). We have never held, as the logic of the Court’s opinion assumes, that once counsel is appointed all professional responsibilities of counsel — even those extending beyond defense against the prosecution — become constitutional commands. Cf. Cobb, supra, at 171, n. 2, 164, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 149 L. Ed. 2d 321;  [*61] Moran, supra, at 430, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410. Because the subject of the misadvice here was not the prosecution for which Jose Padilla was entitled to effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment has no application.

Adding to counsel’s duties an obligation to advise about a conviction’s collateral consequences has no logical stopping-point. As the concurrence observes,
“[A] criminal convictio[n] can carry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses. . . . All of those consequences are ‘serious,’ . . . .” Ante, at 2-3 (ALITO  , J., concurring in judgment).
But it seems to me that the concurrence suffers from the same defect. The same indeterminacy, the same inability to know what areas of advice are relevant, attaches to misadvice. And the concurrence’s suggestion that counsel must warn defendants of potential removal consequences, see ante, at 14-15 — what would come to be known as the “Padilla warning” — cannot be limited to those consequences  [*62] except by judicial caprice. It is difficult to believe that the warning requirement would not be extended, for example, to the risk of heightened sentences in later federal prosecutions pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We could expect years of elaboration upon these new issues in the lower courts, prompted by the defense bar’s devising of ever-expanding categories of plea-invalidating misadvice and failures to warn — not to mention innumerable evidentiary hearings to determine whether misadvice really occurred or whether the warning was really given.

The concurrence’s treatment of misadvice seems driven by concern about the voluntariness of Padilla’s guilty plea. See ante, at 12. But that concern properly relates to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, not to the Sixth Amendment. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970). Padilla has not argued before us that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. If that is, however, the true substance of his claim (and if he has properly preserved it) the state court can address it on remand. 1 But we should not smuggle  [*63] the claim into the Sixth Amendment.

FOOTNOTES

1 I do not mean to suggest that the Due Process Clause would surely provide relief. We have indicated that awareness of “direct consequences” suffices for the validity of a guilty plea. See Brady, 397 U.S., at 755, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the required colloquy between a federal district court and a defendant required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) (formerly Rule 11(c)), which we have said approximates the due process requirements for a valid plea, see Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 49-50, 116 S. Ct. 356, 133 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1995), does not mention collateral consequences. Whatever the outcome, however, the effect of misadvice regarding such consequences upon the validity of a guilty plea should be analyzed under the Due Process Clause.
The Court’s holding prevents legislation that could solve the problems addressed by today’s opinions in a more precise and targeted fashion. If the subject had not been constitutionalized, legislation could specify which categories of misadvice about matters ancillary to the prosecution invalidate plea agreements, what collateral consequences counsel must bring to a defendant’s attention, and what warnings must be given.  [*64] 2 Moreover, legislation could provide consequences for the misadvice, nonadvice, or failure to warn, other than nullification of a criminal conviction after the witnesses and evidence needed for retrial have disappeared. Federal immigration law might provide, for example, that the near-automatic removal which follows from certain criminal convictions will not apply where the conviction rested upon a guilty plea induced by counsel’s misadvice regarding removal consequences. Or legislation might put the government to a choice in such circumstances: Either retry the defendant or forgo the removal. But all that has been precluded in favor of today’s sledge hammer.

FOOTNOTES

2 As the Court’s opinion notes, ante, at 16-17, n. 15, many States — including Kentucky — already require that criminal defendants be warned of potential removal consequences.
In sum, the Sixth Amendment guarantees adequate assistance of counsel in defending against a pending criminal prosecution. We should limit both the constitutional obligation to provide advice and the consequences of bad advice to that well defined area.

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Child Support Lawyers

Helping Clients In Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts

 Child support or child maintenance can be court ordered or voluntary.  Child Support is the periodic payment made directly or indirectly by the non custodial parent to the custodial parent for the financial care and support of children of a relationship or marriage that has been terminated, or in some cases never existed.

There is no gender requirement for payment of child support.  For example, a father may pay a mother or a mother may pay a father. Frequently, in divorce cases, child support is often arranged as part of the divorce by a property settlement agreement or by order of the court. 

If you are dealing with a child support case in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts, contact the SRIS Law Group child support lawyers for help.

Our child support attorneys have handled numerous child support cases as part of a divorce or separation in Virginia, Maryland and Massachusetts.

Our attorneys can help you with the following issues regarding child support:

• Obtaining child support in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts
• Modification of child support in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts
• Defending a show cause motion for failure to pay child support
• Prosecuting a show cause motion for failure to pay child support
• Negotiating child support during a divorce or separation

The following are some of the child support laws in:

• Virginia Child Support Laws
• Maryland Child Support Laws
• Massachusetts Child Support Laws

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ANNULMENT VIRGINIA MARYLAND MASSACHUSETTS

There are two types of annulments. Void ab initio and Voidable.
The ab initio annulment makes the marriage void due to an intrinsic flaw – such as fraud, force, bigamy or mental incompetence.

The void able annulment allows a marriage to be made invalid if the person who is entitled to the annulment desires to exercise their desire to void the marriage.

Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts have different standards for granting an annulment. It is very important to act quickly if you are seeking an annulment in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts due to the fact that there are time limits as to when an annulment may be granted.

Contact the SRIS Law Group annulment lawyers if you need help with an annulment in Virginia, annulment in Maryland or annulment in Massachusetts.

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Immigration Law – O-1 Visa

Immigration Law E-Newsletter

Please click on the link to learn more about our business immigration legal services.

Please click on the link to learn more about our individual immigration legal services.

What are the different types of an O-1 immigration law visas?

The O-1 category is set aside for an immigrant who possesses extraordinary ability. Pursuant to immigration law, there are three different standards for the O-1 category: (1) the most exacting standard applies to aliens in the sciences, education, business, and athletics; (2) a much less rigorous standard applies to individual aliens in the arts; and (3) an intermediate standard applies to aliens of extraordinary achievement in the motion picture or TV industries.

(a). Aliens of extraordinary ability in the sciences, education, business, and athletics

To qualify for O-1 status, the immigrant must demonstrate sustained national or international acclaim and recognition for achievements in the field of expertise by providing evidence of:

• receipt of a major, internationally-recognized award, such as the Nobel Prize, or
• at least three of the following forms of documentation:
  • receipt of nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards for excellence in the field of endeavor.
  • membership in associations in the field which require outstanding achievements of their members (as judged by recognized national or international experts in the discipline or fields).
  • published material in professional or major trade publications or major media about the alien concerning the alien’s work in the field (include the title, date, and author of such published material, and any necessary translation).
  • participation on a panel, or individually, as a judge of the work of others in the field.
  • scientific, scholarly, or business-related contributions of major significance in the field.
  • authorship of scholarly articles in the field in professional journals or other major media.
  • employment in a critical or essential capacity for organizations and establishments that have a distinguished reputation.
  • high salary or other remuneration commanded by the alien for services (as evidenced by contracts or other reliable evidence).
  • other comparable evidence.

(b). Aliens of extraordinary ability in the arts

To qualify as a member of the second group of O-1, immigrant (aliens of extraordinary ability in the arts), the USCIS rules require “distinction.” “Distinction” accrding to USCIS, means a high level of achievement in the field of arts as evidenced by a degree of skill and recognition substantially above that ordinarily encountered to the extent that a person is described as prominent, leading, or well known in the field of arts.

The rules define the term “art” to include any field of creative activity or endeavor such as, but not limited to, fine arts, visual arts, culinary arts, and performing arts. In addition, aliens engaged in the field of arts include not only the principal creators and performers but also other essential persons such as, but not limited to, directors, set designers, lighting designers, sound designers, choreographers, choreologists, conductors, orchestrators, coaches, arrangers, musical supervisors, costume designers, makeup artists, flight masters, stage technicians, and animal trainers. The Administrative Appeals Office has held that a position of architect/urban designer also falls within the field of fine arts.

To establish the immigrant’s distinction, USCIS rules provide that the immigrant must be recognized as being prominent in his or her field as demonstrated by the following:

• evidence that the alien has been nominated for or has been the recipient of significant national or international awards or prizes in the particular field, such as an Academy Award, an Emmy, a Grammy, or a Director’s Guild Award, or
• at least three of the following forms of documentation that the alien:
• has or will perform a lead or starring role in productions or events which have a distinguished reputation (as evidenced by critical reviews, advertisements, publicity releases, publications contracts, or endorsements).
• has achieved national or international recognition for achievements (evidenced by critical reviews or other published materials by or about the individual in major newspapers, trade journals, magazines, or other publications).
• has performed a lead, starring or critical role for organizations and establishments that have a distinguished reputation (evidenced by articles in newspapers, trade journals, publications, or testimonials).
• has a record of major commercial or critically acclaimed successes (as evidenced by such indicators as title, rating, standing in the field, box office receipts, motion picture or television ratings, and other occupational achievements reported in trade journals, major newspapers, or other publications).
• has received significant recognition for achievements from organizations, critics, government agencies, or other recognized experts in the field in which the alien is engaged (such testimonials must clearly indicate the author’s authority, expertise, and knowledge of the alien’s achievements).
• has commanded or now commands a high salary or other substantial remuneration for services in relation to others in the field (as evidenced by contracts or other reliable evidence).
• other comparable evidence.

(c). Aliens of extraordinary achievement in the motion picture or TV industries

To qualify as a person of extraordinary achievement in the motion picture or television industries, it must be shown that the immigrant has a very high level of accomplishment in the motion picture or television industry evidenced by a degree of skill and recognition significantly above that ordinarily encountered to the extent that the person is recognized as outstanding, notable, or leading in the motion picture or television field. This standard is more exacting than the standard applicable to aliens of extraordinary ability in the arts but less rigorous than the standard applicable to aliens in the sciences, education, business, and athletics.

(d). Work in area of extraordinary ability or achievement

The O-1 alien must be coming to the United States to work in his or her area of extraordinary ability or achievement. Under prior rules, the Service had taken the position that the performance, event, or position must require the services of an alien of extraordinary ability or achievement. Responding to comments from industry groups that there was no statutory basis for such a requirement, the August 1994 rules eliminated the requirement that an O-1 alien must be coming to perform services in a performance, event, or position which requires the services of an alien of extraordinary ability or achievement. Instead, under the final rules, it must merely be shown that the alien will perform services in his or her area of extraordinary ability or achievement.

What has Congress defined as a felony and an aggravated felony?

Immigration Law FAQs

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GRANDPARENTS & CHILD CUSTODY, GRANDPARENTS & VISITATION RIGHTS & GRANDPARENTS RIGHTS

Family Law Attorneys Helping Grandparents Exercise Their Rights

Frequently, the grandparents’ rights attorneys of the SRIS Law Group are contacted by grandparents who are either seeking custody of their grandchildren, grandparents seeking visitation with their grandchildren or grandparents who want to know what rights they have as grandparents in regards to their grandchildren.

The honest answer is that it is a fact specific question. What we mean by this is that the law does allow for grandparents to obtain custody of their grandchild or grandchildren. The law also allows grandparents to have visitation with their grandchildren. However, the application of these laws varies from state to state. Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts each have different set of laws and the case laws in each state are truly fact specific.

The SRIS Law Group has attorneys that assist grandparents with custody & visitation rights issues in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts. Grandparents can contact us on line or call us at 888-437-7747

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Internet Sex Crime Defense Attorneys

Licensed in Virginia, Maryland, D.C. & Massachusetts

Defending Clients in both State and Federal Courts

If you have been charged with an internet sex crime or computer sex crime in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts, then you have been targeted for prosecution by a special internet sex crimes taskforce. Defending clients accused of an internet sex crime or computer sex crime requires the skills of a lawyer who is both an aggressive criminal defense lawyer and is extremely knowledgeable about computers.

The Massachusetts, Maryland & Virginia computer sex crimes attorneys of SRIS, P.C. are uniquely situated to defend clients accused on an internet sex crime or computer sex crime. The Maryland, Massachusetts & Virginia sex crime defense attorneys at SRIS, P.C. are extremely knowledgeable about computers and they also have an entire internal IT department available to answer their queries regarding computers and the internet. Most clients don’t realize that Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts are prosecuting people accused of a computer sex crime with an attitude of no mercy. In fact, even the local counties and cities in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts are starting up internet sex crimes task forces. Due to the worldwide presence of the web, a person who is accused of breaking a law regarding an internet sex crime can be prosecuted in an entirely different part of the state or even another state or country.

Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts have different laws regarding internet sex crimes. Compounding that is the federal government’s own laws regarding internet sex crimes & computer sex crimes. Most jurisdictions are now taking the position that if a person accused of an internet sex crime does not plead guilty to the charges as presented, then they will simply turn the case over to the Feds (federal government) for prosecution. The state governments are leveling this threat because they are aware that most attorneys are not willing to take on the federal government if it decides to prosecute a case.

We have offices in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts to better serve you.

The Law Offices of SRIS, P.C. has represented many clients charged with the following types of sex crimes:

• Internet Child pornography
• Stalking charges facilitated through the internet
• Solicitation of a minor via chat room
• Entrapment by Police Officers posing as juveniles on line

If you believe you have been targeted for prosecution for an internet sex crime or online sex crime in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts, contact us immediately. Do not talk to law enforcement without the protection and guidance of a skilled computer sex crime defense attorney who is knowledgeable about internet sex crime prosecution. Please remember, our internet sex crimes defense lawyers are very experienced in representing clients charged with internet sex crimes & online sex crimes in both the state and federal courts of Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts.

Our attorneys are licensed to handle cases in Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania & Massachusetts, however we handle internet sex crimes cases only in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts.

Our attorneys and staff in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts, speak the following languages in addition to English: Tamil, Spanish, French, Arabic, Hindi, Malaysian, Cantonese, Mandarin, and Telugu.

For more information, or to make an appointment with a SRIS, P.C. attorney in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts, call us at 888-437-7747 or fill out our on-line form.

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ATTORNEYS DEFENDING

Virginia Larceny, Virginia Embezzlement, Virginia Shoplifting, Virginia Credit Card fraud, Maryland Larceny, Maryland Embezzlement, Maryland Shoplifting, Maryland Credit Card fraud, Massachusetts Larceny, Massachusetts Embezzlement, Massachusetts Shoplifting & Massachusetts Credit Card fraud

Larceny (theft) is the taking of anything that has value without the consent of the owner. To be convicted of theft/larceny in Virginia, theft/larceny in Maryland or theft/larceny in Massachusetts, the taking must be coupled with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. In Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts, the law defines larceny as either grand larceny or petty larceny. The term grand larceny vs. petty larceny is used to identify the minimum threshold value of the item stolen. If a person is accused of shoplifting, in Virginia, shoplifting in Maryland or shoplifting in Massachusetts, the person can be charged with either grand larceny or petty larceny. The value of the stolen property in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts will determine whether the person will be charged with grand larceny or petty larceny. Virginia still spells petty larceny as petit larceny.  In some states, such as Virginia, the minimum threshold for a person to be charged for grand larceny is only $200.  A grand larceny in Virginia is treated as a felony.

If you wish to speak with a Maryland criminal larceny defense lawyer, Massachusetts criminal larceny defense attorney or Virginia criminal larceny defense attorney, please call us at 888-437-7747, email us or contact us via our fast on line form.

The Law Offices of SRIS, P.C. have offices in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts.

Our offices in Virginia are located in Fairfax, Fredericksburg, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond & Virginia Beach.

Our offices in Maryland are located in Rockville & Baltimore.

Our office in Massachusetts is located in Boston.

If you wish to view some of the laws that pertain to being accused of committing a larceny in Virginia, larceny in Maryland and larceny in Massachusetts, please click on the following links:

Virginia Larceny Crimes Defense
Maryland Larceny Crimes Defense
Massachusetts Larceny Crimes Defense

To better serve you, we have larceny defense lawyers in Virginia, larceny defense lawyers in Maryland and larceny defense lawyers in Massachusetts. Please click on the link to view our different office locations.

If you wish to speak with a Virginia larceny defense attorney, Maryland larceny defense attorney & Massachusetts larceny defense attorney please call us at 888-437-7747, email us or contact us via our fast on line form.

Our Maryland theft/larceny defense attorneys, Massachusetts theft/larceny defense attorneys & Virginia theft/larceny defense attorneys who provide larceny defense and staff in Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts speak the following languages in addition to English: Spanish, French, Arabic, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Cantonese, Mandarin & Malaysian.

Our attorneys are licensed to handle larceny cases in Virginia, Maryland, D.C. & Massachusetts, however we only defend theft/larceny cases in Virginia, theft/larceny cases in Maryland & theft/larceny cases in Massachusetts at the present time.

Please click on attorneys to learn more about the criminal defense lawyers who assist clients with larceny/embezzlement/shoplifting/credit card fraud offenses in Virginia, Maryland or Massachusetts.

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Los abogados federales de infracciones sexuales de SRIS, P.C., tienen una extensa experiencia en casos de infracciones sexuales y todos los otros aspectos de la defensa de crímenes sexuales.

Es importante buscar un abogado federal de infracciones sexuales de SRIS, P.C. si usted ha sido acusado de un crimen sexual. Una condena por un crimen sexual acarrea serias consecuencias, pero hay soluciones y defensas a estos cargos de infracciones sexuales.

Los abogados federales de crímenes federales de SRIS, P.C. tienen oficinas en Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts.

• Nuestras oficinas en Virginia están ubicadas en Fairfax, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond & Virginia Beach.
• Nuestras oficinas en Maryland están ubicadas en Rockville & Annapolis.
• Nuestra oficina en Massachusetts está ubicada en Boston.

Los abogados de SRIS, P.C. que representan clientes acusados de infracciones sexuales en la Corte Federal tienen extensa experiencia en defender agresivamente individuales acusados con crímenes sexuales en los Tribunales Federales de los Estados Unidos. Si desea consultar un abogado federal de crímenes sexuales de SRIS, P.C., por favor simplemente contáctenos vía correo electrónico o llame a nuestro número telefónico gratuito (888-437-7747). Un abogado federal de crímenes sexuales de SRIS, P.C. gustosamente lo consultara sobre su problema.

Nuestros abogados en Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts hablan los siguientes idiomas además del inglés: español, francés, tamil, hindú, telugú, cantonés, mandarín y malayo.

Para más información u obtener una cita con SRIS, P.C., por favor llame, envíe un correo electrónico o complete el formulario en línea

Los abogados de SRIS, P.C. manejan casos Federales en los siguientes tribunales:

• Los Tribunales Federales en Virginia
• Los Tribunales Federales en Maryland
• Los Tribunales Federales en Massachusetts

Si a usted le gustaría tener más información sobre algunas de las Leyes Federales sobre Infracciones Sexuales, por favor lea lo siguiente:

Vejación de menores Registración de agresores sexuales El deber de notificar a agresores sexuales de requisitos de inscripción y para registrarlos Violación Estatutaria Envío postal obsceno o materia que induce al crimen Explotación sexual infantil Ciertas actividades relacionadas a material constituyendo o conteniendo pornografía infantil Producción de retratos sexualmente explícitos de un menor para la importación dentro de los Estados Unidos Abuso sexual agravado Abuso sexual Abuso sexual de un menor o pupilo Contacto sexual abusivo Infractores repetitivos

Female genital mutilation Possession with intent to sell, and sale, of obscene matter on Federal property Importation or transportation of obscene matters Mailing indecent matter on wrappers or envelopes Broadcasting obscene language Transportation of obscene matters for sale or distribution Engaging in the business of selling or transferring obscene matter Obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children Distributing obscene material by cable or subscription television Transfer of obscene material to minors

Los abogados federales de infracciones sexuales de SRIS, P.C., en las oficinas de Virginia, Maryland y Massachusetts, representan y defienden a los clientes en una gran variedad de casos de infracciones sexuales, incluyendo: violación, vejación de menores, solicitación de un menor de edad a través de Internet, violación cometida durante una cita, FMS (Síndrome de Falsa Memoria), exhibicionismo, Síndrome de Munchausen por medio de un delegado, registración del delincuente sexual, posesión de pornografía infantil, agresión sexual, conducta lasciva, violación conyugal, y violación estatutaria, libertades indecentes con un menor de edad y crímenes sexuales en Internet.

Leyes Federales de Infracciones Sexuales

Vejación de menores (top)

“menor” significa una persona debajo de la edad de catorce, y “infracción de vejación de menores ” significa un crimen bajo la Ley Federal o la ley de un Estado (como está definido en la sección 513 del titulo 18, del Código de los Estados Unidos) que involucra–

(1) cualquier conducta proscrita por el capítulo 109A del título 18, del Código de los Estados Unidos, que fue cometido en relación a un menor;

(2) cualquier conducta proscrita por el capítulo 110 del título 18, del Código de los Estados Unidos;

(3) contacto entre cualquier parte del cuerpo del acusado o un objeto y los genitales o el ano de un menor;
(4) contacto entre los genitales o el ano del acusado y cualquier parte del cuerpo de un menor;
(5) derivando en deleite sexual o apaciguamiento de la imposición de muerte, lesión corporal, o dolor físico en un menor; o
(6) un intento o conspiración para involucrarse en la conducta descrita en párrafos (1)-(5).

Registración de agresores sexuales (top)

42 U.S.C.A. § 16911

(9) Registro de agresores sexuales
El termino “registro de agresores sexuales” significa un registro de agresores sexuales, y un programa de notificación, mantenida por una jurisdicción.

§ 16917. El deber de notificar a agresores sexuales de requisitos de inscripción y para registrarlos (top)

(a) En general
Un oficial apropiado, poco antes de liberar al agresor sexual de la custodia, o, si el agresor sexual no está en custodia, inmediatamente después de la sentencia del agresor sexual, que por la infracción da lugar al deber de registrarse–

(1) Informar al agresor sexual de los deberes de un agresor sexual bajo este título y explicar esos deberes;
(2) Requiera que el agresor sexual lea y firme un formulario manifestando que el deber a registrar ha sido explicado y que el agresor sexual comprende el requisito de inscripción; y
(3) Asegurarse que el agresor sexual es registrado.
(b) Notificación de agresores sexuales que no pueden cumplir con el apartado (a) de esta sección
El Fiscal General prescribirá reglas para la notificación de agresores sexuales que no pueden estar registrados de conformidad con el apartado (a) de esta sección.

§ 14072

a) Definiciones
Para los propósitos de esta sección–
(1) El término “FBI” significa la Oficina Federal de Investigaciones;
(2) los términos “delito penal en contra de una víctima que es un menor”, “infracción sexualmente violento”, “depredador sexualmente violento”, “anormalidad mental”, “depredador”, “empleado, lleva adelante una vocación”, y “estudiante” tienen los mismos significados como en la sección 14071 (a)(3) de este título; y
(3) El término “programa mínimamente suficiente de registración del agresor sexual” significa cualquier programa del Estado de registración del agresor sexual que–
(A) requiere la registración de cada agresor que es condenado de una infracción en un rango de infracciones especificadas por la ley del Estado las cuales son comparables o exceden lo descrito en el subinciso (A) o (B) de la sección 14071 (a)(1) de este título;
(B) participa de la base de datos nacional establecida bajo el apartado (b) de esta sección de conformidad con las líneas directivas publicadas por el Fiscal General;
(C) Proveer para verificación de la dirección al menos anualmente; [1]
(D) Requiere que cada persona que está obligada a registrarse bajo el subinciso (A) no hará eso por un período de no menos de 10 años comenzando en la fecha que tal persona fue excarcelada o estuvo puesta en libertad bajo palabra, supervisada liberación, o libertad condicional.

Violación Estatutaria (top)

La violación estatutaria es el crimen de sexo con un menor bajo la edad de consentimiento (AOC). La violación estatutaria difiere de otros tipos de violación en lo referente a que la fuerza o amenaza no necesita estar presente. Por ley (estatuto), se asume que cualquier actividad sexual es coercitiva desde que el menor de edad es considerado en la ley incapaz para dar el consentimiento para los actos.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1461
§ 1461. Envío postal obsceno o materia que induce al crimen (top)

Cada artículo obsceno, lascivo, indecente, sucio o vil articulo, cosa, dispositivo, o sustancia; y–
Cada artículo o cada cosa diseñada, se adaptó, o intentó para producir aborto, o para cualquier uso indecente o inmoral; y
Cada artículo, instrumento, sustancia, droga, medicina, o cosa que es anunciada o descrita en cierto modo calculada para conducir a otro a usar o aplicarlo para producir aborto, o para cualquier propósito indecente o inmoral; y
Cada tarjeta escrita o impresa, carta, circular, libro, folleto, publicidad, o aviso de cualquier tipo de información dada, directamente o indirectamente, donde, o cómo, o de a quién, o por cualquier significado de tales materias mencionadas, artículos, o cosas que pueden ser obtenidos o hechos, o donde o por quién cualquier acto u operación de cualquier tipo para procurar o producir el aborto serán hechos o realizados, o cómo el aborto puede ser producido, ya sea sellado o sin sellar; y

Cada periódico, escritura, publicidad, o representación que cualquier artículo, instrumento, sustancia, droga, medicina, o cosa, o puede, ser usado o aplicado para producir aborto, o para cualquier propósito indecente o inmoral; y
Cada descripción calculada para inducir o incitar a una persona de usar o aplicarle cualquier artículo, instrumento, sustancia, droga, medicina, o cosa–
Se declara que no es material enviable por correo y no será transportada en los correos o entregada desde cualquier oficina de correos o por cualquier cartero.
Quienquiera que a sabiendas destina los correos para el envío postal, transporte en los correos, o la entrega de cualquier cosa declarada por esta sección o la sección 3001 del título 39 de no ser enviable por correo, o a sabiendas causas de ser entregadas por correo según la dirección, o en el lugar en cual es dirigido para ser entregado por la persona para quién está destinado, o a sabiendas toma cualquier cosa de los correos con el propósito de circular o disponer del mismo o de auxiliar la circulación o disposición de la misma, será multado bajo este título o encarcelado por no más cinco años, o ambos, para la primera infracción, y serán multadas bajo este título o encarceladas por no más de diez años, o ambos, por cada infracción posterior.
El término “indecente”, tan usado en esta sección incluye un asunto de una personalidad tendiendo a incitar incendio provocado, homicidio, o asesinato.

18 U.S.C.A § 2251 – Explotación sexual infantil (top)

(a) Cualquier persona que emplea, usa, persuade, induce, seduce, o coacciona a cualquier menor de edad a ocuparse, o quien asiste a un menor de edad a ocuparse, o quien transporta a cualquier menor de edad dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero, o en cualquier Territorio o Posesión de los Estados Unidos, con el intento que tal menor de edad se involucré, en cualquier conducta sexualmente explícita con el objeto de producir cualquier retrato visual de tal conducta, será castigado como está provisto bajo el apartado (e), si tal persona sabe o tiene motivos para saber que tal retrato visual será transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero o enviado por correo, si ese retrato visual estuviese producido usando materiales que les han sido enviados por correo o han transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora, o si tal retrato visual en verdad ha sido transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero o enviados por correo.
(b) Cualquier padre, guardián legal, o persona teniendo custodia o control de un menor de edad que a sabiendas le permite a tal menor de edad ocuparse, o ayudar a alguna otra persona a ocuparse en, una conducta sexualmente explícita con el objeto de producir cualquier retrato visual de tal conducta será castigado como está provisto bajo el apartado (e) de esta sección, si tal padre, guardián legal, o persona sabe o tiene motivos para saber que tal retrato visual será transportada dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero o enviada por correo, si ese retrato visual estuviese producido usando los materiales que le han sido enviados por correo, o transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora, o si tal retrato visual en verdad ha estado transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero o enviado por correo.
(c)(1) Cualquier persona que, en una circunstancia descripta en el párrafo (2), emplea, usa, persuade, induce, seduce, o coacciona a cualquier menor de edad a ocuparse, o quien hace a un menor de edad ayudar a alguna otra persona a involucrarse en, cualquier conducta sexualmente explícita fuera de los Estados Unidos, sus territorios o posesiones, con el objeto de producir cualquier retrato visual de tal conducta, serán castigados como está provisto bajo el apartado (e).

(2) La circunstancia a la que se refirió en el párrafo (1) es que–

(A) la persona que pretende que tal retrato visual sea transportado a los Estados Unidos, sus territorios o posesiones, por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora o correo; o
(B) la persona transporta tal retrato visual a los Estados Unidos, sus territorios o posesiones, por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora o correo.
(d)(1) Cualquier persona que, en una circunstancia descripta en párrafo (2), a sabiendas hace, imprime, o publica, o causa de ser hecho, impreso, o publicado, cualquier aviso o publicidad buscando u ofreciendo–
(A) recibir, intercambiar, comprar, producir, exhibir, distribuir, o reproducir, cualquier retrato visual, si la producción de tal retrato visual implica el uso de un menor de edad encargándose de una conducta sexualmente explícita y tal retrato visual es de tal conducta; o
(B) la participación en cualquier acto de conducta sexualmente explícita por o con cualquier menor de edad con el objeto de producir un retrato visual de tal conducta:
será castigado como está provisto bajo el apartado (e).
(2) La circunstancia referida al párrafo (1) es que–
(A) tal persona sabe o tiene motivos para saber que tal aviso o publicidad estará transportada dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio incluyendo por computadora o enviado por correo; o

(B) tal aviso o publicidad será transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio incluyendo por computadora o enviado por correo.
(e) Cualquier individuo que viola, o trata o conspira para violar, esta sección multará bajo este título y encarcelará por no menos de 15 años ni más de 30 años, pero si tal persona tiene una condena anterior bajo este capítulo, sección 1591, capítulo 71, capítulo 109A, o capítulo 117, o bajo la sección 920 del título 10 (el artículo 120 del Código Uniforme de la Justicia Militar), o conforme a las leyes de cualquier Estado referente al abuso sexual agravado, abuso sexual, contacto sexual ofensivo involucrando a un menor de edad o pupilo, o trafico sexual de niños, o la producción, posesión, recibo, envío postal, venta, distribución, envío, o transporte de pornografía infantil, tal persona será multada bajo este título y encarcelada por no menos de 25 años ni más que 50 años, pero si tal persona tiene 2 o más anteriores condenas bajo este capítulo, capítulo 71, capítulo 109A, o capítulo 117, o bajo la sección 920 del título 10 (artículo 120 del Código Uniforme de Justicia Militar), o conforme a las leyes de cualquier Estado referente al explotación sexual de niños, tal persona será multada bajo este título y encarcelado por no menos de 35 años o de por vida. Cualquier organización que viola, o trata o conspira para violar, esta sección será multada bajo este título. Quienquiera, en el transcurso de una infracción bajo esta sección, se involucra en la conducta que da como resultado la muerte de una persona será penado con muerte o encarcelado por no menos de 30 años o de por vida.
Posesión de pornografía infantil,

La producción ilegal, transporte, distribución, recibo, publicidad y posesión de pornografía infantil, como está definida en la sección 2256(8) del título 18, Código de los Estados Unidos, como también la transferencia de custodia de menores para la producción de pornografía infantil, es dañina para lo fisiológico, emocional, y la salud mental de los niños retratados en pornografía infantil y tiene un efecto sustancial y perjudicial sobre la sociedad generalmente.

Sección 2256(8) del titulo 18, del Código de Estados Unidos (top)

(8) “La pornografía infantil” significa cualquier retrato visual, incluyendo cualquier foto, película, video, cuadro, o computadora o imagen generada por computadora, ya sea hecha o producida por electrónica, mecánica, u de otra manera, de conducta sexualmente explícita, dónde–

(A) La producción de tal retrato visual implica el uso de un menor de edad involucrándose sexualmente en una conducta explícita;

(B) tal retrato visual es una imagen digital, de computadora, o imagen generada por computadora que es, o es indistinguible de, que un menor de edad involucrándose en una conducta sexualmente explícita; o
(C) Tal esbozo visual ha sido creado, adaptado, o modificado para aparecer que un menor identificable está involucrado en una conducta sexualmente explícita.
(D) Revocada. Pub.L. 108-21, Titulo V, § 502 (a)(3), Abril 30, 2003, 117 Estat. 678]

18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A § 2252A. Ciertas actividades relacionadas a material constituyendo o conteniendo pornografía infantil (top)

(a) Cualquier persona quien–
(1) A Sabiendas envía correos, o transporta o envía dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora, cualquier pornografía infantil;
(2) A Sabiendas recibe o distribuye–
(A) Cualquier pornografía infantil que le ha sido enviada por correo, o transportada dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora; o
(B) Cualquier material que contiene pornografía infantil que le ha sido enviada por correo, o se transportó dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora;
(3) A sabiendas–
(A) Reproduce cualquier pornografía infantil para la distribución a través del correo, o dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora; o

(B) hace publicidad, promueve, presenta, distribuye, o solicita a través de los correos, o dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora, cualquier material o en una manera que refleja la creencia, o que está dirigido a causar que otro crea, que el material o supuesto material es, o contiene–
(i) un retrato visual obsceno de un menor de edad involucrándose en una conducta sexualmente explícita; o

(ii) un retrato visual de un menor de edad real involucrándose en una conducta sexualmente explícita;
(4) Tampoco–
(A) en la jurisdicción especial marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos, o en cualquier tierra o edificio poseído por, alquilado para, o de otra manera usado por o bajo el control del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, o en el país indio (como esta definido en la sección 1151), a sabiendas vende o posee con el intento para vender cualquier pornografía infantil; o
(B) a sabiendas vende o posee con el intento para vender cualquier pornografía infantil que le ha sido enviada por correo, o se ha enviado o transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora, o que fue producida usando materiales que han sido enviados por correo, o se han enviado o transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora;
(5) Tampoco–
(A) en la jurisdicción especial marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos, o en cualquier tierra o edificio poseído por, alquilado para, o de otra manera usado por o bajo el control del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, o en el país indio (como esta definido en la sección 1151), a sabiendas posee cualquier libro, revista, periódico, película, videocinta, disco de computadora, o algún otro material que contiene una imagen de pornografía infantil; o

(B) a sabiendas posee cualquier libro, revista, periódico, película, videocinta, disco de computadora, o algún otro material que contiene una imagen de pornografía infantil que le ha sido enviada por correo, o se envió o transportó dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora, o que fue producida usando materiales que han sido enviados por correo, o se han enviado o transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora; o
(6) a sabiendas distribuye, ofrece, envía, o provee para un menor de edad cualquier retrato visual, incluyendo cualquier foto, película, video, foto, o imagen generada por computadora o foto, ya sea hecha o producida por electrónica, mecánica, u otra manera, donde tal retrato visual es, o parece ser, de un menor de edad involucrándose en una conducta sexualmente explícita–
(A) Que ha sido enviado por correo, enviado, o transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora;
(B) que fue producido usando a materiales que les han sido enviados por correo, enviados, o transportados dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora; o
(C) Cuya distribución, oferta, envío, o provisión está consumada usando los correos o transmitiendo o dando lugar a que sea transmitido cualquier comunicación por medio de cables dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero, incluyendo por computadora, para propósitos de inducir o persuadir a un para menor de edad para participar de cualquier actividad que es ilegal.

Será castigado como está provisto en el apartado (b).
(B) (1) Quienquiera que viole, o intente o conspire para violar, el párrafo (1), (2), (3), (4), o (6) del apartado (a) será multado bajo este título y encarcelado por no menos de 5 años y no más de 20 años, pero, si tal persona tiene una anterior condena bajo este capítulo, sección 1591, capítulo 71, capítulo 109A, capítulos 117, o bajo la sección 920 del título 10 (el artículo 120 del Código Uniforme de Justicia Militar), o bajo las leyes de cualquier Estado referente al abuso sexual agravado, el abuso sexual, o la ofensiva conducta sexual involucrando a un menor de edad o pupilo, o la producción, posesión, recibo, envío postal, venta, distribución, envío, o transporte de pornografía infantil, o el trafico sexual de niños, tal persona será multada bajo este título y encarcelada por no menos de 15 años ni tampoco más de 40 años.
(2) Quienquiera que viole, o intente o conspire para violar, el apartado (a)(5) será multado bajo este título o encarcelado por no más de 10 años, o ambos, sino, si tal persona tuviera una anterior condena bajo este capítulo, capítulo 71, capítulo 109A, o capítulo 117, o bajo la sección 920 del título 10 (artículo 120 del Código Uniforme de la Justicia Militar), o conforme a las leyes de cualquier Estado referente al abuso sexual agravado, el abuso sexual, o la conducta sexual ofensiva involucrando a un menor de edad o pupilo, o la producción, posesión, recibo, envío postal, venta, distribución, envío, o transporte de pornografía infantil, tal persona será multada bajo este título y no será encarcelada por no menos de 10 años ni más de 20 años.
(c) será una defensa afirmativa de un cargo violatorio del párrafo (1), (2), (3)(A), (4), o (5) del apartado (a) que–

(1)(A) La supuesta pornografía infantil se produjo utilizando a unas persona real o personas involucrándose en una conducta sexualmente explícita; y
(B) Cada tal persona fue un adulto a la hora que el material fue producido; o
(2) La supuesta pornografía infantil no se produjo utilizando a ningún real menor o menores de edad.

Ninguna defensa afirmativa bajo el apartado (c)(2) estará disponible en cualquier prosecución que involucra pornografía infantil como es descrita en la sección 2256(8)(C). Un acusado no puede sostener una defensa afirmativa para un cargo de párrafo violatorio (1), (2), (3)(A), (4), o (5) del apartado (a) a menos que, dentro del tiempo que tuvo previsto presentar mociones previas al juicio o en tal momento que el juez puede dirigir, pero en ningún acontecimiento más tarde que 10 días antes del comienzo del juicio, el acusado provee al tribunal y los Estados Unidos con aviso del intento para afirmar tal defensa y sustancia de cualquier experto u otro especializado testimonio o evidencia en la cuál el acusado tiene la intención de confiar. Si el acusado falla al cumplir con este apartado, el tribunal, hará un descubrimiento de circunstancias extraordinarias que impidieron conformidad oportuna, prohibirá al acusado de sostener tal defensa para un cargo de párrafo violatorio (1), (2), (3)(A), (4), o (5) del apartado (a) o presentando cualquier prueba para la cual el acusado ha fallado de proveer correcto y oportuno aviso.

(d) Defensa afirmativa.–Será una defensa afirmativa para un cargo de violar el apartado (a)(5) que el acusado–

(1) Poseyó menos de tres imágenes de pornografía infantil; y

(2) Prontamente y de buena fe, y sin retener o permitir a cualquier persona, aparte de una agencia de ejecución de la ley, a acceder a cualquier imagen o copia de la misma–
(A) Tomo los pasos razonables para destruir cada imagen; o
(B) Informó el asunto a una agencia de ejecución de la ley y le proporcionó a ésta el acceso a cada imagen.
(E) Admisibilidad de prueba.–En la moción del gobierno, en cualquier prosecución bajo este capítulo o la sección 1466A, excepto por la buena causa mostrada, el nombre, dirección, número de seguridad social, u otra identificación informativa no física, aparte de la edad o edad aproximada, de cualquier menor de edad que es retratado en cualquier pornografía infantil no será admisible y puede ser redactada de cualquier otra manera evidencia admisible, y el jurado será instruido, a petición de los Estados Unidos, que no pueda sacar inferencia de la ausencia de tal evidencia en decidirse si la pornografía infantil retrata a un menor de edad real.
(f) Remedios civiles.–
(1) En general.–Cualquier persona compungida a causa de la conducta prohibida bajo el apartado (a) o (b) o la sección 1466A puede comenzar una acción civil para el alivio establecido en el párrafo (2).

(2) Alivio.- En cualquier acción comenzada de conformidad con el párrafo (1), el tribunal puede otorgar alivio apropiado, incluyendo–
(A) Alivio temporal, preliminar, o permanente prohibitorio;
(B) Los daños compensatorios y punitivos; y
(C) los costos de la acción civil y retribuciones razonables para abogados y testigos expertos.
(G) iniciativas de la explotación infantil–
(1) Quienquiera que se involucre en una iniciativa de explotación infantil será multado bajo este título y encarcelado para cualquier término de años, no menos de 20 o de por vida.
(2) Una persona se involucra en una iniciativa de explotación infantil para los propósitos de esta sección si la persona viola la sección 1591, la sección 1201 si la víctima es una menor, o el capítulo 109A (involucrando a una víctima menor), 110 (excepto por las secciones 2257 y 2257A), o 117 (involucrando a una víctima menor), como una parte de una serie de violaciones de delito mayor constituyendo tres o más incidentes separados y requiriendo a más de una víctima, y cometen esas ofensas en combinación con tres o más otras personas.

Sección 2260. Producción de retratos sexualmente explícitos de un menor para la importación dentro de los Estados Unidos (top)

(a) Uso de un Menor. – Una persona quien, fuera de los Estados Unidos, emplea, usa, persuade, induce, seduce, o coacciona a cualquier menor a encargarse, o quien hace a un menor ayudar a alguna otra persona en quien involucrarse, o quien transporta cualquier menor con el intento que el menor se involucre en cualquier conducta sexualmente explícita con el objeto de producir cualquier retrato visual de tal conducta, pretendiendo que retrato visual sea importado a los Estados Unidos o en aguas dentro de las 12 millas de la costa de los Estados Unidos, será castigado como está previsto en el apartado (c).
(b) Uso de Retrato Visual. – Una persona quien, fuera de los Estados Unidos, a sabiendas recibe, transporta, envía, distribuye, vende, o posee con intento de transportar, enviar, vender, o distribuir cualquier retrato visual de un menor de edad involucrándose en una conducta sexualmente explícita (si la producción del retrato visual implicase el uso de un menor involucrándose en una conducta sexualmente explícita), pretendiendo que el retrato visual sea importado a los Estados Unidos o en aguas dentro de las 12 millas de la costa de los Estados Unidos, será castigado como está provisto en el apartado (c).
(c) Penalidades. – Una persona que viola el apartado (a) o (b), o conspira o trata de hacer eso -
(1) será multado bajo este título, arrestado por no más de 10 años, o ambos; y
(2) si la persona tiene una anterior condena bajo este capítulo o el capítulo 109A, será multada bajo este título, arrestado por no más de 20 años, o ambos.

Sección 2241. Abuso sexual agravado (top)

(a) Por fuerza o amenaza. – Quienquiera, en la jurisdicción especial marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos o en una prisión Federal, a sabiendas de causar a otra persona de involucrarse en un acto sexual.
(1) utilizando la fuerza en contra de otra persona; o
(2) amenazando o colocando a la otra persona en un temor que cualquier persona será supeditado a muerte, lesión corporal seria, o secuestro; o intenta hacer eso, será multado bajo este título, encarcelado por cualquier término de años o de por vida, o ambos.
(b) De otra manera. – Quienquiera, en la jurisdicción especial marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos o en una prisión Federal, a sabiendas -
(1) deja inconsciente a otra persona y por consiguiente se involucra en un acto sexual con otra persona; o
(2) administra a otra persona por la fuerza o amenaza de fuerza, o sin el conocimiento o permiso de esa persona, una droga, intoxicante, u otra sustancia similar y por consiguiente -
(A) sustancialmente deteriora la habilidad de la otra persona de evaluar o controlar su conducta; y
(B) se involucra en un acto sexual con la otra persona; o intenta hacer eso, será multado bajo este título, encarcelado para cualquier término de años o de por vida, o ambos.
(C) Con niños. – Quienquiera que cruza una línea del Estado con intento de involucrarse en un acto sexual con una persona que no ha alcanzado la edad de 12 años, o en la especial jurisdicción marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos o en una prisión Federal, a sabiendas que se involucra en un acto sexual con otra persona que no ha logrado la edad de 12 años, o a sabiendas se involucran en un acto sexual bajo las circunstancias descritas en los apartados (a) y (b) con otra persona que ha alcanzado la edad de 12 años pero no ha alcanzado la edad de 16 años (y es al menos 4 años mas joven que la persona de la que es cautivo), o intenta hacer eso, será multado bajo este título, encarcelado para cualquier término de años o de por vida, o ambos. Si el acusado previamente ha sido condenado de otro Delito Federal bajo este apartado, o de una infracción del Estado que habría sido una infracción bajo ya sea tal provisión la infracción ocurrió en una prisión Federal, a menos que la pena de muerte sea impuesta, el acusado será sentenciado de por vida en prisión.
(D) Requisito de Prueba de Estado Mental. – En una prosecución bajo el apartado (c) de esta sección, el Gobierno no necesita probar que el acusado supo que la otra persona involucrándose en el acto sexual no había alcanzado la edad de 12 años.

Sección 2242. Abuso sexual (top)

Quienquiera, en la especial jurisdicción marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos o en una prisión Federal, a sabiendas -
(1) causa que otra persona se involucre en un acto sexual amenazando o colocando a esa otra persona en el temor (aparte de amenazando o colocando en esa otra persona en el temor de que cualquier persona será supeditada a la muerte, seria lesión corporal, o secuestro); o
(2) se involucra en un acto sexual con otra persona si esa otra persona es -
(A) incapaz de evaluar la naturaleza de la conducta; o
(B) físicamente incapaz de rechazar la participación, o comunicando la indisposición a involucrarse en ese acto sexual; o intenta hacer eso, será multado bajo este título, arrestado por no más de 20 años, o ambos.

Sección 2243. Abuso sexual de un menor o pupilo (top)

(a) De un Menor. – Quienquiera, en la especial jurisdicción marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos o en una prisión Federal, a sabiendas se involucra en un acto sexual con otra persona que -
(1) ha alcanzado la edad de 12 años pero no ha alcanzado la edad de 16 años; y
(2) es por lo menos cuatro años más joven que la persona que lo cautiva; o intenta hacer eso, será multado bajo este título, arrestado por no más de 15 años, o ambos.
(B) De un Pupilo. – Quienquiera, en la especial jurisdicción marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos o en una prisión Federal, a sabiendas se involucra en un acto sexual con otra persona que es -
(1) en la detención oficial; y
(2) bajo la autoridad de la custodia, supervisora, o disciplinaria de la persona cautivadora; o intenta hacer eso, será multado bajo este título, arrestado por no más de un año, o ambos.
(C) Defensas. – (1) En una prosecución bajo el apartado (a) de esta sección, es una defensa, la cuál el acusado debe establecer por una preponderancia de la evidencia, que el acusado razonablemente creyó que la otra persona había alcanzado la edad de 16 años.
(2) En una prosecución bajo esta sección, es una defensa, la cuál el acusado debe establecer por una preponderancia de la evidencia, que las personas involucradas en el acto sexual estaban en aquel entonces casadas el uno con el otro.
(d) Requisito de Prueba de Estado Mental. – En una prosecución bajo el apartado (a) de esta sección, el Gobierno no necesita probar que el acusado supo–
(1) la edad de la otra persona involucrada en el acto sexual; o
(2) que la diferencia requerida de edad existida entre las personas cautivadoras.

Sección 2244. Contacto sexual abusivo (top)

(a) Conducta Sexual en Circunstancias Donde los Actos Sexuales Están Penados por Este Capítulo. – Quienquiera, en la jurisdicción especial marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos o en una cárcel federal, a sabiendas que involucra o causa contacto sexual con o por otra persona, si es así violaría -
(1) la sección 2241 de este título si el contacto sexual hubiera sido un acto sexual, será multado bajo este título, arrestado por no más de diez años, o ambos;
(2) la sección 2242 de este título si el contacto sexual hubiera sido un acto sexual, será multado bajo este título, arrestado por no más de tres años, o ambos;
(3) el apartado (a) de la sección 2243 de este título el contacto sexual ha sido un acto sexual, será multado bajo este título, arrestado por no más de dos años, o ambos; o
(4) el apartado (b) de la sección 2243 de este título el contacto sexual ha sido un acto sexual, será multado bajo este título, arrestado por no más de seis meses, o ambos.
(b) En Otras Circunstancias. – Quienquiera, en la especial jurisdicción marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos o en una cárcel federal, a sabiendas se involucra en contacto sexual con otra persona sin el permiso de la otra persona será multado bajo este título, encarcelado por no más de seis meses, o ambos.

(c) Infracciones Involucrando Niños Pequeños. – Si el contacto sexual que viola esta sección es con un individuo que no ha alcanzado la edad de 12 años, el máximo término de encarcelamiento que puede ser impuesto por la infracción será dos veces a la que de otra manera es provista en esta sección.

Sección 2245. Abuso sexual resultante en muerte (top)

Una persona que, en el transcurso de una infracción bajo este capítulo, se involucra en conducta que da como resultado la muerte de una persona, estará penada por muerte o encarcelada por cualquier plazo fijo o de por vida.

Sección 2246. Definiciones para el capitulo (top)

Como es usado en este capítulo -
(1) el término “prisión” significa un correccional, complejo de detención, o penal;
(2) el término “acto sexual” significa -
(A) el contacto entre el pene y la vulva o el pene y el ano, y para los propósitos de este subinciso el contacto involucrando al pene ocurre por encima de la penetración, por muy pequeño que sea;

(B) el contacto entre la boca y el pene, la boca y la vulva, o la boca y el ano;
(C) la penetración, por muy leve que sea, de la abertura anal o genital de otro por una mano o dedo o por cualquier objeto, con un intento a abusar, humillar, acosar, degradar, o incitar o complacer el deseo sexual de cualquier persona; o
(D) el manoseo intencional, no a través de la ropa, de los órganos genitales de otra persona que no ha alcanzado la edad de 16 años con un intento de abusar, humillar, acosar, degradar, o incitar o complacer el deseo sexual de cualquier persona;
(3) el término contacto sexual significa el manoseo intencional, ya sea directamente o a través de la ropa, de los órganos genitales, el ano, la ingle, seno, muslo interior, o glúteos de cualquier persona con un intento de abusar, humillar, acosar, degradar, o incitar o complacer el deseo sexual de cualquier persona;
(4) el término “lesión corporal seria” significa una lesión corporal que implica un riesgo sustancial de muerte, inconsciencia, dolor físico extremo, deformidad prolongada y desfiguramiento obvio, o deterioro o pérdida prolongada de la función de un miembro corporal, órgano, o facultad mental;
(5) el término “detención oficial” significa -
(A) la detención por un oficial Federal o empleado, o bajo la dirección de un oficial Federal o un empleado, después del arresto para una infracción; siguiendo la rendición en el lugar del arresto por una infracción; siguiendo un cargo o condena de una infracción, o una alegación o el descubrimiento de delincuencia juvenil; siguiendo el compromiso como un testigo importante; siguiendo el compromiso civil en lugar de los procedimientos de la causa criminal o la reanudación pendiente de la causa criminal que está en suspenso, o extradición pendiente, deportación, o exclusión; o
(B) la custodia por un oficial Federal o empleado, o bajo la dirección de un oficial Federal o empleado, para los propósitos relativos a cualquier detención descrita en el subinciso (A) de este párrafo, incluyendo transporte, diagnóstico médico o tratamiento, apariencia tribunalicia, trabajo, y recreación; pero no incluye supervisión u otro control (aparte de la custodia durante horas especificas o días) después de la libertad condicional, período de prueba, o libertad bajo palabra, o después de la liberación siguiendo un descubrimiento de delincuencia juvenil; y
(6) el término “Estado” significa un Estado de los Estados Unidos, el Distrito de Columbia, y cualquier comunidad, posesión, o territorio de los Estados Unidos.

Sección 2247. Infractores repetitivos (top)

(a) Máximo Término de Encarcelamiento. – El máximo término de encarcelamiento para una violación de este capítulo después de una anterior condena sexual será dos veces al término que de otra manera es provisto por este capítulo, a menos que la sección 3559(e) se aplique.

(b) Condena Previa por Infracción Sexual Definida. – En esta sección, el término “condena previa por infracción sexual” tiene el significado dado en la sección 2426(b).

Código de los Estados Unidos
TITULO 18 – CRIMENES Y PROCEDIMIENTO CRIMINAL
PARTE I – CRIMENES
CAPITULO 7 – ASALTO
Sección 116. Mutilación de los genitales femeninos (top)

(a) Excepto como es provisto en el apartado (b), quienquiera que a sabiendas circuncide o extirpe todo o cualquier parte de los labios mayores o labios menores o el clítoris de otra persona que no ha alcanzado la edad de 18 años será multada bajo este título o encarcelada por no más de 5 años, o ambos.
(b) Una operación quirúrgica no es una violación de esta sección si la operación es -
(1) necesaria para la salud de la persona en quién es realizada, y es realizado por una persona licenciada en el lugar de su función como un médico; o
(2) realizado en una persona en el trabajo o quien recién ha nacido y es realizado para propósitos médicos asociados con ese trabajo o nacimiento por una persona autorizada en el lugar que es un médico, partera, o persona en período de entrenamiento para convertirse en tal practicante o tal partera.

(c) Aplicando el apartado (b)(1), ninguna cuenta será tomada del efecto en la persona en quien la operación debe ser realizada de cualquier creencia de parte de esa persona, o alguna otra persona, que la operación es requerida a causa de una costumbre o ritual.

Sección 1460. Posesión con la intención de vender, y venta, de material obsceno en propiedad Federal (top)

(a) Quienquiera, ya sea -
(1) en la jurisdicción especial marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos, o en cualquier tierra o edificio poseído por, alquilado, o de otra manera usado por o bajo el control del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos; o
(2) en el país indio como está definido en la sección 1151 de este título, a sabiendas vende o posee con intención de vender un retrato visual obsceno será penado por una multa en cumplimiento con lo dispuesto en este título o encarcelado por no más de 2 años, o ambos.
(b) Para los propósitos de esta sección, el término “retrato visual” incluye película subdesarrollada y videocinta pero no incluye meras palabras.

Sección 1462. Importación o transportación de materiales obscenos (top)

Quienquiera que traiga a los Estados Unidos, o adondequiera se supedita a la jurisdicción de la misma, o a sabiendas usa cualquier compañía de correo urgente u otra empresa de servicios públicos o servicios interactivos de computadora (como está definido en la sección 230(e)(2) (!1) de la Sentencia de Comunicaciones de 1934), para carruaje en el comercio interestatal o extranjero -

(a) cualquier libro obsceno, lascivo, o muy sucio, cualquier folleto, cuadro, cinta cinematográfica, periódico, carta, escritura, impresión, u otra materia de carácter indecente; o

(b) cualquier grabación obscena, lasciva, o muy sucio, transcripción eléctrica, u otra artículo o cosa capaz de producir sonido; o
(c) cualquier droga, medicina, artículo, o cosa diseñada, adaptada, o intencionada para producir aborto, o para cualquier uso indecente o inmoral; o cualquier tarjeta escrita o impresa, carta, circular, libro, folleto, publicidad, o aviso de cualquier tipo de información dada, directamente o indirectamente, dónde, cómo, o de a quién, o por cualquier manera de tales artículos mencionados, materias, o cosas que pueden ser obtenidas o hechas; o
Quienquiera a sabiendas toma o recibe, de tal compañía de correo urgente u otra empresa de servicios públicos o servicios interactivos de computadora (como está definido en la sección 230(e)(2) (!1) de la Sentencia de Comunicaciones de 1934) cualquier materia o cosa que el acarreo o importación de la cual es en este punto hecho ilegal – Será multada bajo este título o encarcelada por no más de cinco años, o ambos, para la primera infracción y será multado bajo este título o encarcelado por no más de diez años, o ambos, por cada una de tales infracciones.

Sección 1463. Enviar por correo material indecente en envolturas o sobres (top)

Todo material de otra manera enviable por correo por ley, en el sobre o fuera de la cobertera o envoltura de la cual, y todas las tarjetas postales en las cuales, cualesquier delineaciones, epítetos, términos, o lenguaje de un carácter indecente, lascivo, u obsceno están escritos o impresos o de otra manera están grabados o visibles, son materia no enviable por correo, y no será transportado en los correos ni será redimido de cualquier oficina de correos ni por cualquier cartero, y será abstraído de los correos bajo tales regulaciones como el Servicio de Entrega Postal prescribirá. Quienquiera que a sabiendas deposita para envío postal o entrega, cualquier cosa declarada por esta sección de ser materia no enviable por correo, o a sabiendas toma lo mismo de los correos con el objeto de circular o disponer de o auxiliar en la circulación o disposición de la misma, será multada bajo este título o encarcelada por no más de cinco años, o ambos.

Sección 1464. Transmitir lenguaje obsceno (top)

Quienquiera que pronuncie cualquier lenguaje obsceno, indecente, o profano por medio de la radiocomunicación será multado bajo este título o encarcelado por no más de dos años, o ambos.

Sección 1465. Transportación de materiales obscenos para venta o distribución (top)

Quienquiera a sabiendas transporta o viaja en, o usa una instalación o de manera de, el comercio interestatal o extranjero o un servicio interactivo de computadora (como está definido en la sección 230 (e)(2) (!1) de la Sentencia de Comunicaciones de 1934) dentro o afectando tal comercio con el objeto de la venta o distribución de cualquier libro obsceno, lascivo, o muy sucio, folleto, cuadro, película, periódico, carta, escritura, impresión, silueta, dibujo, figura, imagen, molde, registro de fonógrafo, transcripción eléctrica u otro artículo capaz de producir sonido o alguna otra materia de carácter indecente o inmoral, será multado bajo este título o encarcelada por no más de cinco años, o ambos.

El transporte como anteriormente dicho de dos o más copias de cualquier publicación o dos o más de cualquier artículo del carácter descrito arriba, o un total combinado de cinco publicaciones y artículos, creará una presunción de que tales publicaciones o artículos están dirigidos a la venta o distribución, pero tal presunción será refutable.

Sección 1466. Encargarse del negocio de vender o transferir material obsceno (top)

(a) Quienquiera esté involucrado en el negocio de vender o transferir material obsceno, quien a sabiendas recibe o posee con el intento de distribuir cualquier libro obsceno, revista, cuadro, periódico, película, videocinta, o fonógrafo u otra grabación de audio, que le ha sido enviada o transportada en el comercio interestatal o extranjero, será penada por encarcelamiento por no más de 5 años o por una multa bajo este título, o ambos.
(B) Como es usado en este apartado, el término “encargado en el negocio” significa que la persona que vende o transfiere o ofrece de vender o transferir material obsceno dedica el tiempo, atención, o trabajo a tales actividades, como un curso normal de comercio o negocio, con el objetivo de obtener una ganancia, aunque no es necesario que la persona obtenga una ganancia o que la venta o transferencia u ofrecimiento de vender o transferir tal material sea el negocio exclusivo o principal fuente de ingreso de la persona. El ofrecimiento para la venta de o de transferir, a la vez, dos o más copias de cualquier publicación obscena, o dos o más de cualquier artículo obsceno, o un total combinado de cinco o más de tales publicaciones y tales artículos, crearán una presunción refutable de que la persona ofreciéndolos está “encargada en el negocio” como está definido en este apartado.

Sección 1466A. Representaciones visuales obscenas de abuso sexual de menores (top)

(a) En General. – Cualquier persona que, en una circunstancia descrita en el apartado (d), a sabiendas produce, distribuye, recibe, o posee con intención de distribuir, un retrato visual de cualquier clase, incluyendo un dibujo, caricatura, escultura, o pintura, que -

(1)(A) retrata a un menor de edad involucrándose en una conducta sexualmente explícita; y
(B) es obsceno; o
(2)(A) retrata una imagen que es, o parece ser, la de un menor de edad involucrándose en bestialidad gráfica, sádico o abuso masoquista, o relación sexual, incluyendo genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, u oral-anal, ya sea entre personas del mismo sexo u opuesto; y
(B) carece de serio valor literario, artístico, político, o científico; o intenta o conspira para hacer eso, estará sujeto a las penas provistas en la sección 2252A(b)(1), incluyendo las penas previstas para casos implicando una anterior condena.
(b) Infracciones adicionales. – Cualquier persona que, en una circunstancia descripta en el apartado (d), a sabiendas posee un retrato visual de cualquier clase, incluyendo un dibujo, caricatura, escultura, o pintura, que -
(1)(A) retrata a un menor de edad involucrándose en una conducta sexualmente explícita; y
(B) es obscena; o
(2)(A) describe una imagen que es, o parece ser, de un menor de edad involucrándose en bestialidad gráfica, sádico o abuso masoquista, o relación sexual, incluyendo genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, u oral-anal, ya sea entre personas del mismo sexo u opuesto; y

(B) carece de serio valor literario, artístico, político, o científico; o intenta o conspira para hacer eso, estarán sujetas a las penas provistas en la sección 2252A (b)(2), incluyendo las penas previstas para casos implicando una anterior condena.
(C) Elemento no Requerido de Infracción. – No es un elemento requerido de cualquier infracción bajo esta sección que el menor de edad retratado realmente exista.
(D) Circunstancias. – La circunstancia referida en los apartados
(a) y (b) es que -
(1) cualquier comunicación involucrando o hecho en el fomento de la infracción es comunicado o transportado por correo, o dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora, o cualquier manera o intermedio del comercio interestatal o extranjero es diferente al usado en el cometimiento o en el fomento del cometimiento de la infracción;
(2) cualquier comunicación involucrada o hecha en el fomento de la infracción contempla la transmisión o el transporte de un retrato visual por correo, o dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora;
(3) cualquier persona viaja o es transportada dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero en el transcurso del cometimiento o en el fomento del cometimiento de la infracción;
(4) cualquier retrato visual involucrado en la infracción que ha sido enviada por correo, o ha sido enviado o transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora, o estaba producido usando materiales que les han sido enviados por correo, o que ha sido enviado o transportado dentro del comercio interestatal o extranjero por cualquier medio, incluyendo por computadora; o
(5) la infracción es cometida en la especial jurisdicción marítima y territorial de los Estados Unidos o en cualquier territorio o posesión de los Estados Unidos.
(e) Defensa Afirmativa. – Será una defensa afirmativa para un cargo violatorio del apartado (b) que el acusado -
(1) poseyó menos de 3 de tales retratos visuales; y
(2) prontamente y de buena fe, y sin retener o permitir a cualquier persona, aparte de una agencia de ejecución de la ley, a acceder a tal retrato visual -
(A) se tomaron pasos razonables para destruir cada uno de los retratos visuales; o
(B) le informó la materia a una agencia de ejecución de la ley y le proporcionó a esa agencia acceso a cada uno de tales retratos visuales.
(f) Definiciones. – Para los propósitos de esta sección -
(1) el término “esbozo visual” incluye videocinta y película subdesarrollada, y datos almacenados en un disco de computadora o de la manera electrónica que es capaz de convertir en una imagen visual, y también incluye cualquier fotografía, película, video, cuadro, imagen o foto digital, imagen o foto de computadora, o imagen o foto generada por computadora, ya sea hecha o producida por medio electrónico, mecánico, u otra manera;
(2) el término “conducta sexualmente explícita” tiene el significado dado en la sección 2256(2)(A) o 2256(2)(B); y
(3) el término “gráfico”, cuándo es usado con relación a un retrato de conducta sexualmente explícita, quiere decir que un espectador puede observar cualquier parte de los órganos genitales o el área púbica de cualquier animal o persona retratada durante cualquier parte del tiempo que la conducta sexualmente explícita está siendo retratada.

Sección 1468. Distribuir material obsceno por televisión por cable o subscripción (top)

(a) Quienquiera que a sabiendas pronuncie cualquier lenguaje obsceno o distribuya cualquier materia obscena por medio de la televisión por cable o suscripción de los servicios en televisión serán penados por encarcelamiento por no más de 2 años o por una multa de conformidad con este título, o ambos.
(b) Como es usado en este apartado, el término “distribuir” significa enviar, transmitir, retransmitir, televisar, difundir, o emitir por cable, incluyendo por cable, microonda, o satélite, o de producir o proveer material para tal distribución.
(C) Nada en este capítulo, o la Sentencia de la Política de las Comunicaciones por Cable de 1984, o alguna otra provisión de ley Federal, está dirigida a interferir o tener predominancia sobre el poder de los Estados, subdivisiones políticas de los mismos, para regular el pronunciando de lenguaje que es obsceno o de otra manera sin protección por la Constitución o la distribución de materia que es obscena o de otra manera sin protección por la Constitución, de cualquier tipo, por medio de la televisión por cable o servicios de suscripción en televisión.

Sección 1470. Transferir material obsceno a menores (top)

Quienquiera, usando el correo o cualquier facilidad o cualquiera manera de comercio interestatal o extranjero, a sabiendas transfiere material obsceno a otro individuo que no ha alcanzado la edad de 16 años, sabiendo que tal otro individuo no ha alcanzado la edad de 16 años, o intenta hacer eso, será multado bajo este título, arrestado por no más de 10 años, o ambos.

§ 36 C.F.R. § 1002.34 (top)

(a) Una persona comete conducta escandalosa cuándo, con intención de causar alarma pública, molestia, peligro o violencia, o a sabiendas o imprudentemente crea un riesgo de eso, tal persona comete cualquier de los siguientes actos prohibidos:

(1) Se Involucra en pelear o amenazar, o en comportamiento violento.

(2) Usa lenguaje, una expresión, o gesto, o se involucra en un despliegue o un acto que es obsceno, físicamente amenazador, o hecho en una manera que tiene probabilidad de infligir lesión o incitar a una alteración del orden público inmediata.

(3) Hace ruido que es irrazonable, considerando la naturaleza y propósito de la conducta del actor, ubicación, tiempo del día o noche, y otros factores que gobernaría la conducta de una persona razonablemente prudente dadas las circunstancias.

(4) Crea o mantiene una condición arriesgada o físicamente ofensiva.

(b) Las reglas contenidas en este apartado tienen aplicación, a pesar de propiedad terrestre, en todas las tierras y aguas dentro del área lindera administrado por el Presidio Trust que está bajo la jurisdicción legislativa de los Estados Unidos.

Para más información u obtener una cita con SRIS, P.C., por favor llame, envíe un correo electrónico o complete el formulario en línea.

Nuestros abogados federales están autorizados para manejar casos en Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania & Massachusetts, sin embargo nuestros abogados federales manejan temas legales en los tribunales federales en Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts.

Por favor haga clic en abogados para saber más sobre los abogados federales de infracciones sexuales que asisten clientes con infracciones sexuales en los tribunales federales en Virginia, Maryland o Massachusetts.

Somos Una Agencia de Alivio de Deuda Designada bajo la Ley Federal. Proveemos Asistencia Legal a Consumidores Buscando Alivio bajo el Código de Bancarrota

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Autorizados en Virginia (VA), Maryland (MD) , D.C., & Massachusetts (MA)

Defendiendo multas por conducción imprudente en las cortes estatales y federales

Conducción imprudente es una violación muy seria de tránsito en movimiento en la casi todos los estados. Algunos estados como Virginia incluso lo definen como un delito federal. Conducción imprudente es mucho más seria que ser acusado de conducción negligente. Una condena por conducción imprudente puede resultar en multas exorbitantes, periodo de cárcel y/o pérdida de la licencia para conducir.

Si desea consultar con un abogado SRIS, P.C. de conducción imprudente en Virginia, Maryland o Massachusetts, por favor llámenos, envíenos un correo electrónico o contáctenos a través de nuestro formulario en línea.

Los abogados SRIS, P.C. que defienden conducción imprudente en Virginia, Maryland, y Massachusetts tienen oficinas en los tres estados para servirle mejor.

• Nuestras oficinas en Virginia están ubicadas en Fairfax, Lynchburg, Manassas, Richmond & Virginia Beach.
• Nuestras oficinas en Maryland están ubicadas en Rockville & Annapolis.
• Nuestra oficina en Massachusetts está en Boston.

Por favor haga clic en el estado para ver algunas de las leyes de conducción imprudente que se le pueden aplicar a usted:

• Virginia
• Maryland
• Massachusetts

Si desea ver cuantos puntos recibirá por conducción imprudente en Virginia, por favor haga clic en Puntos de Conducción Imprudente en VA o si quiere ver una explicación de algunas de las mas comunes acusaciones de infracciones de conducción imprudente en Virginia explicadas por un ex fiscal.

Lea mas sobre algunas de las más comunes Preguntas sobre Conducción Imprudente en Virginia o algunos de los diferentes escenarios que pueden resultar en acusaciones de Conducción Imprudente VA.

La mayoría de las leyes de conducción imprudente requieren que sea probado que el conductor se involucro en una conducta de conducción imprudente. Esto es probado por el hecho de que el conductor ignora los procedimientos estándar de conducción por consiguiente intencionalmente causa accidentes u otros daños a la vida o propiedad. La mera puesta en peligro de la vida, extremidad o propiedad puede resultar en una condena de conducción imprudente. Hay muchos diferentes tipos de conducción imprudente. Viajando a un excesivo ritmo de velocidad no es solo la forma de ser acusado de conducción imprudente. Por ejemplo, el mero acto de girar sus llantas antes de entrar a la carretera principal puede resultar en que termine siendo acusado de conducción imprudente.

Conducción imprudente es estrictamente aplicada por el cumplimiento de la ley y los tribunales. Si usted ha sido acusado de esta infracción, debería consultar definitivamente con un abogado. Un experimentado abogado puede darle un realista panorama de lo que usted puede enfrentar en la corte. Nuestros abogados en Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts que ayudan a clientes con serias acusaciones de tránsito serán sinceros y honestos con usted sobre sus chances de arreglar el caso con la fiscalía vs. llevar la cuestión a juicio. Nuestros abogados no intentaran asustarlo diciéndole que usted enfrentara la máxima penalidad si es acusado de conducción imprudente. Ellos apelaran a su extensa experiencia manejando casos ante las cortes de Virginia, Maryland o Massachusetts y le dirán lo que creen que pueden hacer por usted.

Usted puede ser acusado de conducción imprudente incluso en una propiedad federal. Si usted ha sido acusado de conducción imprudente en la corte federal, le recomendamos enfáticamente que contrate un abogado de tránsito que este informado sobre manejar casos de conducción imprudente en la corte federal. Las sentencias en las cortes federales por conducción imprudente son a menudo, incluso mas ásperas que las sentencias en los tribunales estatales por conducción imprudente. AVISO A LOS PADRES - Incluso un menor puede ser acusado de una infracción de conducción imprudente en Virginia, Maryland o Massachusetts. De alguna manera, la ley trata a los menores que recibieron una multa por conducción imprudente incluso más severamente que los adultos quienes reciben una multa por conducción imprudente. El infractor menor puede perder su privilegio de de conducir por incluso una serie de infracciones menores de tránsito. De esta manera, causando a los padres de haber llevado a los chicos al colegio, actividades después del colegio, trabajos de tiempo parcial, etc. Adicionalmente, si su hijo/a esta en su auto asegurado, una condena por conducción imprudente probablemente causara que sus tasas de seguro aumenten vertiginosamente. Afortunadamente, como un adulto, un menor acusado esta también autorizado a una defensa legal. Los abogados de SRIS, P.C. que defienden casos para adultos de conducción imprudente, frecuentemente también representan a menores acusados de conducción imprudente. Estamos al tanto sobre los factores que la corte toma en consideración cuando un menor acusado enfrenta a la corte con un cargo de conducción imprudente. Tomaremos los pasos necesarios para preparar a su hijo para el tribunal, presentaremos los hechos de la mejor forma posible y frecuentemente previniendo al menor de ser condenado de conducción imprudente.

AVISO A CONDUCTORES PROFESIONALES - Clientes que poseen una licencia de conducir comercial (CDL) tales como conductores de camiones están incluso a un riesgo mayor si son condenados por conducción imprudente. La mayoría de nuestros clientes que poseen una CDL nos dicen que desean hacer lo que sea para evitar una condena por conducción imprudente porque sin duda perderían su trabajo si son condenados por conducción imprudente.

Los siguientes son algunos consejos que puede seguir cuando trate con un oficial de policía que lo está acusando de conducción imprudente.

1. Sea amable hacia el oficial de policía sin importa lo que el oficial le diga.
2. Escuche cuidadosamente el motivo por el que el oficial de policía lo detuvo. Esto será muy útil para el abogado en la corte.
3. No admita que usted estaba haciendo algo malo.
4. Finalmente cuando llegue a casa, inmediatamente anote todo lo que paso en los términos de la interacción entre usted y el oficial de policía:

• la conversación exacta entre usted y el oficial de policía.
• ¿cuál era la condición de la carretera?
• ¿cuál era el clima?
• ¿había otros autos en la carretera?
• ¿estaba el tránsito pesado, normal, o liviano?

Si desea consultar con un abogado SRIS, P.C. por favor llámenos al 888-437-7747, envíenos un correo electrónico o contáctenos a través de nuestro formulario en línea.

Los abogados que defienden multas de conducción imprudente en Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts hablan los siguientes idiomas además del inglés: español, francés, tamil, hindú, telugú, cantonés, mandarín y malayo.

Nuestros abogados están autorizados para manejar casos de tránsito en Virginia, Maryland, Distrito de Columbia & Massachusetts, sin embargo manejamos serias violaciones de tránsito únicamente en Virginia, Maryland & Massachusetts por el momento.

Llámenos hoy si usted ha sido abogados de conducción imprudente en Virginia, Maryland o Massachusetts. No se arriesgue con su libertad o privilegio de conducir en Virginia, Maryland o Massachusetts.

Por favor haga clic en abogados para saber más sobre los abogados defensores de conducción imprudente que asisten clientes sobre conducción imprudente en Virginia, Maryland o Massachuset

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